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Abstract 
This thesis explores the link between the residence rights of Union citizens and their 
family members and the Court of Justice of the European Union’s development of 
the concept of Union citizenship.  The Court has not approached this development 
in a predictable or linear fashion, and the cementing of Union citizenship as a status 
capable of leading to residence rights in the form of Directive 2004/38 made the 
continuation of a flexible and expansive approach more difficult.   
This thesis examines the UK’s implementation of both the Citizens’ Directive and 
other EU sources of rights of residence and compares the rights of UK citizens with 
links to EU law to those without any possibility of relying on EU provisions within 
the UK.  It is contended that Union citizenship has had a greater impact upon rights 
of residence for Union citizens and their family members than would have been 
anticipated from either the Treaty provisions or Directive 2004/38.   
The importance of EU rights of residence is particularly high in the UK, given the 
stringent requirements of the Immigration Rules concerning non-EU immigration.  
Treaty rights can circumvent restrictive UK provisions, and the approach of the UK 
judiciary in applying EU concepts in cases concerning the UK Immigration Rules is 
important in this respect. 
The fundamental rights implications of the Lisbon Treaty are assessed, and it is 
argued that the Court's continuing activism in relation to family rights is only in 
respect of Treaty rights, and that this has not been applied to the new Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.  As such, the Court has failed to link Union citizenship and the 
Charter, which could have made for a more coherent sense of citizenship within the 
EU, but instead separates the application of fundamental rights from the unique 
concept of Union citizenship. 
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Chapter One 
Union Citizenship and Residence Rights:  
Directive 2004/38 
This chapter introduces the concept of Union citizenship as well as the ‘Citizens’ 
Directive,’ Directive 2004/38.1  At national level, citizenship and residence rights are 
inherently linked: if you possess the citizenship of a country, it can generally be 
assumed you have the right to live there.
2
  At EU level, the situation is not so simple.  
To explore the links which have been established between Union citizenship and 
rights to reside under EU law, this chapter is split into two main sections.  The first 
section introduces the concept of Union citizenship and considers its impact upon the 
rights of Union citizens and their family members: it assesses the judicial approach 
to the concept and highlights some of the controversy it has provoked.  This section 
shows that, far from being simply an ‘added extra’, Union citizenship can be of 
fundamental importance and determinative of rights.    
The second section assesses rights of residence for Union citizens and their family 
members found within Directive 2004/38,
3
 and the restrictions Member States can 
place upon these.  Its focus is also upon the influence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in shaping these rights, and on the institutional balance in 
determining the rights of Union citizens in relation to residence.  It considers the 
impact of the Directive upon pre-existing rights of residence and demonstrates that 
the Directive made important changes both in substantive law and in the approach 
which has to be taken by Member States: the Directive granted residence rights to 
‘citizens’ rather than workers or students in particular, and thus indelibly linked 
Union citizenship with residence rights under EU law.  The reason for which the 
Directive, a piece of secondary legislation, is considered prior to rights of residence 
derived from primary Treaty rights which the Directive restricts is for purely 
                                                     
1
 Council Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004, on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 
90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, 77–123 
2
 See Article 3 Protocol 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, securing certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in the Convention 
and in the first Protocol thereto as amended by Protocol No. 11, (Strasbourg, 16.IX.1963) ETS 46 
3
 There is no automatic right to live in any given Member State – it is necessary to qualify for 
residence, as discussed in this chapter 
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practical reasons.
4
  In order to apply for residence rights in a Member State, Union 
citizens and their family members will not turn to the Treaty or seek information on 
its provisions: instead, they need to know their exact entitlements under secondary 
legislation, and the hurdles they must pass in order to have their rights recognised.  
To understand the residence rights Union citizens and their families are likely to rely 
upon, the Directive is thus essential to understand. 
1. Union Citizenship: A Meaningful Status 
Long before its introduction by the Maastricht Treaty,
5
 there was discussion of 
various forms of European citizenship,
6
 though the creation of a citizenship was not 
inevitable for a supranational community originally concerned with ensuring peace 
and prosperity.
7
  Union citizenship is somewhat separate from the internal market 
developments which took place within the development of the early EU: it has its 
own section in the Treaty,
8
 and its very purpose is different from that of the four 
fundamental freedoms.
9
  Union citizenship is not intended to link Member States 
economically, but instead to strengthen the bonds between the EU and its people.
10
  
This section will highlight the rights of Union citizens under EU law, explore how 
Union citizenship is established and what control the EU has over its removal, and 
will also discuss the impact of Union citizenship upon the recognition of an 
individual’s rights contained in secondary legislation so as to enable analysis of 
rights to family reunification in later chapters.  It does not adopt what Dougan refers 
                                                     
4
 Article 21 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, 47–403 
5
 Then Article 8 Treaty on European Union (TEU), OJ C 191 , 29.07.1992,1-59 
6
 See, inter alia, David O’Keeffe, ‘Union Citizenship’ in David O’Keeffe and Patrick M. Twomey 
(eds), Legal issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery 1993) 87-88; Andrew Evans, 'European 
citizenship' (1982) 45 The Modern Law Review 497; Walter H.M. Frölich, 'Towards a United States 
of Europe' (1973) 64 Current History 172, 177; Ernst-Otto Czempiel, 'The Citizens' Society: Lessons 
from Europe' (1974) 41 Social Research 746, 749; Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira, 'Union 
Citizenship: Pie in the Sky?' in Allan Rosas and Esko Antola (eds), A Citizens' Europe: In Search of a 
New Order (Sage Publications 1995) 58.  Shaw noted that just as there are many accounts of the past 
of EU Citizenship, there were many suggested futures for it, too- Jo Shaw, 'The many pasts and 
futures of citizenship in the European Union' (1997) 22 European Law Review 554, 560 
7 
Preamble to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, signed 
on 25 March 1957, entered into force on 1 January 1958 
8
 Part II TFEU 
9
 Freedom of Movement for Workers, Article 45 TFEU; the Right of Establishment, Article 49 TFEU; 
Freedom of Services, Article 56 TFEU, and the Free Movement of Capital, Article 63 TFEU 
10
 Preamble to the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), OJ C 83, 
30.3.2010, 13-46; the role of the Court in taking into account Union citizens’ interests is discussed in 
Part I of Michael Dougan, Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Eleanor Spaventa (eds), Empowerment and 
Disempowerment of the European Citizen (Hart Publishing 2012) 
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to as ‘the traditional critique’ that the Court simply frames its preferred judgment in 
terms of Treaty provisions,
11
 but recognises that the Court is an institutional actor 
and its decisions are limited by the political environment in which it finds itself.  
That said, the role of the Court in forging a meaning for Union citizenship is 
undeniable, and how it has done - and continues to do this - in relation to the rights 
of family members to reside with a Union citizen forms the basis of much discussion 
in this thesis.   
a. The Rights of Union Citizens  
There are few specific provisions on the rights of Union citizens in the Treaty: ‘Non-
Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union’ forms Part II of the Treaty, containing 
Articles 18-25 TFEU.  The current Treaty provision establishing Union citizenship is 
contained in Article 20 TFEU: Union citizenship is different from national 
citizenship,
12
 is additional to national citizenship, and dependent upon it.
13
  Article 
18 TFEU  prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality; Article 19 TFEU gives 
the European Council the right to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation; Article 21(1) 
TFEU gives every Union citizen the right to move and reside within the EU, subject 
to limitations and conditions within the Treaty and secondary legislation; Article 22 
TFEU gives Union citizens resident in a host Member State the right to vote and 
stand as a candidate in municipal/European Parliament elections on the same 
conditions as nationals of the host; Article 23 TFEU entitles Union citizens to 
diplomatic/consular protection on the same grounds as host state nationals; Article 
24 TFEU  entitles Union citizens to petition the European Parliament;  and Article 
25 TFEU states that the Commission must report to the European Parliament, 
Council and Economic and Social Committee on the application of the provisions in 
                                                     
11
 Michael Dougan, 'The Bubble that Burst: Exploring the Legitimacy of the Case Law on the Free 
Movement of Union Citizens' in Maurice Adams, Henri de Waele, Johan Meeusen and Gert 
Straetmans (eds), Judging Europe's Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court 
of Justice (Hart Publishing 2013) 128 
12
 Andrew Evans, 'Nationality law and European integration' (1991) 16 European Law Review 190 
and Elizabeth Meehan, 'Citizenship and the European Community' (1993) 64 The Political Quarterly 
172.  For discussion of the historical development of national citizenship see Brian S. Turner, 'Outline 
of a Theory of Citizenship' (1990) 24 Sociology 189 
13
 Article 20(1) TFEU: “Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be 
additional to and not replace national citizenship.” 
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Part II.
14
   Article 20 TFEU is echoed in Article 9 TEU, in relation to the EU’s 
democratic principles:  
“In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its 
citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies. Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the 
Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace 
national citizenship.”15 
The Treaty provisions on citizenship do not give Union citizens equal rights to 
domestic citizens; noticeably the right to vote in national elections does not come 
under EU law, regardless of the length of residence within the host state.
16
  O’Leary 
has argued that the Treaty provisions should have gone further, and included 
fundamental rights protection in the citizenship provisions.
17
  However, the Treaty 
emphasis on equality of citizens in Article 9 TEU and the Article 18 TFEU principle 
of non-discrimination are important in reducing O’Leary’s concerns in relation to 
discrimination to some degree.
18
  The importance of the Part II rights contained in 
Articles 20-21 TFEU
19
 in relation to residence cannot be underestimated.  It is from 
them that the fundamental status of Union citizenship is recognised, and the link 
between free movement of persons and residence is established.    
The insertion of Union citizenship into the Treaty has been symbolically important: 
it brought the rights of the economically inactive to move and reside within the 
Treaty text.
20
  However, despite their importance, the Article 18-25 rights are not 
seen as the ultimate rights of Union citizens - O’Keeffe emphasised the “promise 
                                                     
14
 ‘Non-Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union,’ is Part II of the Treaty, containing Articles 18-
25 TFEU 
15
 Article 9 TEU  
16
 Voting rights are discussed by Shaw in Jo Shaw, 'EU Citizenship and Political Rights in an 
Evolving EU' (2007) 75 Fordham Law Review 2549 and Jo Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship 
in the European Union: Electoral Rights and the Restructuring of Political Space (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) 
17
 Siofra O'Leary, 'The Relationship between Community Citizenship and the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in Community Law' (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 519 
18
 Fundamental rights protection within the EU is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6 
19 Article 21 TFEU treats the right “to move and reside freely” as one right, but the approach of 
Advocate General Sharpston in her Opinion for Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, delivered on 30 
September 2010, para 55 raised the issue of whether it could be split into two rights- “a right to 
move and a free-standing right to reside – or whether it merely confers a right to move 
(and then reside)” with the Advocate General in para 100 suggesting that “(although in practice the 
right to reside is, in the vast majority of cases, probably exercised after exercise of the right to move) 
Article 21 TFEU contains a separate right to reside that is independent of the right of free movement.” 
20
 Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers 'Union Citizenship' in Nicola Rogers, Rick Scannell and John 
Walsh, Free Movement of Persons in the Enlarged European Union (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2012) 65 
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they hold out for the future,” declaring that “[t]he concept [of Union citizenship] is a 
dynamic one, capable of being added to or strengthened, but not diminished…”21  
This anticipation of greater rights for citizens has been partially vindicated, given 
that the teleological approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union has 
continued since the Directive’s implementation in some respects, with reliance upon 
Union citizenship being capable of determining rights to residence,
22
 though notably 
not in relation to access to social security.
23
   
b. Determining Union Citizenship  
Member States have absolute discretion in conferring their own citizenship, and 
hence Union citizenship too.
24
 Union citizenship is not a status conferred upon 
residents of the EU by the Union, which disappointed some commentators, who 
favoured residence as a test for citizenship over Member State nationality.
25
  Bhabba, 
for instance, focussed on the lack of uniformity in Member States’ approaches to 
giving their citizenship, and the negative effects of these differences being echoed at 
Union level; she thought the EU missed an opportunity to link the “new Europe and 
its population” rather than continuing a focus on “ethnicity or civic status that 
European states traditionally have displayed in establishing their laws.”26  As the law 
                                                     
21
 David O'Keeffe, 'Reflections on European Union Citizenship' (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 
347, 373; Shaw viewed the emergence of citizenship “as a preoccupation” for the post-Maastricht EU, 
suggesting its impact on the interpretation of law is immense- Jo Shaw, 'The Interpretation of 
European Union Citizenship' (1998) 61 The Modern Law Review 293, 294 
22
 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177 
23
 Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] ECR I-08507 can be seen as a step backwards from the Court 
strengthening Union citizens’ rights and enabling flexible consideration of integration.  
24
 Declaration on Nationality of a Member State, annexed to the Final Act of the Maastricht Treaty OJ 
C 191, 29.07.1992,1-59: “...wherever in the Treaty establishing the European Community reference is 
made to nationals of the Member States, the question whether an individual possesses the nationality 
of a Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State 
concerned. Member States may declare, for information, who are to be considered their nationals for 
Community purposes by way of a declaration lodged with the Presidency and may amend any such 
declaration when necessary.” Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239; Case C-192/99 Kaur 
[2001] ECR I-1237; Case C-200/02 Chen [2004] ECR 1-9925; see also Case C-135/08 Rottmann 
[2010] ECR I-1449 discussed in  Theodore Konstadinides, ‘La fraternite europeene? The extent of 
national competence to condition the acquisition and loss of nationality from the perspective of EU 
citizenship’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 401 
25
 See Peo Hansen and Sandy Brian Hager, The Politics of European Citizenship: Deepening 
Contradictions in Social Rights and Migration Policy (Berghahn Books 2010), 131; Jacqueline 
Bhabba, '“Get Back to Where You Once Belonged”: Identity, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Europe' 
(1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 592, 605.  However, O’Keeffe was initially pro-residence as a 
criterion of Union citizenship, but changed his opinion on this- see David O'Keeffe, 'Reflections on 
European Union Citizenship' (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 347, 359  
26
 Jacqueline Bhabba, ‘“Get Back to Where You Once Belonged”: Identity, Citizenship, and 
Exclusion in Europe' (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 592, 604-5 
6 
 
stands, Union citizenship is determined at national level and the EU cannot control 
who is, or is not, a Union citizen;
27
 there is no EU harmonization of Member State 
conditions for this: “[t]he exclusive gate-keepers remain the member states”.28   
The Rottmann decision of the CJEU has impacted upon the Member States’ ability to 
remove citizenship from their nationals.
29
  Dr Rottmann, an originally Austrian 
citizen, acquired German nationality (causing the loss of his Austrian nationality) 
without informing the German authorities of proceedings against him for serious 
fraud in Austria.  When the Austrian municipal authorities informed the city of 
Munich that there was a warrant for Dr Rottmann’s arrest which had been issued 
before the naturalisation proceedings commenced, naturalisation was withdrawn 
with retrospective effect, as Dr Rottmann obtained German nationality by deception.  
The German revocation of German citizenship was thus the issue: it would have left 
Dr Rottmann stateless, and hence also removed his Union citizenship, as Article 
20(1) TFEU states that Union citizenship is dependent upon nationality of a Member 
State of the EU so it cannot exist following the removal of that national citizenship.  
The German Court considered whether Austria might be required to grant Dr 
Rottmann Austrian citizenship to prevent his statelessness, but stayed the 
proceedings and asked the CJEU for a ruling whether it was contrary to EU law for 
the withdrawal of naturalisation obtained by deception if this has the effect of 
making an applicant stateless.
30
   
Both the Advocate General and the CJEU thought the situation fell within the scope 
of EU law.  Advocate General Maduro gave the Opinion for Rottmann,
31
and, while 
he rejected that the issues fell outside the scope of EU law and that it was a purely 
internal situation, he relied on what was termed ‘the presence of a foreign element’32 
to explain why the issue fell within the scope of EU law: 
“though a situation concerns a subject the regulation of which comes within 
the competence of the Member States, it falls within the scope ratione 
                                                     
27
 Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-7917 
28
 J. H. H. Weiler, 'To be a European citizen- Eros and Civilization' (1997) 4 Journal of European 
Public Policy 495, 497 
29
 Rottmann, n24 above 
30
 ibid para 35 
31
 Case C-135/08 Rottmann Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 30 September 
2009 
32
 ibid para 11 
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materiae of Community law if it involves a foreign element, that is, a 
cross-border dimension. Only a situation which is confined in all respects 
within a single Member State constitutes a purely internal situation.”33 
The foreign element present was not elaborated upon by the Advocate General, and 
the Court did not follow his approach, but found that “by reason of its nature and 
consequences”,34 the factual situation came within the scope of EU law and therefore 
that the decision to withdraw naturalisation has to observe the principle of 
proportionality in light of EU law.
35
  Mengozzi suggested that the CJEU did not 
engage with what happened before Dr Rottmann achieved German citizenship
36
 - the 
move from Austria to Germany - but instead was able to disregard the lack of cross-
border element.  In finding that the situation in Rottmann fell within the scope of EU 
law, and in its requirement for the principle of proportionality to be observed by 
Member States in taking decisions affecting individuals’ citizenship,37 the CJEU has 
affected Member States’ abilities to control when they remove their own citizenship. 
The Rottmann decision was not based upon wholly unusual facts,
38
 but its 
importance lies mostly in that the CJEU found a link to EU law based on the ‘nature 
and consequences’ of the effect the national decision would have upon Dr 
Rottmann’s Article 20 TFEU status and attached rights.39  In this way, the Court 
specifically linked the ‘fundamental status’ of Union citizenship40 with the finding of 
a trigger for EU law, and thus CJEU jurisdiction.  This seminal decision 
demonstrates a major part of the potential of Union citizenship – not only does it 
give Union citizens a unified status under EU law, but there is a potential it can make 
EU law applicable to them in situations which otherwise might have had difficulty 
demonstrating a cross-border link.
41
 
                                                     
33
 ibid para 10 
34
 Rottmann, n24 above, para 42 
35
 ibid paras 55, 58-59 
36
 Paolo Mengozzi, 'Zambrano, An Unexpected Ruling' in Pascal Cardonnel, Allan Rosas and Nils 
Wahl (eds), Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System: Essays in Honour of Pernilla Lindh (Hart 
Publishing 2012) 235 
37
 Rottmann, n24 above, paras 55-59 
38
 Whether statelessness will be a result of the removal of an acquired citizenship will determine on 
whether that acquisition caused the loss of the applicant’s previous citizenship under domestic law 
39
 Rottmann, n24 above, para 42 
40
 ibid para 43; Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para 31; Case C-413/99 Baumbast and 
R [2002] ECR I-7091, para 82 
41
 Discussed in Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira, 'Court of Justice of the European Union Decision of 
2 March 2010, Case C-315/08 Janko Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern; Case Note 1 Decoupling 
Nationality and Union Citizenship?' (2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 138;  Robin 
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c. The Impact of Union Citizenship upon Individuals’ Rights 
The Treaty did not make clear whether Union citizenship was ‘supposed’ to bring 
additional substantive rights to Union citizens, or whether it was a merely symbolic 
flourish.
42
  The Court of Justice has been criticised for failing to fully harness Union 
citizenship’s potential, and for relying upon unwritten rules: “the presumption that 
EU citizenship is not supposed to affect the material scope of EU law, and that a 
good citizen is mobile and economically active.”43  The presumptions Kochenov and 
Plender described are not contained within the Treaty text.  The Court’s approach to 
interpreting the scope of EU law has not traditionally been so restrained - its 
definition of ‘worker’, for instance, was expansive in Levin, where all ‘effective and 
genuine’44 work fell within the definition, even where this was supplemented by 
social assistance or did not meet the minimum wage.  This interpretation was 
adopted in subsequent cases,
45
 though the Court’s approach in relation to Union 
citizenship rights did not echo this broad rights-giving approach in early case law 
where Union citizenship was present:  Kochenov and Plender suggested that “the 
Grzelczyk/Martínez Sala case law largely applied the pre-Maastricht paradigm of 
using a Treaty-based pretext, be it services or citizenship, for moving a particular 
situation within the scope of the Treaty, based on the purely market-oriented cross-
border logic.”46 
Though its decisions did not immediately revolutionise the way Union citizens’ 
rights were identified under EU law, the Court of Justice has emphatically 
demonstrated that Union citizenship is not a meaningless rhetorical Treaty 
                                                                                                                                                    
Morris, 'European Citizenship: Cross-Border Relevance, Deliberate Fraud and Proportionate 
Responses to Potential Statelessness' (2011) 17 European Public Law 417; Gerard Rene De Groot and 
Anja Seling, 'Case Comment: Court of Justice of the European Union decision of 2 March 2010, Case 
C-315/08 Janko Rottman[n] v Freistaat Bayern case note 2: The Consequences of the Rottmann 
judgment on Member State autonomy - the European Court of Justice's avant-gardism in nationality 
matters' (2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 150 
42
See: Catherine Jacqueson, ‘Union citizenship and the Court of Justice: Something New under the 
Sun? Towards Social Citizenship’ (2002) 27 European Law Review 260; Stephan Wernicke, ‘Au nom 
de qui? The European Court of Justice between Member States, Civil Society and Union Citizens’ 
(2007) 13 European Law Journal 380; Sybilla Fries and Jo Shaw, 'Citizenship of the Union: First 
Steps in the European Court of Justice' (1998) 4 European Public Law 533; Norbert Reich, 'Union 
citizenship- Metaphor or Source of Rights?' (2001) 7 European Law Journal 4 
43
 Dimitry Kochenov and Richard Plender, 'EU citizenship: from an incipient form to an incipient 
substance? The discovery of the treaty text' (2012) 37 European Law Review 369, 370 
44
 Case 53/81 Levin [1982] ECR 1035, para 17 
45
 See Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 212, and Case 139/85 Kempf [1986] ECR 1741, etc. 
46
 Dimitry Kochenov and Richard Plender, 'EU citizenship: from an incipient form to an incipient 
substance? The discovery of the treaty text' (2012) 37 European Law Review 369, 376 
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addition.
47
  Spaventa found that the impact of Union citizenship upon bringing 
individuals within the personal scope of the Treaty was such that “nationality alone 
[wa]s sufficient”48 and that the consequences of this meant that the CJEU only had to 
consider whether the question fell within the material scope of the Treaty in order to 
apply EU law.  As the cases referred to the Court determine its ability to develop 
doctrine in any area, Nic Shuibhne usefully reminds us that “EU citizenship would 
not exist without the Member States; and it would be meaningless if their nationals 
(and their lawyers, courts and tribunals) had not engaged with its possibilities.”49  
The willingness of Advocates General and the Court to recognise Union citizenship 
as a potentially meaningful status dispelled the criticism that it was no more than a 
‘false prospectus’.50  For Kochenov and Plender, the Court only escaped from the 
shackles of pre-Maastricht thinking with its decision in Rottmann.
51
 where a “new 
non-market rights-based paradigm of EU citizenship law emerged”.52  They view 
this, and subsequent decisions, as a move closer to the text of the Treaty, and 
therefore towards fulfilling the potential of Union citizenship, though this view fails 
to fully engage with the huge steps taken by the Court in decisions such as Martínez 
Sala, as discussed by Spaventa.
53
  In relation to residence rights, this chapter will 
attempt to dispel the view that it was only since Rottmann that the CJEU moved past 
Maastricht - market focussed - thinking. 
2.  Residence Rights for Union Citizens and Family Members  
                                                     
47
 See: Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691;  Grzelczyk, n40 above; Baumbast n40 above; 
Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, and,  inter alia, Eleanor Spaventa, 'Seeing the Wood 
Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and its Constitutional Effects' (2008) 45 
Common Market Law Review 13; Michael Dougan, ‘The constitutional dimension to the case law on 
Union citizenship’ (2006) 31 European Law Review 613; Siofra O'Leary, ‘Case Comment: Putting 
flesh on the bones of European Union citizenship’ (1999) 24 European Law Review 68; and Francis 
G. Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the European Union- A Legal Analysis’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 
591 
48
 Eleanor Spaventa, 'Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and its 
Constitutional Effects' (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 13, 22 
49
 Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘The Outer Limits of EU Citizenship: Displacing Economic Free Movement 
Rights?’ in Catherine Barnard and Okeoghene Odudu (eds), The Outer Limits of European Union 
Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 
50
 Discussed in Francis G. Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the European Union- A Legal Analysis’ (2007) 13 
European Law Journal 591, 592 
51
 Rottmann, n24 above 
52
 Dimitry Kochenov and Richard Plender, 'EU citizenship: from an incipient form to an incipient 
substance? The discovery of the treaty text' (2012) 37 European Law Review 369, 371 
53
 Eleanor Spaventa, 'Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and its 
Constitutional Effects' (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 13 
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This section discusses Directive 2004/38’s provision for residence rights of Union 
citizens and their family members in order to assess the legislative basis upon which 
most Union citizens in Member States other than their own must base their rights of 
residence.  The Directive is important because it is the first piece of secondary 
legislation to link the concept of Union citizenship with the idea of residence.  The 
purpose of this discussion is to enable later exploration of the rights of TCN family 
members to join their Union citizen relative, as these rights are derivative upon the 
Union citizen’s right of residence. 
This section then assesses the mid-term right of residence in detail: Directive 
2004/38 provides three different length terms of residence, up to three months,
54
 
residence for more than three months, and the right of permanent residence,
55
 and 
focus upon the requirements for the right to reside for more than three months is 
appropriate as there is greater opportunity for this to be relevant to rights to family 
reunification than the other periods of residence.  The Court’s approach to 
restrictions to residence rights is considered in relation to both the requirement of 
sufficient resources and sickness insurance as this was modified by the introduction 
of Union citizenship.  Next, the right to equal treatment when residing in a host 
Member State is discussed, in order to demonstrate when Union citizens have access 
to certain benefits during their period of residence within another Member State, and 
to explore the effect of Directive 2004/38 upon the CJEU’s decisions. 
a. Directive 2004/38 and Rights to Move and Reside Freely   
Directive 2004/38 aimed at simplifying and strengthening citizens’ rights, reviewing 
the separate legislation relating to workers, self-employed persons, and the 
economically inactive.
56
  The Directive overhauled much of the pre-existing 
secondary legislation in the area of free movement and residence, amending one 
regulation and repealing nine directives.
57
  In addition to the secondary legislation it 
                                                     
54
 Or 6 months – the CJEU decision in Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1992] ECR I-04265 in relation to 
jobseekers was incorporated in Article 14(4)(b) Directive 2004/38 
55
 Articles 6, 7 and 16 Directive 2004/38 respectively 
56
 Preamble Directive 2004/38 para 3 
57
 Amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, 2–12, and repealing Council Directive 
68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within 
the Community for workers of Member States and their families OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, 13 –16, 
Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
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affects in its title, the Directive replaced a further regulation, Regulation 1251/70 on 
the right of workers to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been 
employed in that State,
58
 which was in fact repealed by Regulation 635/2006 which 
took effect on the same day as Directive 2004/38 had to be implemented.
59
  The 
Directive thus brings together provisions which were previously disparate: the 
repealed and amended legislation had been introduced over four decades,
60
 and, as 
such, developments within the EU, including the impact of successive 
enlargements,
61
 the creation of the Single market,
62
 and the introduction of Union 
citizenship, which had taken place over this time could be reflected in Directive 
2004/38.  
The Directive’s focus is upon Union citizens’ rights to free movement in general, 
rather than upon those of workers, self-employed persons, work-seekers, the self-
sufficient, students, or retirees in particular.  However, Directive 2004/38 does not 
aim to create uniformity of rights.  The Directive neither entitles all persons to the 
same rights under its own provisions,
63
 nor does it remove the possibility for 
individuals to rely upon rights of residence which it does not codify, such as the 
rights of job-seekers to remain within a Member State for longer than three months 
without qualifying for residence under Article 7.
64
  Restrictions upon rights to reside 
derived from the Treaty could be modified by their codification into Directive 
                                                                                                                                                    
residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the 
provision of services OJ L 172, 28.6.1973, 14–16, Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on 
the right of residence, OJ L 180, 13.7.1990, 26–27; and Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 
1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their 
occupational activity, OJ L 180, 13.7.1990, 28–29; Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993 
on the right of residence for students, OJ L 317, 18.12.1993, 59–60 
58
 Regulation (EEC) No 1251/70 of the Commission of 29 June 1970 on the right of workers to 
remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, OJ L 142 , 
30.06.1970, 24 -26 
59
 Article 1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 635/2006 of 25 April 2006 repealing Regulation (EEC) 
No 1251/70 on the right of workers to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been 
employed in that State, OJ L 112, 26.4.2006, 9 
60
 Directive 64/221 is the earliest piece of legislation Directive 2004/38 repeals, and Directive 93/96 
the most recent 
61
 In 1964, when Directive 64/221 was introduced, the Community was composed of only the six 
original Member States; in 2004 there were 15, but soon to be 24 Member States of the European 
Union.  http://europa.eu/about-eu/member-countries/index_en.htm 
62
Single European Act, OJ L 169, 29.6.1987, 1-23 
63
 See the different Article 7 requirements for rights of residence for workers (Article 7(1)(a)); those 
with sufficient resources (Article 7(1)(b)); students (Article 7(1)(c)); and family members (Article 
7(1)(d)) 
64
 See Preamble Directive 2004/38, para 9 on the right of residence for up to three months: this is 
applied “without prejudice to a more favourable treatment applicable to job-seekers as recognised by 
the case law of the Court of Justice.”   
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2004/38, though ‘acquired rights’, such as those of workers or self-employed persons 
and their family members in relation to the acquisition of the right of permanent 
residence under Regulation 1251/70,
65
 are maintained by the Directive.
66
   
In addition to updating and amending secondary EU legislation, Directive 2004/38 
codified case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union into its provisions.
67
  
In recognising that Union citizens are entitled to rights as Union citizens,
68
 the 
Directive presents itself as part of a community of law in which the emphasis is not 
exclusively upon economic status or contribution.
69
  Kostakopoulou considered that 
citizenship had ‘matured as an institution’70 due to both case law developments and 
legislative initiatives, including Directive 2004/38.  The Directive’s statement in its 
preamble that Union citizenship should be the ‘fundamental status’ of Member State 
nationals when they exercise their right of free movement and residence
71
 
corresponds to the traditional requirement of EU law needing a ‘trigger’ of cross-
border movement in order to be relevant.
72
  The requirement of exercise of free 
movement rights is emphasised within the definition of host Member State- “the 
Member State to which a Union citizen moves in order to exercise his/her right of 
free movement and residence.”73  This has meant that domestic nationals have been 
                                                     
65
Articles 2(1) or 3(1)-(2) Regulation  1251/70 
66
 Preamble Directive 2004/38, para 19 
67
 Such as the Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091 primary carer rights which now may be 
found in Article 12(3) Directive 2004/38.   See  Peter Starup and Matthew J. Elsmore, 'Taking a 
logical step forward? Comment on Ibrahim and Teixeira' (2010) 35 European Law Review 571, 575-
576, discussion of Joined Cases 389/87 and 390/87 Echternach and Moritz [1989] ECR 723 and 
proposals for Article 12(3) Directive 2004/38.  Case law forms part of the ‘piecemeal’ developments 
which the Directive aims to remedy (Preamble Directive 2004/38, para 4) 
68
 Qua citizen, rather than qua mover- see Eleanor Spaventa, ‘From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a 
(Non-) Economic European Constitution’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 743, 744 
69
 Development of ‘citizenship rights’ from a market background is considered in: Michelle Everson, 
‘The legacy of the market citizen’ in Jo Shaw and Gillian More (eds), New Legal Dynamics of 
European Union (Clarendon Press 1995)  
70
 Dora Kostakopoulou, 'European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future' (2007) 13 European Law 
Journal 623 
71
 Preamble Directive 2004/38, para 3  
72
 See Case C-456/12 O v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel v B, Judgment of the Court, 12 March 2014, nyr, para 39:  “Accordingly, Directive 
2004/38 establishes a derived right of residence for third country nationals who are family members 
of a Union citizen, within the meaning of Article 2(2) of that directive, only where that citizen has 
exercised his right of freedom of movement by becoming established in a Member State other than 
the Member State of which he is a national...” Also: Case C-457/12 S v Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v G, Judgment of the Court, 12 
March 2014, nyr, para 34 
73
 Article 2(3) Directive 2004/38 
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unable to rely upon the Directive to find a right of residence for their family 
members.
74
 
Residence is not defined in the Directive and Guild et al. viewed this as indicating 
that the term must be interpreted in accordance with the terms of the Directive, rather 
than by individual Member States.
75
  There are three distinct terms of residence 
rights available to Union citizens and family members in Directive 2004/38: these 
are for up to three months,
76
 for a duration of longer than three months,
77
 and a right 
of permanent residence.
78
  Short-term residence is permitted for Union citizens and 
their family members without any conditions other than showing an accepted form of 
identification.
79
 Only the Article 7 rights of residence for longer than three months 
are discussed in this section as the right of permanent residence is acquired through 
the Directive
80
 after five years of legal residence, which is likely to be under Article 
7 of the Directive,
81
 so the ‘medium’ length term residence is more important to 
rights of family reunification than the later status which can be acquired following 
exercise of the right to reside for a period of five years.
82
   
b. The Right of Residence for more than Three Months 
Article 7 of Directive 2004/38 contains the right of residence for periods longer than 
three months.  This Article places the right to reside of the economically inactive,
83
 
which was introduced with the Residence Directives in 1990,
84
 alongside the right to 
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 See Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375, paras 30-35; also Case C-87/12 Ymeraga and 
Others, Judgment of the Court, 8 May 2013, nyr, para 33 
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(Oxford University Press 2014) 109 
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 Article 7(1) Directive 2004/38 
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81
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 Article 7(1)(b)-(c) Directive 2004/38 
84
Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence, OJ L 180, 13.7.1990, 26–
27; and Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and 
self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity, OJ L 180, 13.7.1990, 28–29; 
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reside of workers and self-employed persons,
85
 and the right of family members of 
Union citizens satisfying the conditions in Articles 7(1)(a)-(c).
86
  Economically 
active Union citizens qualifying for residence rights under Article 7(1)(a) need not 
demonstrate anything further than their economic activity: being a worker or self-
employed person qualifies them for the right to reside.  The economically inactive 
Union citizen qualifying for residence rights under Article 7(1)(b) must possess 
sufficient resources so that they and any family members would not “become a 
burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State” alongside 
comprehensive sickness insurance; similarly, students qualifying for residence rights 
under Article 7(1)(c) must show they are enrolled “on a course of study”, that they 
have comprehensive sickness insurance and “assure” the host Member State’s 
national authority that they possess sufficient resources so that they and family 
members
87
 would not become a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State.   
Economically active Union citizens have never had to meet the sufficient resources 
or comprehensive sickness insurance requirements; demonstrating that they fell 
within the broad definition of worker, or self-employed person, sufficed, without 
focus on whether they earned enough money to support themselves.
88
  Though 
residence rights are available to Union citizens in reliance upon the Directive, this is 
not under any circumstances, and there remains an obvious financial requirement for 
eligibility for residence.
89
  As such, it seems that ‘market citizenship’ still has a hold 
over free movement rights,
90
 though this has been reduced by the CJEU in its 
                                                                                                                                                    
Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students, OJ L 317, 
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 Article 7(1)(d) Directive 2004/38 
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 Article 7(4) Directive 2004/38 restricts the scope of the Article 2(2) definition of “family member” 
for students 
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Review 1597 
15 
 
decisions.  For instance, the Court’s approach91 to the requirements of sufficient 
resources and sickness insurance contained in the Residence Directives and repeated 
in Directive 2004/38 has been to not enable restrictions of the general Article 21 
TFEU right of residence to apply in a disproportionate manner.
92
  O’Leary doubted 
the compatibility of the Residence Directives’ requirements with the principle of 
equal treatment and with the spirit of the Directives, to encourage free movement,
93
 
and her concern about the strict requirements was to be proven right by the Court: 
while the Residence Directives contained clear conditions in relation to residence, 
these were mitigated to some extent by the CJEU in the groundbreaking decisions of 
Grzelczyk and Baumbast and R.
94
  These cases had a great impact upon the way the 
Residence Directives were to be applied,
95
 and the Court was able to demonstrate the 
impact of Union citizenship.  
c. Sufficient Resources, Comprehensive Sickness Insurance and Union 
Citizenship 
Grzelczyk declared Union citizenship to be the fundamental status of migrant 
Member State nationals,
96
 which echoed in subsequent case law,
97
 and was codified 
by Directive 2004/38.
98
  The case reduced the stringency of the application of the 
requirement of sufficient resources to entitle economically inactive citizens to a right 
to reside within a host Member State.
99
 The facts of Grzelczyk  are well known – the 
case concerned a  French student studying in Belgium who, after working to support 
his studies for three years, applied for a ‘minimex’ (loan) to support himself in his 
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final year.
100
  The Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve 
(CPAS)
101
 proceeded on the assumption that Mr Grzelczyk did not fall within the 
definition of worker in his fourth year, and the minimex which had been granted to 
Mr Grzelczyk was subsequently withdrawn, and reimbursement was sought for the 
amount paid.  Mr Grzelczyk submitted that the minimex was a social advantage 
within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68,
102
 and the Court agreed.
103
 
As the minimex would have been granted to a Belgian student in the same position 
as Mr Grzelczyk, the only bar was his nationality, and the decision to withdraw it 
was discrimination based solely on grounds of nationality.    
 The Court in Grzelczyk followed Martínez Sala in finding that the principle of non-
discrimination applies across the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty,
104
 and 
deviated from Brown,
105
where student maintenance was not found to fall within the 
scope of EU law at that stage of development of Community law.
106
  This suggests 
that Brown recognised the potential for future developments bringing student 
maintenance and training within the scope of the Treaty.  The Court in Grzelczyk 
noted that Brown was decided before the Maastricht Treaty, and before the 
introduction of Union citizenship.
107
  As the scope of EU law was found to include 
student maintenance since the introduction of Union citizenship, this led to the 
finding that a principle of ‘financial solidarity’ had been accepted by Member 
States.
108
   
Article 14(3) Directive 2004/38 takes Grzelczyk into account, stating that: “An 
expulsion measure shall not be the automatic consequence of a Union citizen's or his 
or her family member's recourse to the social assistance system of the host Member 
State,” so some reliance upon social assistance is permitted, and grounds of 
nationality cannot be the sole access criterion.  Furthermore, Article 8(4) of the 
Directive requires Member States to take the personal situation of an individual into 
                                                     
100
  Grzelczyk, n40 above 
101
 Public Social Assistance Centre for Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve 
102
 Regulation 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers 
within the Community, OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, 2–12   
103
 Grzelczyk, n40 above, paras 27-29 
104
 ibid para 32 
105
 Case 197/86 Brown [1988] ECR 3205 
106
 ibid para 18 
107
  Grzelczyk, n40 above, para 35 
108
 ibid para 44 
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account, and forbids using a fixed amount to represent sufficient resources.
109
  In this 
way, the Grzelczyk approach of financial solidarity influences the application of the 
Directive, and requires a lack of rigidity in a Member State’s approach.   
In addition to the requirement of sufficient resources, economically inactive Union 
citizens are required to have comprehensive sickness insurance for themselves and 
their family members.
110
  Baumbast considered the application of this requirement 
under the (now repealed) Article 1(1) of Directive 90/364 and essentially found that 
it was disproportionate to not allow Mr Baumbast to reside with his family within 
the UK given that the only way in which he did not fulfil the requirements of the 
repealed directive was in lacking emergency medical cover within the UK.
111
  The 
case is discussed in greater detail in relation to rights of residence dependent upon 
the direct effect of the Article 21 TFEU in Chapter 4, but the Court’s approach to the 
restrictions contained in secondary legislation – the requirement of comprehensive 
sickness insurance under Directive 90/364 – is relevant to consideration of Directive 
2004/38’s similar restriction in Article 7(1)(b)-(c).  The Court’s assessment 
considered the reasons for the restrictions in secondary legislation: the protection of 
legitimate interests of Member States,
112
 and the requirement of the resident not 
becoming an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the host Member State’s finance.  The CJEU 
found that the limitations must be proportionate, which meant that “national 
measures adopted on that subject must be necessary and appropriate.”113  Under the 
circumstances, it was found to be disproportionate to refuse to allow Mr Baumbast to 
exercise his right of residence under Article 21 TFEU.
114
 
Baumbast was by no means the first case to utilise a concept of proportionality to 
determine the outcome of a case,
115
 but it was unique in that the proportionality 
assessments essentially pertained to EU secondary legislation, rather than simply 
domestic law implementing the EU legislation, thus the significance of finding that 
                                                     
109
 Article 8(4) Directive 2004/38 
110
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111 
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the requirements were disproportionate was greater.  While the Court phrased its 
proportionality assessment in terms of the ‘national measures’ having to be 
necessary and appropriate, these transpose the requirements of comprehensive 
sickness insurance from the secondary legislation, so could be the same as 
undertaking a proportionality assessment of the secondary legislation and the 
circumstances of the individual case which were being considered, rather than the 
national measures as such, as these can just be a vessel of achieving the requirements 
of the secondary legislation.   
However, the Court did not say that the Residence Directives’ conditions were 
disproportionate in themselves, nor did it question their applicability.
116
  The novel 
“interpretative technique” utilised in Baumbast enabled assessment of the facts of the 
case, rather than of the content of the law in question.
117
  Dougan found that cases 
such as Grzelczyk and Baumbast
 
established the principle that, due to the demands of 
Union citizenship, Member States’ authorities must not simply apply ‘legislative 
blunt tools,’ but instead must undertake ‘individual administrative evaluations.’118  
The introduction of Union citizenship therefore strengthened residence rights, and 
means that Union citizens may continue benefitting from the Court’s approach 
building upon this established case law.  However, legal certainty could suffer if the 
Court’s interpretation of ‘proportionate’ or ‘necessary’ meant that secondary 
legislation cannot be understood as providing clear rules.  Hailbronner suggested in 
2005 that “Union citizenship and the principle of proportionality are used to rewrite 
the rules laid down in secondary Community law”.119  If true, this would make 
provisions adaptive at best, or ignored and irrelevant at worst.  Since the introduction 
of Directive 2004/38, the CJEU has been less willing to disregard the limitations on 
Union citizens’ rights to reside in other Member States, and this is notable in the 
Court’s approach to the restriction on the right to equal treatment under the 
Directive. 
                                                     
116
 Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Educating Rudy and the non English patient: a double bill 
on residency rights under Article 18 EC’ (2003) 28 European Law Review 699, 704 
117
 Eleanor Spaventa, ‘The Constitutional Impact of Union Citizenship,’ in Ulla Neergaard, Ruth 
Nielsen, and Lynn Roseberry (eds), The Role of Courts in Developing A European Social Model- 
Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives (DJØF Publishing 2010) 149 
118
 Michael Dougan, ‘Expanding the Frontiers of Union Citizenship by Dismantling the Territorial 
Boundaries of the National Welfare States?’ in Catherine Barnard and Okeoghene Odudu (eds), The 
Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 162 
119
 Kay Hailbronner, 'Union Citizenship and Access to Social Benefits' (2005) 42 Common Market 
Law Review 1245, 1251 
19 
 
d. The Right to Equal Treatment under EU Law 
Member States are not required to support all nationals of other EU Member States 
who choose to reside within their territory; access to social security is determined by 
Directive 2004/38, and affects the entitlements of Union citizens enjoying residence 
rights within a host Member State, as well as the entitlements of any family members 
joining them.  The provision relating to social security assistance is Article 24(2), 
which states that Member States are not obliged to give Union citizens from other 
Member States access to social assistance within the first three months of 
residence,
120
 or to “grant maintenance aid for studies, including vocational training, 
consisting in student grants or student loans to persons other than workers, self-
employed persons, persons who retain such status and members of their families”121 
prior to the acquisition of permanent residence.  Article 165(2) TFEU aims at 
“encouraging mobility of students and teachers”, which restrictions on student grants 
permitted under Directive 2004/38 does not further.  In order to understand when a 
Union citizen can be denied residence rights on the grounds of requiring social 
security, it is necessary to consider legal developments predating the Directive. 
The Directive does not make entirely clear the circumstances in which reliance upon 
social assistance does not affect a Union citizen’s right of residence- Article 24(1) 
gives a general right to equal treatment, but the risk of expulsion exists if Union 
citizen residents and family members become an ‘unreasonable burden’.122  
Directive 2004/38 is clearer than the Residence Directives were about when reliance 
upon social assistance may be refused.  The discretionary restrictions
123
 upon Article 
24(1) permitted under Article 24(2) are based upon the length of residence of the 
Union citizen, and equal treatment cannot be derogated from once the right of 
permanent residence has been acquired.     
The Court has adhered to the strict interpretation of the Article 24(2) derogation 
before the acquisition of permanent residence in relation to student maintenance aid: 
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this means that for five years, economically inactive Union citizens may not be able 
to claim equal treatment in relation to maintenance grants unless domestic law is 
more generous.  While this would not lead to the expulsion of the Union citizen, it 
could make their residence, and that of any dependants, far more difficult than had 
there been an entitlement to equal treatment.  The Court’s acceptance of the 
appropriateness of the five year rule, in terms of achieving legitimate aims, is 
evidenced in Förster,
124
 where the Court’s decision has been criticised as countering 
integration,
125
 though it was consistent with the Directive’s requirements.126    
Ms Förster was a German national settled in the Netherlands and enrolled for 
primary school teacher training then for a bachelor’s degree course from 1 
September 2001at the Hogeschool van Amsterdam.  She undertook a variety of paid 
employment in the course of her studies, and undertook a placement in a school from 
October 2002 to June 2003 after which she did not work.  She completed her degree 
in mid-2004, and accepted a post as a social worker in an institution for people with 
psychiatric problems on 15 June 2004.  From September 2000, the IB-Groep granted 
Ms Förster a periodically renewed maintenance grant. The IB-Groep initially took 
the view that Ms Förster was to be regarded as a ‘worker’ within the meaning of 
Article 45 TFEU and should be treated in the same way as a student of Netherlands 
nationality in relation to maintenance grants, under Article 7(2) of Regulation 
1612/68.   
In March 2004, the IB-Groep decided that, as Ms Förster had not been employed 
between July 2003 and December 2003, she was no longer a worker, was not entitled 
to the maintenance grant during that period and should repay the excess sums.
127
  Ms 
Förster brought an action against this decision, then appealed the district court’s 
decision to the Centrale Raad van Beroep claiming 1) she was sufficiently integrated 
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into Dutch society to claim the maintenance grant for July –December 2003 under 
EU law and, in the alternative, 2) that she should be regarded as a worker for the 
whole of 2003.
128
 The Centrale Raad van Beroep stayed proceedings and referred 
questions to the CJEU. 
The Court found that Ms Förster’s situation did not come under Regulation 1251/70 
which entitles a worker who has ceased employment to remain permanently within a 
Member State and to continue to be entitled to equality of treatment with that 
Member State’s citizens.129  The Court then examined whether/when Article 18 
TFEU enabled students to obtain a maintenance grant and whether a five year 
residence requirement is compatible with the Article 18 TFEU.  It found that Article 
18 TFEU applies across the material scope of EU law, and that a Union citizen who 
goes to another Member State to pursue secondary education exercises the freedom 
to move guaranteed by Article 21 TFEU.  The Court stated that: 
“With regard to social assistance benefits… a citizen of the Union who is not 
economically active may rely on the first paragraph of Article [18 TFEU] 
where he or she has been lawfully resident in the host Member State for a 
certain time”130  
The CJEU referred to its decision in Bidar,
131
 where it said the requirement placed 
upon students to be eligible for maintenance grants was to be ‘established’ in the 
host state, and made it impossible for students from other Member States to become 
established and therefore precluded their access to maintenance grants;
132
 this 
decision was distinguished.  The CJEU considered that, while Member States must 
show financial solidarity with Union citizens from other Member States, “it is 
permissible for a Member State to ensure that the grant of assistance to cover the 
maintenance costs of students from other Member States does not become an 
unreasonable burden”,133 and that it was therefore permissible to require students to 
have achieved a ‘certain degree of integration’ into the host Member State.  The 
Court held that five years’ continuous residence could not be held to be excessively 
restrictive to achieving the legitimate aims of the host Member State in relation to 
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integration.
134
  The CJEU emphasised that the criteria in this case were clear and 
known in advance as evidence that they were proportionate criteria: the principles of 
legal certainty and transparency were important to the Court’s decision, though the 
fundamental status of Union citizens was not mentioned.   
The CJEU agreed with the Dutch law that a residence requirement of five years to 
entitle students who were not working to the grant was proportionate.  The finding 
that five years’ residence was not disproportionate in relation to access to 
maintenance is hardly surprising, given Directive 2004/38’s coming into force since 
the facts of the case took place, though the Directive was not applicable in Förster.  
The five year rule in Article 24(2) of the Directive thus effectively sets a fixed term 
to represent sufficient integration of a Union citizen, despite other links including 
residence of less than five years must, logically, be capable of demonstrating 
integration and a strong financial link to a host Member State.  For a young person, 
five years’ continuous residence is a large proportion of their lifetime, so makes 
integration in a lesser period seem more likely for young persons, and they are the 
likely beneficiaries of student maintenance grants.   
What is also difficult about the Förster decision is that the CJEU did not consider 
whether Ms Förster could still be a worker; although this could ultimately be 
determined by the referring court, the CJEU lack of guidance on how to approach 
whether the status of worker continued to attach to Ms Förster in the second half of 
2003 while she studied before commencing full-time employment was not in line 
with the previous ‘expansive’ approach to identifying worker status.135 The Court 
did not choose to assess whether Ms Förster’s worker status was capable of 
continuing during the period when she was only a student engaged in studies 
arguably related to her previous employment,
136
 rather than both a worker and a 
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student, despite its power to provide clarification on terms to guide national courts in 
interpreting EU law.
137
 
Skovgaard-Petersen reminded us that, in Morgan and Bucher,
138
 the Court indicated 
that “in order to stand up to the proportionality test, national measures must allow for 
some degree of flexible or individualised assessment of the requisite degree of 
integration into society”.139  The individual assessment is seemingly the missing 
element in both Förster and the Directive, which sets a strict requirement from 
which there is no derogation for economically inactive students.  In the recently 
decided Prinz and Seeberger,
140
 there was a requirement of three years residence in 
Germany to entitle students to an education grant, which had to be completed 
immediately before the student moved abroad to study.  In this case, it was a single 
condition – the residence requirement immediately before study – which enabled a 
student to benefit from the maintenance grant: such a condition “barring an 
assessment of individual attachment, falls short of the necessity test”,141 and thus 
was not proportionate.
142
  Unlike in Prinz and Seeberger, the Directive’s five year 
requirement is not the single criterion for eligibility: economically active Union 
citizens cannot be barred from access to maintenance grants on the same conditions 
as nationals of the host Member State, and those host Member State nationals are not 
subject to a five year residence requirement under the Directive, hence the difference 
in approach. 
The Court did not miss the opportunity to remind the referring court of the broad EU 
definition of ‘worker’ in the Vatsouras decision,143 where it took a different 
approach to job seekers seeking benefits than to students seeking maintenance 
grants.  Article 24(2) states that Member States are not obliged to confer entitlement 
to social assistance during the first three months of residence, or longer period of 
job-seeking.
144
  However, the Court focussed upon the Treaty right to work in other 
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Member States –Article 45 TFEU – and the right to equal treatment this right 
ensures, as well as the finding in Ioannidis that work seekers fall within the scope of 
Article 45 TFEU.
145
  As such, financial assistance was found to be within the reach 
of job-seekers: the Court found that “[b]enefits of a financial nature which, 
independently of their status under national law, are intended to facilitate access to 
the labour market cannot be regarded as constituting ‘social assistance’ within the 
meaning of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38.”146  The Vatsouras decision was 
criticised as too ‘fact specific’ and difficult for national courts to follow as it 
“inadequately addresses the distinction drawn therein between work-seekers' 
allowance and social assistance”147 which was key to the decision.   
e. The Court’s Approach to Restrictions to Equal Treatment  
Though the claimants in Grzelczyk and Baumbast met with happy results due to the 
Court’s mitigating the requirements of the Residence Directives,148 in relation to the 
Citizens’ Directive, there has been no ‘interpretation’ of the five year rule as a 
derogation from the right to equal treatment contained in Article 24(2) Directive 
2004/38.  In Förster,
149
 ‘citizenship’ and solidarity arguments were insufficient to go 
against the text of the incoming Directive: in this case, the status of ‘worker’ would 
have been far more advantageous to Ms Förster than evidence of her obvious 
integration within the host state.  In a sense, this is a set-back for the development of 
Union citizenship rights,
150
 but had the Court applied a proportionality test and found 
that a five year residence requirement was disproportionate would have been to go 
against the changed institutional balance in relation to Union citizens’ rights which 
Directive 2004/38 represented.  The Directive aimed “to capture and demarcate the 
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rights- and the limits- of EU citizenship law”,151 and the Court cannot rewrite or 
ignore EU secondary legislation, but must interpret and apply it.
152
  According to 
Dougan, this decision marked the end of the Court’s “previously clear and consistent 
case law”, leading to more confused and unpredictable decisions.153  This thesis 
agrees with Horsley’s view that the Court itself should be seen as an institutional 
actor,
154
 and further recognises that courts act within what was termed by Stone 
Sweet as a ‘strategic environment’.155  Both the introduction of Union citizenship 
and of Directive 2004/38 thus represented an alteration in the Court’s strategic 
environment: Union citizenship gave it an entirely new concept to interpret, and the 
Directive reduced the flexibility in the Court’s interpretative scope.156  
Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 (and hence the Council, and European 
Parliament) stated that five years was an appropriate length of time to recognise 
economically inactive Union citizen students as integrated into the host Member 
State and as eligible for equal treatment in relation to student maintenance.  The 
rigidity introduced by the Directive in this provision may have served to assuage 
Member State fears of having to support Union citizen students within their borders, 
but, given the Court’s approach in relation to other rights of residence discussed in 
Chapters Four and Five, following it seems to be out of line with its more generous 
approach in relation to more fundamental rights.  Nonetheless, given the new 
institutional input into defining rights the Directive represented, it is understandable, 
taking into account the non-legislative role of the Court, and the importance of 
deference to the other EU institutions, that the Court has applied the unambiguous 
text of the Directive in a literal way in relation to Article 24(2).   
Weatherill discussed the fluctuating activism and restraint in the approach of the 
Court, noting the increased constitutional and institutional complexity since the birth 
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of the EU;
157
 this is partially what the ‘restraint’ shown since the introduction of the 
Citizens’ Directive demonstrates – respect for the legal order of the EU, and an 
institutional shift in clarifying the law.  However, as discussed in Chapters Four and 
Five, the Court has been able to rely upon its interpretations of the Treaty since the 
introduction of the Citizens’ Directive in order to help families in need of rights of 
residence.  There is no Treaty right to equal access to social assistance, and the right 
at stake in Förster was less important to Ms Förster’s enjoyment of her rights as a 
Union citizen than her right of residence within the Netherlands itself.  Her right of 
residence was not in danger, though her finances would have benefitted from 
allowing access to the funds, the ‘core’ right of residence was not at stake in the 
case.  The Court’s ‘activism’, as discussed in later chapters, is more focussed upon 
interpreting Treaty-based rights, rather than reducing the restrictions imposed upon 
these rights in relatively straightforward secondary legislation.  
3. Conclusions 
Union citizenship has developed since its introduction by the Maastricht Treaty and 
is more than a rhetorical treaty addition - it has a meaningful status, and has added to 
the free movement rights of Union citizens and their family members.  The 
acquisition of Union citizenship is still determined by Member States according to 
their nationality law, yet the Court indicated that EU law may be relevant to its 
loss.
158
  The Citizens’ Directive recognises that citizens are rights-holders within the 
EU and aimed to strengthen Union citizens’ rights and repealed pre-existing 
legislation in relation to residence and movement rights of citizens and their families.  
The Directive does not create uniformity of rights, but does grant rights to Union 
citizens as citizens, rather than to them under whatever occupational capacity they 
may fall.  The Directive states that Union citizenship is the ‘fundamental status’ of 
Member State nationals when they exercise their rights of free movement and 
residence, confirming the approach of the Court of Justice in its case law.  
Directive 2004/38 continued the approach of the Residence Directives through not 
requiring an economic activity to grant a right of residence:  Article 7 contains the 
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right of residence of more than three months, and this requires sufficient resources 
and comprehensive sickness insurance if the Union citizen is economically inactive.  
The Grzelczyk and Baumbast
159
 approaches of applying financial solidarity and 
proportionality assessments remain relevant to the application of these requirements, 
but the potential degree of uncertainty caused by such assessments was reduced by 
Directive 2004/38, which clarified in its Article 24(2) when Member States are not 
obliged to allow Union citizens to benefit from the right to equal treatment.  
Economically inactive Union citizens are not entitled to equal access to work-seekers 
allowances for the first three months of residence, or to student maintenance awards 
in Article 24(2), until they have a right of permanent residence.   
The Court of Justice did not limit the application of Article 24(2) Directive 2004/38 
in Förster,
160
 which emphasised the importance of the acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence prior to access to student maintenance grants for the 
economically inactive.  The Court did not try to use the link of Union citizenship to 
interpret the five year residence requirement to a lesser period.  The Court respected 
the approach of the Directive, despite its non-applicability on the facts of the case.  
The restriction is open to criticism and reduces the Court’s ability to find real 
integration on the part of an economically inactive Union citizen.  Allowing only an 
arbitrary term of five years to demonstrate integration in a host state allows that state 
to treat nationals of other Member States differently from their own nationals for a 
substantial period of time, despite these residents having real links to the host state.  
However, in Vatsouras, the Court did find that financial benefits “intended to 
facilitate access to the labour market” did not fall within the Article 24(2) restriction 
on equal access to social assistance within the first three months of residence,
161
 
which potentially shows a willingness to mitigate the restrictions contained within 
the Directive in relation to the would-be economically active Union citizen, but not 
in relation to the economically inactive student.   
The Court’s ability to extend the rights of Union citizens as it did prior to Directive 
2004/38 in an obviously expansive manner, taking every opportunity to interpret 
restrictions upon rights to equal treatment, has slowed in some respects.  The 
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Citizens’ Directive both incorporated elements of the Court’s case law, such as 
Antonissen,
162
 thus making rights more accessible without legal knowledge, and 
made other areas more rigid, such as access to student maintenance.  This thesis 
argues that the CJEU’s efforts to reduce restrictions to rights such as access to 
benefits have been restricted by the introduction of Directive 2004/38, but that its 
interpretative ability in relation to rights of residence of Union citizens and their 
family members has not been so restricted. 
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Chapter Two 
The UK approach to the residence of Family Relatives of Union citizens under 
Directive 2004/38 
Article 21(1) TFEU does not give an absolute freedom for a Union citizen to move and 
reside within the EU, and Directive 2004/38 provides some of the restrictions to which 
the article refers.
1
  Directives are unique to EU law,
2
 and Directive 2004/38 is 
implemented in the UK by the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations,
3
 
so the Regulations are to be examined for their accuracy in relation to the requirements 
of the Directive.  Exercise of a Union citizen’s right to move can rely, in practice, upon 
whether members of their family are able to move with the Union citizen.  Thence, 
determining the rights of family relatives within the UK also determines the likelihood 
that Union citizens can exercise their rights effectively.   
This chapter aims to show how the introduction of Union citizenship and the Citizens’ 
Directive has been able to positively impact upon the ways families are able to claim 
rights of residence within the UK, though the UK has not always responded positively 
to the requirements placed upon it.  It assesses the correctness of the UK Regulations 
in implementing the Directive, and aims to highlight areas in which Union citizens’ 
rights are not fully guaranteed within the UK.   It further aims to show where the 
introduction of Union citizenship has had greatest impact upon rules in relation to 
family residence: the Citizens’ Directive has highlighted that individuals within the EU 
may be granted rights of residence due to their status as citizens of the Union.   
This chapter is divided into three main sections: in the first section, the UK 
Implementing Regulations are introduced.  The UK has a dualist system of law, so 
directives need to be transposed into national law.  This means that the UK 
implementing Regulations are relied upon by Union citizens and family members to 
enforce their rights under Directive 2004/38 within the UK. 
                                                     
1
 Council Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004, on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, 77–123 
2
 They are defined in Article 288 TFEU, and discussed in Sacha Prechal, Directives in EC law (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2005)  
3
 Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, S.I. 2006/1003 
30 
 
Member State have a duty under Article 19(1) TEU to provide sufficient remedies to 
ensure effective legal protection in the fields of EU law, and the effectiveness of the 
UK provisions are considered throughout this chapter. 
The second section assesses the Regulations’ approach to family members as defined 
in Article 2(2) Directive 2004/38 in detail – in order to demonstrate the broad 
definition under EU law, and to contrast this with the UK immigration rules for non-
EU immigration considered in Chapter Three.  Those falling within the definition in 
Directive 2004/38 are automatically entitled to join their Union citizen family member, 
so the reverse discrimination which UK law creates in its more restrictive approach to 
UK nationals’ family members will become apparent.  Section three considers the 
Directive’s concept of other family members (OFMs) as defined in Article 3(2) 
Directive 2004/38.  The status of OFMs is more precarious than that of close family 
members, and this chapter aims to clarify when OFMs may rely upon a right of 
residence based on the Directive within the UK, as case law and Regulation-changes 
have made this difficult to ascertain with certainty since the Directive came into force 
in 2006.  The difficulties family members face in ascertaining their rights and 
enforcing them within the UK is discussed throughout this chapter: without knowledge 
of rights, Union citizens cannot successfully navigate the complex UK legislation. 
The Commission has the role of checking implementation of directives in general, and 
Directive 2004/38 in particular under the Directive’s Article 39.  It has opened cases 
against the UK for poor implementation, though these have since closed.
4
  The 
Commission also acted in its checking capacity in producing its 2008 Report on the 
Implementation of Directive 2004/38;
5
 this Report found that overall transposition was 
“rather disappointing.”6  The Report is useful as a starting point for looking at the 
implementation of Directive 2004/38 in the UK; it does not go into great detail, but 
highlights that the Member States did not successfully implement the whole of 
Directive 2004/38 initially.  The Report is vague and lacks detailed assessments of the 
failure or successes in implementation of each Member State in particular, but 
indicates that the UK was not alone in misunderstanding or mis-implementing various 
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provisions: “Not one Member State has transposed the Directive effectively and 
correctly in its entirety. Not one Article of the Directive has been transposed 
effectively and correctly by all Member States.”7 In examining solely the UK’s 
implementation in detail, this Chapter will be able to add more substance to the 
information contained in the Report, and will track whether the areas highlighted by 
the Commission have been successfully addressed by the updates to the UK 
Implementing Regulations, or whether further Commission action may yet be required.  
This will enable consideration of the sources upon which Union citizens and their 
family members are able to rely to enjoy their rights under Directive 2004/38. 
1. The Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2006 
The UK implemented Directive 2004/38 with its Immigration (European Economic 
Area) Regulations 2006.
8
  The UK Regulations did not incorporate the Directive’s 
articles in a linear fashion - for instance, Article 2(1) defines a Union citizen, and this 
was implemented by Regulation 2(1); but Article 2(2) which defines family members 
was implemented by Regulation 7.  The different arrangements of the Regulations and 
Directive means that assessing the success of the UK’s implementation requires 
understanding of the content of each article, in order to properly locate the 
corresponding rights within the implementing Regulations.  The following section 
considers the UK’s implementation of the Directive’s definitions of family member 
and OFMs.  In addition to the Regulations, the UK also issued an Explanatory 
Memorandum
9
 and Note,
10
 both of which give further guidance as to the application of 
the implementing Regulations, and to the UK government’s understanding of Directive 
2004/38 and its interpretation thereof.  The European Casework Instructions (ECIs) 
also serve to add context to understanding the UK’s approach to implementation, and 
clarified how the UK Border Agency was likely to approach some uncertain or 
ambiguous points in the Regulations,
11
 and how the Border Force and UK Visas and 
Immigration now will in its stead.  
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The Regulations have been regularly updated,
12
 with further memoranda and notes to 
guide interpretation, but with no official consolidated version available, so confusion is 
likely to arise.
13
  It becomes apparent very quickly that the UK legislation is spread out 
over a number of documents, and is not at all user friendly.  The difficulties which 
Union citizens and their family members face in navigating these cumbersome rules 
represent an inauspicious start to a potential period living within the UK.  However, 
entry into the UK is assured under Article 5(1) of Directive 2004/38 to Union citizens 
with a valid ID card or passport, and the same applies to TCN family members 
possessing valid passports.
14
  Assuming that entry is granted to a mobile Union citizen 
without difficulty, family members who are not also Union citizens may face more 
difficult tasks, which can be some of the first hurdles to overcome to establish a right 
of residence within the UK.  Who is classified as a family member under the Directive 
and UK Regulations is thus of paramount importance to establish, as holding an EEA 
family permit can ensure easy entry to the UK for TCN family members.  
a. Union Citizens and TCN Family Members  
Thym suggests that the legal status of TCN family members “has become the new 
battleground,” or frontier, for the CJEU in its development of the concept of Union 
citizenship,
15
 and it does pose many challenges, especially to Member States’ 
autonomy.  TCN rights are derivative: in order for family members/other family 
members to be able to rely upon a right of residence derived from Directive 2004/38, 
there must be a Union citizen residing legally within the UK.  The UK terms such a 
person “a qualified person”, and this means a Union citizen qualifying under the 
Regulations.  The 2012 updates to the Regulations insert the additional criterion that 
qualifying Union citizens must not be nationals of the United Kingdom.
16
  The 
Regulations define a qualifying person as “a person who is an EEA national and in the 
United Kingdom as- (a) a jobseeker; (b) a worker; (c) a self-employed person; (d) a 
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self-sufficient person; or (e) a student”,17 and outlines ways in which the status of 
worker may be retained.
18
  Union citizens who are “qualified persons” are entitled to 
reside within the UK for so long as they remain qualified persons under Regulation 
14(1).  The Regulation’s definitions of self-employed person, self-sufficient person 
and student all comply with the Directive’s definitions.19  The definition of worker, 
however, has just been restricted.  The Department for Work and Pensions recently 
published a ‘minimum earnings threshold’ policy requiring EEA workers to £149 a 
week for at least three months,
20
 with the aim of reducing access to benefits, but the 
application of which may be too stringent to comply with the EU’s flexible definitions 
of genuine and effective work.
21
  This has not been incorporated into the EEA 
Regulations, and there has been no time for judicial consideration of the policy, but the 
fact that it was introduced shows how important appearing to be strict on access to 
social security is to the current government. 
Worker and self-employed status can be retained after the cessation of a Union 
citizen’s work or self-employment under Article 7(3) Directive 2004/38, including 
where there is a temporary inability to work as a result of illness or accident; where the 
individual is involuntarily made unemployed after employment for more than one year 
and has registered with the relevant employment office; where the individual is 
involuntarily unemployed after completing a fixed-term contract of less than a year 
and having registered with the relevant employment office; where the individual 
embarks upon vocational training - which must be linked to the previous employment 
unless this was lost involuntarily.
22
  In the UK Court of Appeal Tilianu
23
case, the 
involuntary employment referred to in Article 7(3)(b) of the Directive was interpreted 
as only applying to persons who are ‘employed’ rather than self-employed, which 
technically fits with the Directive’s terminology, though strongly favours workers over 
self-employed persons.  The directives regarding self-employed persons, which 
Directive 2004/38 repealed,
24
 did not contemplate retention of the status of self-
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employed person, merely retention of the right to reside within the host Member 
State,
25
 and there is no CJEU case law applying Article 7(3)(b) of Directive 2004/38 to 
self-employed persons.   
A ‘jobseeker’ is a qualified person under the UK Regulations, though the status is kept 
distinct in the Directive, where jobseekers are not automatically given the Article 7 
right of residence, unlike under the Regulations where they are entitled, as qualified 
persons, to this right of residence beyond three months.  Under the Directive, Article 
14(4)(b) instead grants a jobseeker protection against expulsion for a longer period, 
incorporating the Antonissen decision of the Court of Justice,
26
 if the jobseeker can 
show that they “entered the territory of the host Member State in order to seek 
employment...” and “can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek 
employment and that they have a genuine chance of being engaged.”  The UK 
Regulations require that a jobseeker must not be an unreasonable burden on the 
finances of the UK, and the jobseeker is normally only entitled to reside for up to 6 
months, though this may be extended if “they are able to provide compelling evidence 
of seeking work and having a genuine chance of being engaged.”27  Obviously, the 
period in which they can seek work as a matter of practicality would be limited by 
their resources and ability to support themselves within the UK, and implementation is 
in line with the requirements of Article 14(4)(b). 
b. Domestic Citizens and the Directive 
While UK citizens are also Union citizens,
28
 they are not normally entitled to rely upon 
Union law in their home states despite being workers or self-employed, etc. - EU law 
does not apply to purely internal situations.
29
  The rule has been subject to criticism,
30
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and is particularly open to attack in relation to the right of an individual to live with 
their family in exercising their fundamental freedoms under EU law, as this does not 
apply to domestic citizens.  It is the responsibility, and entitlement, of Member States 
to determine the laws in relation to family reunification for their own citizens.  While 
there have been instances where individuals have been able to rely on rights under EU 
law against their home state, these situations are not the norm, and are discussed in 
much greater detail in Chapter Four.
31
  
2. Union Citizens’ Family Members and the Regulations  
This section discusses the Directive’s definition of ‘family member’, in order to 
demonstrate that the movement of a family member is respected under EU law and is 
at the heart of ensuring the movement of a Union citizen.  As Advocate General 
Sharpston said, “when citizens move, they do so as human beings, not as robots. They 
fall in love, marry and have families...  If family members are not treated in the same 
way as the EU citizen exercising rights of free movement, the concept of freedom of 
movement becomes devoid of any real meaning.”32 The approach of EU law is to 
protect the rights of family members to move with a Union citizen automatically: other 
than requiring the family member to fall within the Article 2(2) definition and the 
Union citizen to be eligible to live within a Member State, few conditions can be 
imposed,
33
 and virtually none if the Union citizen is a worker or self-employed.
34
 This 
is in contrast to the approach of the UK Immigration Rules discussed in Chapter Three, 
where TCN family members’ rights are far from automatic. 
a. Who is a Family Member? 
Family members are defined in Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/38 and include spouses, 
registered partners “with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered 
partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the 
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host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in 
accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host 
Member State”, direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants of 
the Union citizen or spouse or partner, dependent direct relatives in the ascending line 
of the Union citizen or spouse or partner. 
Family members benefit from the right of equal treatment,
35
 and, for family members 
in Article 2(2)(a)-(b),
36
 and (c) for under 21 year olds, entrance and residence rights 
are automatic, and require only proof of the familial relationship and valid ID.
37
  As 
emphasised in the preamble: those who have already obtained a residence card do not 
need to obtain an entry visa,
38
 though this requirement remains for TCN family 
members who have not yet acquired a residence card.  For descendants over 21, and 
for ascending line relatives, dependency
39
 must be shown to demonstrate family 
member status.  In addition to entry and residence rights, family members are entitled 
to work,
40
 and this must be in the same state as the one in which the Union citizen is 
residing.
41
  Regulation 7(1) of the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2006,
42
 successfully 
transposed the family member definitions.  Some general requirements of family 
members are discussed below, prior to more detailed consideration of the actual 
statuses of family members, which will be divided into two sections: the first, focusing 
on the partners (spouse or registered partner) of Union citizens, and the second 
focusing on the dependent direct descending or ascending line relatives who qualify as 
family members under Article 2(2)(c)-(d) of the Directive.
43
 
b. Requirements Placed on Family Members 
Directive 2004/38 does not require that Union citizens’ family members have lawfully 
resided in the EU prior to their joining the Union citizen.  The CJEU decision of 
Metock rejected Member State submissions that TCNs must have legally resided 
legally within the EU before being able to claim a right to reside as a family member 
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of a Union citizen.
44
  This requirement was not found in secondary legislation, and the 
Court found it was irrelevant whether the TCN had become established in the host 
state before or after founding a family with a Union citizen.
45
  The case effectively 
overruled Akrich on this point,
46
 and removed the restriction of prior lawful residence 
within the EU which had been placed upon TCN family members.
47
  Metock 
concerned the rights of residence of the TCN spouses of Union citizens who were 
lawfully residing in Ireland, but its reasoning applies beyond the spousal relationship 
to all close family members-
48
 no distinction is made between the rights of spouses and 
the other Article 2(2) family members by Directive 2004/38.  The case thus showed 
that EU law had reduced governmental migration control,
49
 though this was not new.  
In MRAX,
50
 the CJEU found that where family members lacked the required visas or 
documents, the Member State had to give them the opportunity to obtain these 
documents, or to prove their right by other means, as it would be disproportionate not 
to accept other proof.
51
  Metock strengthened Union citizens’ rights and rejected that 
governments had ‘exclusive competence’ over first entry to the territory of the EU.52  
Rights to move and reside with their family members ought not to depend on the 
legality of residence of those family members prior to the relationship with the Union 
citizen- this would distinguish between Union citizens’ rights unfairly, and be likely to 
discriminate against Union citizens with TCN family members.    
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The Directive requires Member States to issue a registration certificate immediately 
upon application by a Union citizen,
53
 and within six months of an application for a 
residence card being submitted by a Union citizen’s family member, with a certificate 
of application for the residence card being issued immediately;
54
 Regulation 17(3) 
correctly transposes these time limits.  As the Court emphasised in MRAX, the issue of 
a permit does not give rise to rights, but instead serves to prove the individual’s 
position under Union law.
55
 The UK does not require the registration of Union 
citizens, so technically puts fewer burdens upon family members.  This meant that 
Article 8(2) of the Directive did not have to be fully transposed into the EEA 
Regulations, although Union citizens may choose to register and are entitled to a 
certificate immediately upon application.
56
  For many TCNs, this is essentially a 
requirement, and the UK issues more registration certificates than all but three Member 
States, with only Spain, Belgium and Austria issuing more certificates.  However, the 
UK rejects more than 15% of applications, which is a high proportion and reflects the 
rigidity of the process: forms must be complete and correctly filled in or they are 
rejected.
57
  Regulation 17 transposes the law in relation to residence cards of TCN 
family members, and requires production of a valid passport and proof of the 
applicant’s family member status.58    
c. Spouses and Registered Partners  
Spouses and civil partners are defined in the UK Regulations in Regulation 7(1)(a), 
and individuals can only be party to one such partnership at any given time.
59
  
‘Spouse’ may be a deceptively complicated term: the meaning is not the same across 
Member States, for instance Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain and now the UK  recognise same-sex marriage, while other EU states 
either recognise non-marriage partnerships, or do not recognise same-sex relationships 
as equivalent to marriage at all.  In the UK, same-sex partners in a relationship 
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contracted in another Member State have been allowed to enter and reside as family 
members due to the UK’s recognition of civil partnerships.  Since 29 March 2014, 
same sex marriage has also been permitted within the UK.
60
 In other Member States, 
same-sex spouses who have lawfully contracted a partnership or marriage in one 
country would be unable to have their relationship recognised within a host state.  The 
difficulties faced by same-sex couples in being recognised as family members for the 
purposes of EU law are due to the non-harmonisation of family law in relation to 
same-sex partnerships, and therefore to its dependence on the domestic law of two 
Member States.   
Under the Directive, a registered partner of a Union citizen must be recognised as a 
family member if the relationship was contracted on the basis of law within a Member 
State, and if the host Member State “treats registered partnerships as equivalent to 
marriage”.61  Article 2(2)(b) does not mention the sex of registered partners, only that 
the two partners must have contracted a partnership and partnerships must be 
recognised as equivalent to marriage within the host state.  There is no requirement 
that any combination of genders be able to enter a partnership within a host state under 
EU law, but it would ease free movement between Member States if countries which 
recognise civil partnerships agreed to recognise all forms of civil partnership 
concluded within other Member States.   
In addition to the registered partnerships which the UK is required to recognise under 
the Directive due to its recognition of civil partnerships within the UK as equivalent to 
marriage,
62
 there is no restriction in the UK Regulations matching that of Article 
2(2)(b) in limiting the partnerships to be recognised to those concluded within another 
Member State.  This means that the UK definition is broader than the Directive’s, and 
more likely to recognise partnerships including TCN partners, as these would be more 
likely to have been concluded outside the EU.  The UK Regulations do not mention 
where a registered partnership must have taken place, merely that it must be valid, 
monogamous and not coterminous with a marital relationship.
63
  In this way, the UK 
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eases the entry and residence of a TCN registered partner, if they fulfil the other 
requirements of entry.
64
   
There is no attempt by the Directive to harmonise the law in relation to recognition of 
registered partnerships: the EU lacks competence to harmonise in this area.  In the UK, 
only registered partnerships between same-sex couples are recognised, following the 
definition in the Civil Partnership Act 2004.
65
   Article 1(1) states that a civil 
partnership “is a relationship between two people of the same sex”, and, following 
Regulation 2(1), this is the definition which is applied in relation to the UK European 
Economic Area (Immigration) Regulations.  This definition means that there is no 
possibility for a man and a woman who have entered into a civil partnership, for 
instance in France, where le pacte civil de solidarité is a contract between two persons 
above the age of majority, of the same or of different sex, to organise their life 
together.
66
  For a heterosexual pacte, the UK is not, following the Civil Partnership 
Act definition, obliged to recognise the relationship within the UK, or to treat such a 
partner as a family member for the purpose of the Regulations.  This has the greatest 
potential impact upon TCN partners, though they could potentially find a right of 
residence as an OFM under Article 3(2)(b) of Directive 2004/38.
67
  This seems to be 
contrary to the general principles of non-discrimination on grounds of sex and sexual 
orientation contained in Articles 10 and 19 TFEU, as the differentiations drawn 
between civil partnerships which are and are not recognised within the UK are wholly 
on the sex of the partners.  However, these provisions are not directly effective, so 
cannot be relied upon to obtain recognition of a partnership which the Member State 
has not chosen to recognise as equivalent to marriage.   
Factors which can potentially mitigate the result of this include the potential of entry to 
a Member State as a beneficiary under the Directive – a partner in a long-term 
relationship, or, depending on national law, the principle of equal treatment as applied 
in Reed
68
 could assist civil partners.  Here, the Court required that a Member State 
which permits the unmarried companions of its nationals, who are not themselves 
nationals of that Member State, to reside in its territory, cannot refuse to grant the same 
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benefit to migrant workers who are nationals of other Member States.
69
  The 
Directive’s recognition of registered partnerships as family is an important 
development within EU free movement law: same-sex partners have often encountered 
difficulty in relation to having their rights recognised for immigration and residence 
purposes,
70
 and while the Directive was unable to harmonise the substance of the law 
within each Member State, it at least ensured that Member States cannot discriminate 
against registered partnerships contracted in other Member States if they themselves 
recognise registered partnerships within their national law thereby enhancing the scope 
of Reed. 
The requirement that partnerships be treated as ‘equivalent to marriage’ in Article 
3(2)(a) of the Directive is potentially open to different interpretations: though the UK 
implemented the civil partnership relationship in its Regulations as that of registered 
partners, this is not a ‘marriage’ relationship: other Member States have same-sex 
marriage, as the UK has since 29 March 2014, and while the UK’s registered 
partnership grants many of the same rights to the couple as to a married couple, the UK 
does not distinguish between those same-sex relationships in other Member States 
which do not accord same-sex couples anything which could be considered similar to 
marital rights, and which are not truly equivalent to marriage. 
Saez divides countries recognising same-sex relationships into three groups- those 
granting: 
“(1) Full equality of rights between same- and opposite-sex couples but no 
access to a marriage certificate.  
(2) Recognition of same-sex couples as partners with ample recognition of 
material rights and a narrow access to building family ties.  
(3) Recognition of same-sex couples as a lawful association between two 
individuals, narrow or no access to family ties, and limited material rights”71 
The UK civil partnership falls into the first group, and is still an option for same-sex 
couples to formalise their relationship, despite the availability of same-sex marriage.  
The UK’s civil partnership offers equivalent rights to marriage, in relation to the 
                                                     
69
 For further judicial consideration of the principle of non-discrimination, see Case C-144/04 Werner 
Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981 
70
 For example Zvi Triger, 'Fear of the wandering gay: some reflections on citizenship, nationalism and 
recognition in same-sex relationships' (2012) 8 International Journal of Law in Context 268 
71
Macarena Saez, 'Same-Sex Marriage, Same-Sex Cohabitation, and Same-Sex Families around the 
World: Why ‘Same’ Is So Different' (2011) 19 European Review of Private Law 631, 640 
42 
 
‘material consequences, parental consequences and other consequences’, as 
categorised by the ECtHR in Schalk v Austria,
72
 though this is not the case for all 
Member States recognising civil partnerships.  For instance, Austria recognises same-
sex couples as ‘almost equal’ to married couples,73 but lacking rights in certain 
important areas- notably family law in relation to essentially parental, or adoptive 
rights.
74
   
The Directive does not state whether ‘equivalent to marriage’ means in relation to the 
partner, or in relation to broader family rights.  McGlynn discussed the contradictions 
in the EU’s approach to marriage and partnerships,75 highlighting the disparity 
between the lack of recognition of same sex partnerships as familial relationships and 
the ‘right to marry’ as a fundamental right.76  She highlighted the difficulty between 
the CJEU respecting a traditional ideology of family and the transformed modern 
approach to relationships including cohabitation and same-sex partnerships not having 
been responded to as quickly as necessary.   
As family rights under the Directive are derivative rights, dependent upon the 
existence and qualification (worker/other qualifying status) of a Union citizen, rather 
than rights accorded to a family unit containing a Union citizen within a host Member 
State, howsoever that family may be construed, there is always the difficulty of 
showing entitlement.  Third-country nationals are not automatically entitled to reside 
in a given Member State under EU law: in order to derive residence rights due to their 
relationship with a Union citizen they must provide proof of their relationship with a 
Union citizen who has a right to reside in that state.  For same-sex partners, this proof 
is doubly complex: in addition to demonstrating a duly contracted relationship, the 
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partners may be required to show this is equivalent to marriage, without much 
guidance as to the meaning of that requirement. 
It is unclear whether the CJEU follows the ECtHR’s approach in Schalk, or whether 
same-sex unions recognised by Member States for tax-purposes, inheritance, etc., can 
suffice.  Saez discussed France’s PACS and identified that it provided “rights and 
obligations similar but not equal to marriage”77, so while, for the purposes of UK law, 
a French pacte relationship is sufficient to recognise partners as family members, it is 
not necessarily clear that this would be compulsory under the Directive- the 
‘equivalent to marriage’ criterion is unmentioned by the UK Regulations,78 so as long 
as there is a civil partnership, the UK recognises partners as family members.  The lack 
of harmony between states’ approach to same-sex relationships is difficult- unlike with 
a marriage lawfully concluded within the UK, there is no guarantee that a civil 
partnership so concluded will be recognised outside the UK and the partners available 
to rely upon their rights as partners, unless a host Member State of the EU recognises 
that the UK recognises such partnerships as equivalent to marriage. 
For Tobin, the key feature to establish whether a civil partnership can be equivalent to 
marriage is in relation to whether “the partners are afforded the opportunity to jointly 
apply to adopt children”.79  If this test were to be applied, under the Adoption and 
Children Act,
80
 the UK’s registered partnership would pass the ‘equivalent’ test- as 
rights of adoption are granted equally to couples of the same or opposite sex: an 
“enduring family relationship” is determinative.  If civil partnerships must be 
equivalent to marriage, as the Directive suggests, do same-sex couples need to be able 
to adopt under national law?  This raises the question whether Member States are able 
to assess the civil partnerships of another Member State, or whether the fact that a 
partnership exists sufficient to allow an assumption of equivalence of the relationship 
to marriage. 
The relevance of the Citizens’ Directive recognising same-sex partners as family 
members can be seen as an important step towards Member States realising that they, 
too, should, and can recognise such partnerships as indicative of family rights.  
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However, despite resolutions such as the Council Resolution on Equal Rights for 
Homosexuals and Lesbians,
81
 and the Council of Europe Resolution on Discrimination 
on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,
82
 the EU cannot require 
recognition of same-sex relationships.  As Hofmann
83
 made clear long ago: EU law “is 
not designed to settle questions concerned with the organization of the family”.84   
d. Dependent Family Members 
The concept of direct descendants under 21 or dependants under Article 2(2)(c) of the 
Directive has been transposed by Regulation 7(1)(b), and ascending line 
relatives/dependants are incorporated by Regulation 7(1)(c).  Just as the Directive does 
not define dependency, the UK implementing Regulations do not impose a definition 
upon UK law which means that guidance for this term must be found in case law.  In 
Lebon, the Court of Justice determined that dependency was a question of fact:  
“the status of dependent member of a worker's family, to which Article 10(1) 
and (2) of Regulation No 1612/68 refers, is the result of a factual situation, 
namely the provision of support by the worker, without there being any need to 
determine the reasons for recourse to the worker' s support.”85 
This is a broad definition and enables national courts to determine whether family 
members are actually dependent, without consideration of whether they need to be 
dependent, or whether they have any right to be dependent, which, being stricter tests, 
would have the potential to restrict the rights of free movement of Union citizens and 
their dependent family members.  Jia
86
 emphasised that the need for support must exist 
within the state of origin, or state from which the application to join the Union citizen 
was made.
87
  According to guidance issued by the European Commission, to determine 
dependency, individuals must be assessed, inter alia, with regard to their “need for 
material support to meet their essential needs in their country of origin or the country 
from which they came at the time when they applied to join the EU citizen (i.e. not in 
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the host Member State where the EU citizen resides)...”88  The reference to needing 
support for ‘essential needs’ makes it seem that the Commission invoked a dependency 
of necessity rather than of fact in its guidance, although it states elsewhere that 
dependency is a question of fact.
89
  The usefulness of the Commission’s approach to 
dependency is reduced by its failure to distinguish between dependency for the 
purposes of Article 2(2)(c)-(d) and Article 3(2)(a) of the Directive, which will be 
discussed further below.   
Logically, dependency must arise somewhere and at some time: Article 2(2)(c)-(d) 
does not specify when the dependency has to have arisen, nor does it require 
dependency in a particular place, so requiring dependency prior to the 
movement/joining of the Union citizen and family member may be in excess of the 
requirements of the Directive, so the Commission guidance appears to be inappropriate 
in this regard.  In Metock, the CJEU held that family members need not have been 
family members at the time of the Union citizen’s exercise of their right of free 
movement,
90
 which was potentially hugely important for Union citizens’ rights to 
family reunification.
91
 This was not followed in the recent CJEU decision of O and 
B,
92
 where the Court diverged from its normal, generous path.  Here, the TCN fiancé of 
a Union citizen who had lived with him in one Member State tried to rely upon this 
residence as ‘family members’ in order to acquire residence rights in the Union 
citizen’s home Member State.  This, however, was rejected by the Court, which 
adhered to Directive 2004/38’s definition of family members,93 despite the situation 
being one which fell outside the scope of the Directive.
94
  Potentially the more 
restrictive approach was due to the ‘movement’ under EU law being before the familial 
relationship: rather than a move to a Member State to exercise Treaty freedoms with a 
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Union citizen, O and B relied upon previous movement in an attempt to trigger 
residence rights in a home Member State.
95
 
Family members have a privileged position under the Directive - the facilitation of 
their movement is seen as vital to encourage and facilitate the exercise of the Union 
citizen’s rights to move and reside within the territory of other Member States.  This is 
not something the Court of Justice is likely to restrict without good reason,
96
 and a 
family member not having been dependent prior to joining a Union citizen would not 
seem like a good enough reason, as fear of an elderly parent being unable to provide 
for themselves in the near future may prevent a Union citizen from moving to another 
Member State if that parent would be unable to join them had there not been a 
relationship of dependency in the state of origin.  Chapter 2 of the European Casework 
Instructions clarifies dependency- to some extent- for the purposes of UK law, stating 
the reasons for recourse to financial support do not need to be determined, and the 
potential for the family member to take up work is also not to be considered.  The 
Instructions only include material support in the dependency definition, rather than 
emotional, and interpret financial dependency as needing the support of the Union 
citizen to meet ‘essential needs in the country of origin – not in order to have a certain 
level of income.”97 
The assessments of dependency carried out in UK courts are in line with the case law 
of the Court of Justice: in Pedro,
98
 the Secretary of State argued that Mrs Pedro- an 
ascending-line relative who was not dependent on her Union citizen son prior to his 
move to the UK- could not be counted as dependent for the purposes of Article 2(2)(d) 
of the Directive, but the Court of Appeal disagreed:  
“if the Secretary of State is right, were Mrs. Pedro to have become dependent 
upon her son in Portugal and he to have supported her, she could have come to 
the United Kingdom to join him as a dependent and enjoy her derived benefits, 
yet if she becomes dependent in the United Kingdom she cannot. It is difficult 
to see a principled distinction between the two situations.”99   
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The Court of Appeal rejected guidance issued by the European Commission that to 
determine dependency, individuals must be assessed, inter alia, with regard to their 
“need for material support to meet their essential needs in their country of origin or the 
country from which they came at the time when they applied to join the EU citizen (i.e. 
not in the host Member State where the EU citizen resides)...”100  The Court of Appeal 
instead applied a more generous assessment in relation to family members,
101
 which 
though not required according to the text of the Directive, is very much in line with its 
aims of ensuring that Union citizens’ movement is facilitated.102  
As dependent family members fall within the Article 2(2) definition, they are entitled 
to work.
103
  For ascending line relatives, this right might not be of great use, but for 
descending line dependants capable of work, it could be extremely important.  There is 
no CJEU, or UK, case law on whether a dependent-descendant over the age of 21 must 
remain dependent for the duration of his/her residence in the UK with a Union citizen.  
Obviously, if the descendant was an EU citizen, they would be entitled to work under 
Article 7(1)(a) Directive 2004/38.  However, if the dependent-descendant is a TCN 
citizen, their right to work due to their ‘family member’ status is potentially more 
complex.  It is unclear whether once-proven, dependency enables TCN dependants to 
work and reside for as long as the Union citizen has a right to reside under the 
Directive, or whether the dependant must remain dependent so that they qualified as a 
family member.   
In its recent Reyes judgment,
104
 the CJEU made a determination on the interpretation 
of Article 2(2)(c) Directive 2004/38 regarding what may be required to show 
dependency of descendants over the age of 21. This is important because such 
dependent descendants are close family members and thus entitled to work, so the 
issue of dependency and relevancy of later work-intentions had to be considered.  In 
this case, an over 21 year old daughter of a Filipina married to a Norwegian man 
residing in Sweden applied for a residence permit as a family member in Sweden.  The 
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daughter had evidence of money which her mother and her stepfather sent her, but her 
application for a residence permit as a family member was refused due to the fact that 
she had not proved that the money had been used to supply her basic needs in the 
Philippines prior to her travel to Europe.  Ms Reyes appealed against this decision, and 
the subsequent appeal court’s decision that she could support herself in her country of 
origin without support from her mother and stepfather.  The referring court asked two 
main questions, concerning whether the person trying to show dependency could 
provide for their own basic needs, and whether an intention to gain work in the host 
Member State after benefitting from the status of dependent family member should 
have an effect on the assessment.
105
 
The CJEU echoed Jia in its determination that the existence of a situation of real 
dependence must be established, that this is a factual situation, and that it must exist in 
the state of origin.
106
  The Court found that there was no requirement for a national 
court to consider the reasons for dependence upon a Union citizen, in order to follow 
the principle that the Citizen’s Directive should be broadly construed.  As long as a 
Union citizen has regularly given support over a significant period to the descendant 
claiming to be a dependent family member in order for the latter to support themselves 
in their State of origin, that descendant is shown to be in a situation of real 
dependence.  There is no additional requirement for the descendant to establish that 
he/she has tried without success to find work or obtain subsistence support from the 
authorities of the State of origin/elsewhere in order to support him/herself- such a 
requirement would be likely to “deprive Articles 2(2)(c) and 7 of Directive 2004/38 of 
their proper effect.”107 
Regarding the question of likelihood of a descendant getting a job within the Member 
State, the CJEU found that job prospects do not affect the interpretation of a dependant 
for the purposes of Article 2(2)(c) of the Directive,
108
 and agreed with the European 
Commission that the opposite would “in practice, prohibit that descendant from 
looking for employment in the host Member State and would accordingly infringe 
Article 23 of that directive, which expressly authorises such a descendant, if he has the 
right of residence, to take up employment or self-employment (see, by analogy, Lebon, 
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paragraph 20).”109  While Reyes does clarify the financial requirements on a 
descendant over the age of 21 before they become a family member for the purpose of 
the Directive, it fails to address whether, or to what extent, a TCN dependant 
descendant is required to remain eligible to be a dependant under the Citizens’ 
Directive, which is likely to be a concern of Member States.  The CJEU and 
Commission are correct that a denial of dependant status due to job prospects would be 
contrary to the right of family members to work under Article 23 of the Citizens’ 
Directive, but the purpose of the family member status for over 21 year olds – i.e. 
enabling the movement of their Union citizen relative – does not seem to be furthered 
by an indefinite recognition of a working over 21 year old descendant. Case law may 
need to clarify whether the status is to be an enduring one, as otherwise a temporary 
dependence could enable many adults otherwise ineligible to work in a given Member 
State, to join a Union citizen relative and potentially stay and work for the duration of 
that Union citizen’s residence, without any further dependency or potential to restrict 
the Union citizen’s exercise of their rights of free movement.  This is particularly 
likely to be opposed within the UK due to existing attempts to reduce migration. 
3. Other family members 
Article 3 of Directive 2004/38 defines beneficiaries, and Article 3(2)(a) includes what 
the Directive terms ‘other’ family members (OFMs), with Article 3(2)(b) extending 
beneficiary status to partners of a durable relationship.  These persons do not fall 
within the close family member category, but may benefit under the Directive due to 
their relationship with the Union citizen, and Member States must ‘facilitate’ their 
entry and residence in accordance with national legislation, taking ‘an extensive 
examination of the personal circumstances’ and justifying any denial of entry or 
residence to such beneficiaries. 
The OFM definition echoes Article 10(2) of Regulation 1612/68,
110
 and is broad in 
scope; a wide range of relatives for whom the Union citizen provided, or shared a 
household with could fall within the scope of the Directive, despite not being part of 
the more limited close family.  However, the broad definition is countered by the 
narrow entitlements of OFMs- this status does not entitle individuals to work: Article 
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23 of the Directive is silent as regards the employment rights of other family 
members.
111
  This presents a potential financial impediment to the free movement of a 
Union citizen- there would be no opportunity for a dependent OFM to become less 
dependent through working, unless the other family member was entitled to work in 
their own right, so a Union citizen would have to support the OFM throughout their 
stay.  In addition, family members’ enjoyment of equal treatment under Article 24(1) is 
not extended to OFMs. 
This category of person has been much debated within the tribunals and courts of the 
UK,
112
 and Article 3(2) was initially not correctly transposed by the UK.  According to 
the 2008 Commission Report, the UK was one of thirteen Member States failing to 
transpose this Article,
113
 which suggests there was general confusion about its 
requirements.  Shaw’s analysis of UK correspondence with the Directive also found 
that Article 3(2) was incorrectly implemented by the 2006 Regulations.
114
  The 
Regulations required OFMs to have previously resided within an EEA state, which 
was more restrictive than the Directive allowed.
115
 Despite the obvious incorrect 
transposition of requirements placed upon OFMs, the 2009 updates to the Regulations 
did not remove the prior lawful residence requirement.
116
 The legislative failure to 
properly implement the Article 3(2) concept of extended family member/beneficiary 
correctly continued for a number of years.  However, the judiciary of the UK refused 
to apply the incompatible requirements of the Regulations in 2009,
117
 and the UK 
government responded.  The Implementing Regulations were updated in 2011 in 
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response to the courts’ non-application of the Regulation 8 provision, and the 
incompatible requirement of prior EEA residence was removed.
118
   
The updated Regulation 8 transposes the definition of beneficiaries, but uses the term 
‘extended family members’ in its place, which was intended to reduce confusion 
caused by referring to persons as ‘other’ family members.119  Relatives other than 
direct ascendants/descendants are included if they require the personal care of the 
Union citizen or the spouse or civil partner of the Union citizen,
120
 if they are 
dependant relatives,
121
 or if they are (non-civil) partners who can prove they are in a 
‘durable relationship’ with the Union citizen.122 
Other family members face a more difficult task of proving their relationship with the 
Union citizen than family members- their relationship with a Union citizen does not 
automatically derive a right to reside with that Union citizen.  Instead, a right of 
residence has to be demonstrated.  For OFMs without another entitlement to reside 
within the Member State, while registration certificates are not strictly compulsory for 
EU OFMs, it is clear that for an extended family member they represent one of the few 
means by which they can be recognised as a family member under Regulation 7(3) 
(along with the EEA family permit or the residence card).   
The UK Regulations do not require documents in addition to those outlined in the 
Directive, but in practice, individuals have been asked to provide additional 
documents.
123
  Carrera and Faure-Atger carried out a study on the implementation of 
Directive 2004/38, and found that the documents required by Member States to 
substantiate their dependency status varied greatly.
124
  This makes it difficult for 
individuals to know what to send to ensure that applications are successful, and also 
makes the UK’s implementation of the Directive difficult to assess: if the Regulations 
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conform to its requirements on paper, but this is not being applied in practice, then the 
UK must resolve the discrepancies, as implementation of Directives on paper is 
insufficient: their aims must be achieved. 
The requirement of a certificate from the country of origin proving the relationship is a 
requirement only of OFMs under the Directive,
125
 close family members need not 
show such a certificate.  Article 8(5) of the Directive is transposed by Regulation 
16(5), which Shaw criticised for giving too much discretion to the Secretary of 
State.
126
  The Regulation says the Secretary of State ‘may’ issue a registration 
certificate, when ‘in all the circumstances it appears to the Secretary of State 
appropriate to issue the registration certificate’.127  The discretion here is not 
unbounded- the Secretary of State is required to ‘undertake an extensive examination 
of the personal circumstances of the applicant and if he refuses the application shall 
give reasons justifying the refusal unless this is contrary to the interests of national 
security’,128 but perhaps allows for too much leeway in the decision.   
a. OFMs and Dependency 
The Court of Appeal in Soares determined that OFM dependency had to be on the 
Union citizen, rather than on a TCN spouse as is permitted for family members.
129
  
The criteria for being an ‘extended family member’ in Regulation 8(2)(a) and (c) did 
not extend to dependency on, or household membership of, a spouse or partner of an 
EEA national. Such dependency or household membership could only relate to the 
EEA national, unlike the status of family member dependants, who may be dependent 
upon the spouse of partner of a Union citizen. 
i. Prior Dependency 
For OFMs, unlike for close family members, the issue of whether dependency could 
arise within the host state was not met with an affirmative answer within the UK 
courts.  The Pedro decision does not to apply to OFMs- as the failed reliance in the 
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Upper Tribunal VN
130
 case shows, where the TCN brother-in-law of an Italian citizen 
residing within the UK failed to show dependence prior to his arrival within the UK, 
and the Upper Tribunal did not accept that dependency since arrival was sufficient to 
entitle the brother-in-law to a residence card as an extended family member.  
In 2011 the Upper Tribunal made a referral to the CJEU from MR,
131
 asking about the 
status of OFMs which became Rahman before the Court.
132
  The CJEU decision 
underlined that Article 3(2)(a) does not give automatic rights of residence for OFMs 
who show they are dependants of a Union citizen;
133
 the Court emphasised the 
distinction drawn between a close family member and an OFM, whose entry and 
residence has to be ‘facilitated’ by a host Member State, but is not automatic.  As 
shown by the preamble to Directive 2004/38, the situation of relatives not falling 
within the definition of family member, “should be examined by the host Member 
State on the basis of its own national legislation, in order to decide whether entry and 
residence could be granted to such persons, taking into consideration their relationship 
with the Union citizen or any other circumstances, such as their financial or physical 
dependence on the Union citizen.”134  Rahman clarified that dependants need not have 
lived within the same state as the Union citizen, ties may exist where that had not been 
the case – but the circumstances would need to be examined.135  This necessitated the 
removal of the requirement of dependency in the same state from the UK Regulations, 
which were updated accordingly.
136
 
Rahman found that Article 3(2) was insufficiently precise to allow for direct reliance 
by potential beneficiaries upon the Article,
137
 and found that Member States are “not 
required to grant every application for entry or residence submitted by family members 
of a Union citizen who do not fall under the definition in Article 2(2) of that directive, 
even if they show, in accordance with Article 10(2) thereof, that they are dependants of 
that citizen.”138  The wide discretion granted by the Directive in relation to 
‘facilitating’ the entry and residence of OFMs was not curtailed in Rahman, though 
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Member States need to ensure that their relevant national laws do perform an adequate 
examination of the personal circumstances of individual citizens, and there should be 
the possibility for judicial review of the relevant decision.  
b. Partners of a Durable Relationship  
The inclusion of persons in a ‘durable relationship’ as beneficiaries in Article 3(2) of 
the Directive means that the Directive recognises relationships beyond those of 
marriage and civil partnerships as potentially giving rise to the possibility of being 
granted residence rights within Member States in order to facilitate the free movement 
of Union citizens.  As for dependent OFMs, this is on the basis of national legislation 
rather than harmonised law.  Regulation 8(5) places persons in a durable relationship 
with a Union citizen in the ‘extended family member’ category, and the relationship 
must have lasted for at least two years to qualify as ‘durable’.139   
In Rose,
140
 the Upper Tribunal found that persons in a durable relationship were not 
included in the definition of other family members by the Directive.
141
  The Upper 
Tribunal is correct that OFMs are defined in Article 3(2)(a), and that partners in a 
durable relationship are separate in Article 3(2)(b), but both fall within the definition 
of beneficiary and placing Member States under the same obligations in relation to 
their entry and residence:  Member States must “undertake an extensive examination 
of the personal circumstances and shall justify any denial of entry or residence to these 
people”.142  Persons in durable relationships with Union citizens wanting to rely upon 
their relationship to show rights of residence, therefore do so as beneficiaries, rather 
than OFMs.  However, the UK Regulation 8 blurs this distinction, including Article 
3(2)(a) OFMs and partners of a durable relationship.   
The key distinction to be drawn, however, is between beneficiaries and close family 
members: as emphasised by the Court of Appeal in FD, “The construction of Articles 
2 and 3 of the Directive makes it absolutely clear that a person who is an other family 
member, or a partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, is in a 
different position from a family member, because it is specifically envisaged that the 
Secretary of State will conduct an examination of his position before allowing him 
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entry -- something he could not do if he had a substantive right to enter as a partner of 
a citizen of the Union.”143  AG Bot in his Opinion for Rahman, found that:  
“a Member State may not reduce the scope, either directly, by deciding, for 
example, to exclude from the facilitation measures family members in the 
direct line beyond a certain degree of relationship, or even collaterals, or the 
partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, or indirectly, 
by laying down conditions which have the purpose or effect of excluding 
certain categories of beneficiaries. It would not seem possible, for example, to 
make the rights accorded to the partner with whom the citizen has a durable 
relationship subject to a requirement of a registered partnership or to a 
condition of the partnership being treated as equivalent to marriage, as appears 
in Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2004/38.”144   
The UK has not tried to restrict the durable relationship to fiancé(e)s, or registered 
partnerships, so its interpretation is compatible with the Directive.  Prior to Directive 
2004/38, unmarried partners of Union citizens could potentially find a right of 
residence if the intended Member State recognised unmarried partners of domestic 
citizens to reside within its territory due to their relationship.  The Reed judgment of 
the CJEU,
145
 as discussed above, went some way to reducing the impact of a lack of 
harmonisation of law in relation to non-marital partners, but there are still many 
differences between national law which mean that the movement of TCN unmarried 
partners, and to some extent civil partners, is still uncontrolled by the EU, and is thus 
subject to change at Member States’ discretion.  
c. Entitlements of OFMs 
There is also a degree of confusion as to the entitlements of OFMs under UK law: the 
UK transposed the family member definition in its Regulation 7;
146
 Regulation 7(1)(d) 
includes extended family members (i.e. OFMs) satisfying the conditions in Regulation 
8(2),(3),(4) or (5)
147
 who have been issued with EEA family permits, or registration 
certificates or residence cards,
148
 as family members.  This represents an additional 
category of family members for the purposes of some elements of UK law,
149
 and blurs 
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the boundaries between extended and family members.  It seems that, if an OFM has 
had their entrance facilitated and been issued with the appropriate documentation, they 
are to be treated as family members of a Union citizen for the purposes of UK law, 
with rights to work, etc., which is not the Directive’s approach.  As the UK is more 
generous, its interpretation is compatible with the Directive, though its application of 
the distinction between the two categories in practice is more complex. 
Directive 2004/38 itself is not consistent with its use of the term ‘family member’ 
either.  Though it defines family members in Article 2(2), it does not consistently 
apply its own definition: for instance, Article 10 on the issue of residence cards states 
that residence rights of TCN family members shall be evidenced by the issuing of a 
document called ‘Residence card of a family member of a Union citizen,’ and goes on 
to discuss Article 2 and Article 3(2) relatives- thus mixing its own terminology 
through the use of ‘family member’ in a general way in Article 10.150  While the 
‘various’ uses of terms is not unique to Directive 2004/38, for instance- Regulation 
1612/68 used several different conceptions of worker- as including work seekers at 
times, and actually employed people at others, it is not helpful for ensuring 
standardised application of the UK implementing Regulations, or for developing a full 
understanding of the different rights and obligations placed open family members as 
defined in Article 2(2), and other/extended family members under Article 3(2)(a)-(b). 
The most important right conferred upon Union citizens exercising their rights of free 
movement and residence, as well as that of any family members who move with them- 
is the right to be treated equally with the nationals of the Member States in which they 
reside.  The Treaty does not allow discrimination on grounds of nationality, and the 
UK approach to family relative residents respects this important right of equality in its 
definition of family member as including extended family who qualify for a right of 
residence under the Regulations in Regulation 7(1)(d).  This is because, if, an OFM 
has been granted the discretionary right of residence under the Regulations, she has 
fulfilled the conditions of entry and residence, and thus is able to move and reside with 
the Union citizen; but that is not all that is required to encourage the Union citizen to 
exercise their rights under EU law freely.  The guarantee that the OFM will not be 
discriminated against on grounds of nationality is important, too. 
4. Conclusions 
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The UK has had to amend its Immigration Regulations repeatedly in order to more 
accurately implement Directive 2004/38 as interpreted by the CJEU.  The aims of the 
Directive of facilitating easy movement of Union citizens and their family members 
are not always met in practice, however. As eluded to above, complicated application 
processes and delays in assessing documents in relation to residence rights can 
jeopardise individuals’ free movement.  
The Directive’s definition of family members has been successfully transposed into the 
UK Regulations- though the potential for discrimination against same-sex couples 
exists in other Member States, the UK recognises both same-sex marriage and civil 
partnerships in domestic law and therefore recognises same-sex partners as family 
members for the purposes of Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/38.  It does so without 
quibbling about any equivalence to marriage or assessing the rights to which partners 
are entitled in the state of origin.  The ‘automatic family members’ – the spouse, 
registered partner or dependent child concepts are successfully implemented within the 
UK.  The concept of dependent family member above the age of minority was 
embraced by the UK courts in Pedro, where no prior dependency of a family member 
was required, which indicates that the UK does not always have to refer cases in order 
to give the most generous interpretation of EU law.   
In relation to OFMs, the UK has faced greater difficulties in achieving compliance 
with the Directive.  The incompatible requirement of previous lawful residence within 
an EU Member State was only removed from the EEA Regulations in 2011, despite 
case law highlighting the discrepancy much earlier.  Despite the UK needing to amend 
its Regulations in order to meet the minimal requirements in relation to facilitating 
residence of OFMs under the Directive, once the UK recognises that an extended 
family member is entitled to residence under its Regulations, this individual is treated 
as a family member in relation to the important right of equal treatment.   
In this way, the Regulations go beyond the requirements of the Directive in their 
provision for OFMs, while remaining true to its aims of facilitating free movement and 
residence of Union citizens, who remain key to all the derivative rights to which family 
members or OFMs are entitled.  The Rahman judgment by the Court of Justice 
clarified the requirements under the Directive in relation to OFMs’ rights, but the 
concept is not without difficulty: the facilitation of rights of residence, though not 
compulsory, must not give too much discretion to the Secretary of State.  Facilitation 
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requires flexible guidance to be taken into account and individual circumstances to be 
considered, though, as Chapter Three discusses, the UK is not very willing to adopt 
flexible stances where rigid rules can be applied in relation to immigration.
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Chapter Three 
Residence Rights of TCN Family Members of UK Nationals: 
Reverse Discrimination and Restrictive Rules 
While Union citizens relying upon rights contained in Directive 2004/38 to reside in a 
Member State other than their own can be joined by family members automatically, 
there is no corresponding right for UK citizens to be joined by their TCN family 
members in the UK.  This is an obvious example of a situation in which reverse 
discrimination can arise, and the CJEU is unable to bring equal rights to family 
reunification to all Union citizens as the EU lacks competence.
1
  The UK introduced 
newly restrictive rules for TCN immigration in June 2012,
2
 so EU routes of 
immigration have become particularly important to UK citizens since the changes, as 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five.  This chapter explores the reasons for the UK’s 
newly restrictive approach, and demonstrates the difficulties which UK citizens with 
TCN family members face to bring their family to the UK.
3
  This chapter also 
examines the important influence of the CJEU in relation to UK immigration - it shows 
that there is consideration of CJEU case law before national courts in relation to the 
UK rules on family reunification, despite the fact that the Family Reunification 
Directive was not adopted by the UK,
4 
and the lack of competence on the part of the 
EU in what are wholly internal situations.   
This chapter has three main sections, the first of which analyses the rights of UK 
nationals under the UK Immigration Rules to be joined by TCN partners – spouses or 
civil partners - and contrasts this with rights of family reunification in relation to 
settled TCN citizens under EU law.  This section will show that UK judges have 
adopted the same considerations and approaches to UK citizens’ rights as the CJEU 
does to protecting the exercise of free movement rights.  The second section focuses 
upon the UK’s efforts to limit family immigration through preventing abuse of its 
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laws, specifically through targeting marriages of convenience.  This is an area in which 
the courts have effected a change of law in reliance upon the European principle of 
proportionality, and which, it is argued, has heralded the way forward to a more active 
scrutiny by the courts in relation to restrictive immigration law within the UK.    
The final section of this chapter considers the potential for ‘Europeanisation’ of 
immigration law in the UK: there has been much discussion of the potential for 
harmonisation of family law by the EU, with strong arguments for and against such a 
move,
5
 but each Member State still controls immigration law in relation to its domestic 
nationals, and, where Directive 2003/86 does not apply, in relation to TCNs, too.  
Whether a ‘citizenship-friendly’, or liberal, approach encouraging of free movement 
and a sense of unity across the EU, can be ascertained within the UK case law and the 
approach of the UK courts to applying UK legislation will be considered throughout 
the chapter.   
1. The UK Immigration Rules: Domestic and TCN Family Reunification 
Rights 
Member States retain control over non-EU immigration within their territories: 
domestic citizens’ family members, and those of TCN residents within the UK 
represent “some of the few categories in respect of which... [the UK] can still exercise 
immigration powers”,6 and as a consequence the individuals concerned may be treated 
less favourably than EU citizens.  There is clearly the potential for reverse 
discrimination against domestic nationals, even in states where both Directives 
2003/86 and 2004/38 apply:
7
 as there is a vacuum left by the framework whereby static 
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citizens do not benefit unless they meet the only partially explored potential of Ruiz 
Zambrano,
8
 while the EU provides ascertainable rights for TCN residents under 
Directive 2003/86.  Adam and Van Elsuwege suggest that “Further harmonisation of 
the European Union's common immigration policy under art.79 TEU might provide for 
a possible way out of this uncomfortable reality”,9 but for now, the EU cannot even 
influence migration in relation to TCNs in all Member States, so harmonisation is 
unlikely to come quickly.  Though Member States may choose to prevent it under 
national legislation,
10
 reverse discrimination is not contrary to EU law, and the UK 
Immigration rules do not entitle UK citizens to equivalent rights to family reunification 
as their EU neighbours residing under Directive 2004/38.   
Successive UK governments have had targets to cut immigration in order to be shown 
to be ‘taking a stand’ against excessive immigration; this has led to many changes in 
policy,
11
 with the post recent update to the Immigration Rules being 10 March 2014, 
but with major changes being brought in from July 2012.
12
  Family members of UK 
nationals/TCN residents who arrived prior to 9
th
 July 2012 are treated under the old 
rules, while family members arriving on or after that date are subject to the new, more 
restrictive rules.  Family members can be seen as easy targets by governments wishing 
to cut back numbers of non-EU immigrants: family ties are the most common reason 
for settling in the UK,
13
 and, unlike workers or skilled immigrants, family members 
enter on the basis of a relationship with an existing resident, or move with a family 
member, and it is difficult for family members to lobby for rights of residence, as they 
are a disparate group.  The most important reason for family members to enter the UK 
is not to work or to study, though these may be additional aims - the primary purpose 
is to join a family member.   
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UK policy favours migrants who enter intending to make a financial contribution to 
the country - generally their visas are processed under the Points Based System,
14
 
though this, too, is subject to regular change, and requires arduous processes to be 
followed.  As Symonds highlighted, migrant workers and students may have 
supporters in the business world or within universities and there is an obvious financial 
interest in their migration, but as a group, “migrant family members do not so 
obviously have friends in high places.”15  This section firstly considers the 
requirements placed upon a sponsor to enable them to bring TCN family relatives into 
the UK, before considering the partners to whom the rights of family reunification may 
be granted under the Immigration Rules. 
a. Requirements placed upon a sponsor by the UK Immigration Rules  
In order to bring TCN family members to the UK, sponsors must be over the age of 
18,
16
 and have a right of residence within the UK.  For TCN residents, they must have 
leave to remain within the UK,
17
 or be ‘settled in the United Kingdom’.  This means 
that the person concerned has to be free from restrictions on their leave to remain, and 
either ordinarily resident in the UK, without having entered or remained in breach of 
the immigration laws, or despite having entered or remained in breach of immigration 
laws, have since been granted leave to remain and become ordinarily resident.  In 
addition to these residency requirements, the changes to the Immigration Rules 
brought in strict financial requirements which sponsors must meet.
18
  To sponsor their 
spouse, the sponsor within the UK must earn £18,600 or more per year.  This rises to 
£22,400 if there is also a TCN child under the age of 18 to be sponsored, and an 
additional £2,400 of income is required for each additional child.  If the sponsor does 
not earn £18,600, they can utilise savings to make up the difference, but only if they 
have substantial savings not in the form of property or in another’s name.  To make up 
for any shortfalls, the sponsor must have £16,000 of savings, in addition to 2.5 times 
the shortfall (this means the shortfall is covered for 2.5 years – the equivalent of 30 
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months).  For a sponsor without an income, this equates to savings of £62,500 to be 
joined by a TCN spouse.  Given the UK’s preferred immigrants make a financial 
contribution, it seems bizarre that, for 30 months after their entry, family members’ 
incomes are ignored in relation to the assessment of the couple’s assets.   
The Rules have been challenged before the UK courts, and were found to be 
disproportionate in MM,
19
 which has since been appealed to the Court of Appeal, 
though the verdict has yet to be handed down.
20
  In the Queen’s Bench Division, MM 
was heard by Mr Justice Blake, and was an application for judicial review by MM, a 
Lebanese national who entered the UK in 2001 and had been granted refugee status in 
the UK until 28 January 2014.  He was a PhD student and unable to find work 
commensurate with his qualifications, so earned about £15,600 per annum.  MM was 
engaged in 2010 to a Lebanese woman, and they married by proxy in 2013.  His wife 
is a pharmacist and fluent in English so likely to find skilled employment if resident in 
the UK.  MM contended that the restrictions were an unjustified interference with his 
right to respect for private and family life.  His complaints were that his wife’s arrival 
would not lead to any additional costs as they would reside in the accommodation he 
currently had; that the Rules prevent the couple from relying on the wife’s earning 
capacity; that a deed of covenant by MM’s brother to the effect that he would provide 
£80 per week to the couple over a five year period could not be considered, nor a 
promise by MM’s father to provide a further £80 per week from Lebanon.21   
The joined cases both concerned unemployed British citizens of Pakistani origins, the 
first of whom, Abdul Majid, received state benefits of £17,361 per annum and 
contended he had relatives willing to support him and his wife; his complaint was that 
the rules dealing with the admission of parents of children settled in the UK for 7 years 
do not apply to parents seeking leave to enter as spouses.
22
 The second joined case was 
brought by Shabana Javed, a resident of an area of Birmingham that she described as 
‘economically and socially deprived’, where she was unaware that any of her female 
peers had been able to earn more than £18,000.  Her complaints were similar to those 
of MM.  She further submitted that the regime under the new rules as a whole was 
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unjustifiably discriminatory as it impacts on women and in particular on British Asian 
women, as this segment of society suffers from significantly lower rates of pay or 
employment than other sectors.
23
  Blake was not convinced that the rules were 
unlawfully discriminatory, as no overtly discriminatory criteria are used.
24
 
Blake found the case to be “challenging”,25 as it represented the tensions between 
judicial respect for sensitive issues of policy making and judicial scrutiny of rules 
which affect the enjoyment of a fundamental right.  He relied upon CJEU 
jurisprudence – Carpenter26 and Chakroun27 to demonstrate how denying admission to 
a spouse undermines the right of the sponsor to reside, and found that the right of a 
Union citizen to reside in another Member State exercising Treaty rights ‘can rank no 
higher in terms of constitutional significance than the indefeasible right of the British 
national to reside in his or her own country’, finding that the exercise of either right is 
equally interfered with by preventing the admission of a spouse:
28
  “Given the 
importance in human affairs of matrimonial cohabitation with a chosen partner, and 
recognising the basic policy response in Appendix FM, that partners who cannot 
comply with the rules will not generally be admitted to the United Kingdom unless 
there are insurmountable obstacles to the couple living elsewhere in the world, the 
administrative measures that prevent the cohabitation interfere just as much with the 
British citizen's right of residence as that of the European Union national.”29 
Blake was satisfied that the newly introduced measures amounted to “considerably 
more intrusive interference than the ‘colossal’ interference deriving from the minimum 
age rule in Quila...”30  Unlike getting older, earning £18,600 is not inevitable, so the 
Immigration Rules present a more restrictive condition than Quila.
31
  While 
recognising that there are reasons for the restrictions in the Immigration Rules, in 
combination of more than one, five of them can “be so onerous in effect as to be an 
unjustified and disproportionate interference with a genuine spousal relationship.”32  
The five features identified by Blake are: the setting of the minimum income level 
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above the £13,400 level identified by the Migration Advisory Committee as the lowest 
maintenance threshold under the benefits and net fiscal approach (a level close to the 
adult minimum wage for a 40 hour week);  the requirement of £16,000 savings before 
savings can be said to contribute to rectify any income shortfall; using a 30 month 
period for forward income projection, as opposed to a twelve month period that could 
be applied in a borderline case of a couple’s ability to maintain themselves without 
needing social assistance; disregarding credible evidence of undertakings of third party 
support effected by deed and supported by evidence of ability to provide financial 
support; and the disregard of the spouse's own earning capacity during the thirty month 
period of initial entry.
33
 
Blake found that the restriction on housing benefit for either spouse for five years is 
‘more austere than it needs to be’34 to pursue the legitimate aim of preventing 
unjustified recourse to public funds. He compared the less restrictive pre-July 2012 
rules, which enable savings to be taken into account without requiring a high initial 
threshold, and described the £16,000 initial savings requirement for sponsors on low 
incomes as “a rather cruel piece of mockery”,35 and it does seem entirely fanciful that a 
low earner should be able to demonstrate huge savings in order to be joined by their 
spouse.  Blake recognised the Secretary of State’s aims to ensure the long-term 
economic viability of families, but did not find that the ‘front loading’ of the financial 
requirements made sense: he suggested that examination of financial circumstances of 
the couple at the end of the five year period when the earning capacities of both 
spouses could be assessed would be more appropriate.
36
 
The fifth factor – the complete disregard of the future earning capacity of the spouse, 
was considered to “the most striking feature of the new scheme”: this lasts for 30 
months of residence, and appeared to Blake to be “both irrational and manifestly 
disproportionate in its impact on the ability for the spouses to live together.”37  The 
legitimate aim of achieving transparency and ease of assessment has to be balanced 
against the restrictions imposed on rights to family reunification, and Blake accepted 
that families should be encouraged to integrate and not live on or near the subsistence 
level, but that the Immigration Rules “amount together to a disproportionate 
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interference with the rights of British citizen sponsors and refugees to enjoy respect for 
family life. In terms of the Strasbourg approach they do not represent a fair balance 
between the competing interests and fall outside the margin of appreciation or 
discretionary area of judgment available in policy making in this sphere of 
administration.”38  The Immigration Rules seem to be manifestly unbalanced: their 
approach to savings to make up shortfalls in savings is harsh, and not able to be 
mitigated in practice.  As Blake identified, there are justifiable and proper aims behind 
the Rules, but their strictness and lack of flexibility means they are disproportionate.  It 
is to be hoped that the Court of Appeal decision will find that the rules are overly 
strict, manifestly disproportionate and irrational, as Blake did, and be able to reduce 
the likelihood of separation for many families on lower incomes.   
If the Court of Appeal adopts Blake’s approach of recognising the importance of 
family members’ residence to ensure a UK citizen enjoys their right of residence, with 
reference to the CJEU cases mentioned above, this link would bring the ‘Union 
citizen’ into consideration under the Immigration Rules.  Blake does not refer to 
reverse discrimination, but that is in essence what he recognised.  The Court of 
Appeal’s judgment is thus awaited by many in the hope that the £18,600 requirement 
can be reduced or at least have third party funds recognised, to make it more in line 
with the approach of the CJEU, and a more fitting criterion for the family members of 
UK citizens.   
b. The Family Reunification Directive: Regular and Stable Resources  
Under Article 7(1)(c) Directive 2003/86, a would-be sponsor must prove that they 
possess stable and regular resources.  This assessment of resources is closer to the 
approach in the UK’s Immigration Rules than that of Directive 2004/38.  The differing 
aims of the pieces of legislation are readily apparent: the Citizens’ Directive aims not 
to restrict a Union citizen’s right of free movement, while both the UK Immigration 
Rules and the Family Reunification Directive aim to protect a Member State from 
incurring further expense on the social security system due to family reunification.  
Article 7(1)(c) represents a more onerous test than the requirement of being a worker, 
or possessing sufficient resources under the Citizens’ Directive: there is no concept of 
‘(un)reasonable burden’ for Directive 2003/86.  Instead, there can be no recourse to the 
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social security system of the host Member State if a sponsor is to qualify.  In 
Chakroun,
39
 the amount required to indicate ‘stable and regular resources’ was set at 
120% of the minimum wage of a 23 year old worker by the host Member State, and the 
Court found it to be incompatible with the requirements of the Directive.
40
   
While the CJEU ruled that the 120% requirement was too strict, an income 
requirement of 100% of the minimum wage would have been allowed - but this would 
have had to be only a reference amount, rather than a strict requirement.  If applicants 
were unable to meet this requirement, their applications must be assessed individually 
taking into account other facts.
41
  In Chakroun, it was not the idea of a level against 
which TCN workers’ incomes would be measured which the Court of Justice found 
disproportionate - it was the application and rigidity of that rule which led to the 
Court’s finding.  Through not taking account of individual circumstances the Dutch 
rule was too harsh, and the minimum amount required was too high.  This underlines 
the difficulty which UK law may face in the continued application of its fixed income 
requirement for sponsors to qualify to bring family members into the UK.  While, 
obviously, the UK is not compelled to follow the Chakroun decision, in that it did not 
implement Directive 2003/86, the UK Court of Appeal considered the case and its 
reasoning in the MM appeal.   
In Chakroun, ‘citizenship reasoning’ was employed in relation to when a family must 
be formed in order to benefit from Union law: the Court deemed that it would be 
unduly restrictive to require that a family pre-existed the joining up of TCN sponsor 
and family member within a Member State, and that the Directive drew no distinction 
based on the date of a marriage.
42
  The Court “for the first time established a direct link 
between the rights of Union citizens and their family members on the one hand and the 
rights of TCNs on the other.”43 That the approach of the Court of Justice in relation to 
Metock, which at the time of the decision was a controversial decision,
44
 has been 
applied to TCNs, demonstrates the expansive quality of citizenship case-law, and 
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potentially increases the likelihood of reverse discrimination within the UK.  This is 
not the only instance in which the Court has adopted the same approach to TCN and 
rights of Union citizens – Sharpston discussed the ‘intellectual parallelism’ in the 
Court’s approach to non-discrimination in the area of rights for third-country national 
residents,
45
 and it does seem that this is evidence in the residence cases too, with 
Chakroun being a particularly good example. 
In Chakroun, just as under the UK Rules, the financial requirements placed upon 
sponsors were unable to be mitigated by any other factors - which is very different 
from Directive 2004/38’s approach to assessing family life in relation to OFMs.46 
Symonds highlighted that there must have been serious questions whether a blanket 
approach would be lawful.
47
  The Supreme Court held in Mahad that restrictions 
excluding third-party support under the previous Immigration rules were not lawful, 
and focussed on the requirement not to become a burden on the social security 
system.
48
   The current £18,600 minimum income requirement is above the level of 
income support within the UK, so UK nationals and TCN residents within the UK 
need not simply not require social assistance, but they must earn significantly in excess 
of the threshold amount.  This does not seem to follow Mahad, as far less than £18,600 
can indicate that a sponsor and family will not be likely to rely upon social security – 
particularly if the TCN spouse to join the sponsor is highly skilled and able to work 
within the UK once residency was granted. 
i. The Inevitability and Impact of Chakroun 
Wiesbrock suggested the Court’s decision in Chakroun was ‘far from self-evident’,49 
given the earlier criticism the Directive faced.  The legitimacy of Directive 2003/86 
was challenged in Parliament v Council and Commission,
50
 where the European 
Parliament sought the annulment of various articles restricting the right to family 
reunification.  The Parliament challenged exceptions to rights of family reunification 
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allowed under the Directive “on the grounds that these exceptions violated the rights to 
family life protected in both the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.”51  
Parliament v Council and Commission was the first time that the Court referred to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights,
52
 despite the fact that, at the time, it did not have 
binding legal effect.  The CJEU also relied upon the ECHR,
53
 as well as other 
international human rights instruments, to support the Directive’s validity.  The CJEU 
first had to consider whether the action was admissible; it was - the discretion allowed 
to Member States by the Directive did not make the Directive any less an ‘act’ of the 
institutions of the EU.
54
  The Parliament argued that Article 4(1) rendered family 
reunification unachievable, through requiring integration before the child joined the 
sponsor, additionally that the discrimination on age was not objectively justified, and 
was contrary to Article 14 ECHR.
55
  The Council, supported by the German 
Government and Commission, drew careful distinctions between family reunification 
and the right to respect for family life- submitting they are not equivalent.  The 
Council also submitted that children prior to the age of 12 are more able to integrate 
into society than those above 12 years of age.
56
 
The CJEU recognised that right to respect for family life is protected in EU law, and 
that it may create positive obligations for Member States.  The Court emphasised the 
importance of Member States having regard to the best interests of minor children 
when implementing law, and did not find the age of 12 to infringe the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age.  The Court did not find that Article 4(6) prohibited 
Member States from taking account of the applications of children over 15,
57
 or that 
family reunification was threatened where a Member State applied the derogation.  The 
Court also did not find that the Article 8 waiting period precluded family 
reunification.
58
  The Court was careful to distinguish between the importance of 
respecting family life, and a right to family reunification.  While the CJEU repeatedly 
emphasised the importance of respecting the best interests of a minor child, it stated 
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that treating a sponsor’s child over the age of 12 differently from their spouse “cannot 
be regarded as unjustified discrimination against the minor child.  The very objective 
of marriage is long-lasting married life together, whereas children over 12 years of age 
will not necessarily remain for a long time with their parents.”59   
As 12 is very young- not even close to the age of majority in any Member State, and 
no information was cited in the judgment about the average ages at which children 
leave their parental home, assuming it will be not ‘long’ after 12 is misleading, and 
likely to lead to harsh decisions if the derogation is applied.
60
  However, what this case 
underlines is that there is no automatic right to family reunification in a given state 
under national law, or EU law relating to Union citizens, or EU law relating to TCNs, 
or based on the Convention of Human Rights or Charter.  The circumstances, the 
relationship in question, and, often, economic activity of a sponsor are all relevant to 
individual assessments of whether there is a right to family reunification in a given 
state, at a given time.
61
  This is an example of the CJEU respecting the clearly outlined 
restrictions in secondary legislation, as it did in Förster,
62
 but here with greater impact 
upon what can be seen as a ‘core’ right of TCNs – the right to reside with family, 
rather than what can be seen as an ancillary right of equal access to maintenance in 
Förster.  The Court’s decision making was constrained, once more, by the clear 
phraseology of the Family Reunification Directive, but, as in Chakroun,
63
 where the 
Directive was not clear and unambiguous, the CJEU was able to apply its citizenship 
logic in a manner which protected the rights of family members to live together in a 
Member State. 
c. Aims: Integration v Reducing Numbers 
The Home Office Statement of Intent declared that in 2010, family migration 
accounted for “approximately 18 per cent of all non-EU immigration to the UK – 
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around 54,000 people out of 300,000”64 and also that its objectives in updating the 
Immigration Rules included respecting the right to family life while maintaining 
immigration control and preventing abuse of the immigration system, promoting 
integration,
65
 and safeguarding the economic interests of the UK.
66
  However, the strict 
application of the £18,600 minimum income requirement potentially means that 
integration and fostering a community spirit will be more difficult, as families not 
meeting the threshold are denied a visa for the TCN spouse, and therefore are not 
complete families within the UK.   
The idea of broken homes with low incomes does not fit easily with the Home Office 
assessment that the income requirement will lead to “increased integration of family 
migrants as they will be supported at a reasonable level to allow participation in 
everyday life”.67  It is possible that the denial of visas in cases where the sponsor fails 
to meet the earnings criteria would even cost the UK more than it would to allow the 
spouse to enter, reside and work within the UK.  Families with two adults of working 
age are more likely to have a higher income than one working age adult.  There have 
been suggestions that the Immigration Rules will cost the UK £850 million over ten 
years,
68
 identify underlying problems with the current rules, and there has been much 
publicised in the press about their disproportionate impact upon women and minority 
groups.
69
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Prior to July 2012, sponsors only had to earn around £5,500 a year, after tax and 
housing costs were deducted,  which seemed “remarkably low”,70 and inadequate to 
prevent dependency upon the state.  The Migration Advisory Committee advised 
various income thresholds, with £18,600 being the lowest- the income at which a two 
person household no longer needs Housing Benefit.
71
  The Statement of Intent 
published in 2012 about the new immigration rules states that “The UK benefits from 
immigration but not from uncontrolled immigration.”72  To tackle the perceived 
problem of too much immigration and an escalating benefits bill, the introduction of a 
minimum earnings requirement does not seem to be a disproportionate with an 
individual’s right to family life.  Instead, it is the strictness of application of this 
income requirement which seems most problematic for the UK’s respect for family 
life- no judicial discretion is permitted.  The Secretary of State has decided that 
£18,600 is a proportionate earnings requirement, and judges have to apply this rule:  
“The new Immigration Rules are intended to fill this public policy vacuum [of 
courts determining what is proportionate] by setting out the Secretary of State’s 
position on proportionality and to meet the democratic deficit by seeking 
Parliament’s agreement to her policy. The rules will state how the balance 
should be struck between the public interest and individual rights, taking into 
account relevant case law, and thereby provide for a consistent and fair 
decision-making process. Therefore, if the rules are proportionate, a decision 
taken in accordance with the Rules will, other than in exceptional cases, be 
compatible with Article 8.”73 
The strict application of the minimum income requirement is particularly troublesome 
for UK domestic citizens and TCN nationals when Chakroun
74
 is considered, as the 
UK is treating individuals’ family members less favourably than under EU law, not 
only when compared to family members of Union citizens, but also to those of TCN 
residents in other Member States which have implemented Directive 2003/86 and thus 
have to carry out more balanced assessments of resources.  Despite UK efforts, 
discussed in Chapter Two, it seems difficult to legally impose strict minimum earnings 
thresholds upon economically active Union citizens living within the UK and a family 
member wanting to reside with them, as it has long been established that any level of 
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work which is more than ‘marginal and ancillary’75 qualifies a Union citizen to qualify 
as a worker, and that reliance upon social security to supplement an income is not fatal 
to the classification of worker,
76
 so a UK national may be a victim of reverse 
discrimination if the Immigration Rules are not found to be disproportionate.  
No casework discretion is allowed in assessing a sponsor’s resources - as “It is a 
matter of public policy to introduce a financial requirement based on an income 
threshold for this form of sponsorship, and a threshold means a threshold: it must be 
clear and consistent in all cases.”77 So if a sponsor earned £18,000 per annum, just 
under the required amount, instead of the income of their spouse if they were offered a 
job within the UK, or any property they own being taken into account, they would 
have to show almost £18,000 in savings.  Where a sponsor has no income, they require 
£62,500 in savings, which seems very restrictive- particularly in relation to the rights 
of domestic citizens who would be refused entry of their TCN spouse due to this.   
The peculiarity that the sponsor alone must earn the required threshold creates an 
artificial comparator - if the sponsor was not likely to be the primary earner once the 
couple were united in the UK it seems unreasonable that a main earner’s income 
potential cannot even be considered.  The requirement of significant savings if the 
sponsor earns less than the required amount creates an obstacle difficult for many 
families to overcome.  This would be most likely to have a negative impact upon UK 
citizens’ TCN partners’ rights to family reunification- as a TCN resident/settled person 
would most likely have a visa to work, and hence have fulfilled the criteria to enter as 
a worker under the Points Based System.  However, a sponsor’s pregnancy, illness, 
disability or caring obligations could be fatal to their earning over the threshold, and 
hence fatal to the application for their spouse’s residence within the UK, unless they 
had significant savings (though excluding evidence of resources such as a family 
home) which again reveals discrimination against the least wealthy applicants.   
Fundamental rights considerations cannot mitigate the application of the rules: in 
Gulshan,
78
 the Upper Tribunal judges determined that ‘free-wheeling Article 8 
analysis’ was not the correct approach, as the Immigration Rules addressed family 
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members’ positions.79  The judges also recognised that “the case law on Article 8 is 
vast” so did not fully engage with it: “we do not intend to add to the problem.”80  This 
case was identified as ‘run of the mill’, but the approach of the Upper Tribunal to the 
problem is disappointing; the Immigration Rules’ effect upon UK citizens’ lives 
should never be considered run of the mill.  While separating families on a daily basis 
in accordance with strict rules may be easier, it should not be the final analysis for the 
courts and tribunals of the UK. 
2. The TCN Partners of UK Nationals or TCN Residents within the UK 
To qualify for family reunification within the UK as a partner of a UK/TCN resident, a 
partner must be above the age of 18,
81
 although there were suggestions to raise this 
minimum age to counter-sham marriages these were not implemented: as Wiesbrock 
highlighted, there is no reason to think that raising age combats forced marriages,
82
 and 
the Supreme Court undermined the initiative in Quila.
83
  In 2008, the Home Secretary 
raised the minimum age for grant of a marriage visa from 18 to 21 in order to deter 
forced marriages.
84
  Quila was a case for judicial review brought by the Chilean spouse 
of a British citizen who was refused a marriage visa under the Immigration Rules when 
his wife turned 18.  There was no question of the marriage being forced, and he had to 
prove interference with Article 8 ECHR rights.  The Supreme Court declined to follow 
the “old” decision of Abdulaziz v UK,85 that Article 8 ECHR was not easily engaged on 
entry cases, as it was decided with dissent at the time and had been superseded.  The 
inquiry was whether interference with the right to reside was justified.
86
  Lord Brown 
dissented, finding that considerations of rules tackling forced marriage should be for 
government.
87
 
Combating forced marriages by an age increase for visas did not justify the 
interference with Article 8 ECHR: the Supreme Court failed to find that the 
amendment was necessary, or evidence that the balance between harm caused to 
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genuine marriages and prevention of forced marriages was fair.  The UK rules placed 
greater restrictions upon UK spouses than EU law does upon the spouses of Union 
citizens residing within the UK, though the Supreme Court’s decision put pressure on 
the government to remove the requirement.   
The case demonstrates the importance of identifying justifications for interferences 
with fundamental rights, and if these are not proportionate, shows the Supreme Court’s 
ability to highlight this to the government, even if such an outcome would be 
politically unwelcome.  As Tew noted, the deciding majority’s focus on the greater 
numbers of genuine marriages impacted by the rule “appears to ignore the potentially 
much more serious infringement of the rights of individuals forced into marriage 
compared with the effects of a temporary restriction on entry that genuine couples 
suffer.”88  This case readily highlights the difficulties which states face in finding the 
right balance in order to protect the rights of individuals to marry, while protecting the 
rights of others not to be forced to marry.  It was predictable that the Supreme Court 
would find that a blanket ban was disproportionate: such policies need strong 
justifications, and the government has since considered a different approach - 
criminalising the arranging of a forced marriage instead of forbidding young people to 
marry.
89
 
Paragraph 271 of the Immigration Rules contains the current requirements placed upon 
spouses or civil partners, and states that relationships must be genuine, and subsisting, 
with an intention to live together- although this does not necessarily mean 
immediately: the Immigration Rules recognise that circumstances may prevent living 
together straight after a decision is made: “intend to live together permanently means 
an intention to live together, evidenced by a clear commitment from both parties that 
they will live together permanently in the United Kingdom immediately following the 
outcome of the application in question or as soon as circumstances permit thereafter.”90  
If the UK approach to marriage is viewed by the public as burdensome, or an undue 
interference, Swennen’s discussion of the evolving concept of marriage suggests that 
overly tight regulations may not receive widespread support.  His analysis of the 
changing role of marriage vis-à-vis the State, and, indeed, family reproduction, leads to 
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a conclusion that interference by the State in an individual’s private life is less 
acceptable now than in previous years: “The emphasis is now on the spouses' 
fundamental right to marry; the legitimation of the limitation thereof must meet higher 
requirements.”91 
a. Tackling Immigration 
UK immigration law has responded to changing dynamics over the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, and the government has made clear that it intends to reduce 
immigration.
92
   Following this aim, the family route is relatively painless to tackle, as 
there are less obvious financial ramifications than, for instance, limiting the numbers 
of TCN students able to attend university in the UK.  The approach adopted by the UK 
in relation to what it viewed as ‘abuse’ of Union citizens’ rights to family 
reunification, evidenced particularly in Chen and Metock in relation to Union 
citizenship,
93
 was found to be incorrect by the CJEU, and this is largely similar to the 
approach of the UK courts.  In Chen, the UK government contended that: 
“the appellants in the main proceedings are not entitled to rely on the Community 
provisions in question because Mrs Chen’s move to Northern Ireland with the aim 
of having her child acquire the nationality of another Member State constitutes an 
attempt improperly to exploit the provisions of Community law. The aims pursued 
by those Community provisions are not, in its view, served where a national of a 
non-member country wishing to reside in a Member State, without however 
moving or wishing to move from one Member State to another, arranges matters in 
such a way as to give birth to a child in a part of the host Member State to which 
another Member State applies its rules governing acquisition of nationality jure 
soli. It is, in their view, settled case-law that Member States are entitled to take 
measures to prevent individuals from improperly taking advantage of provisions of 
Community law or from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the 
Treaty, illegally to circumvent national legislation...”94 
As the CJEU made clear, it is not the place of the EU to determine citizenship: if 
Union citizenship is validly acquired through the genuine and legal acquisition of 
national citizenship under a Member State’s laws, the EU cannot find this is an abuse 
of law.  This is similar to the UK courts’ approach to the government’s restrictive laws 
in relation to marriages of convenience: where the UK contended that marrying in 
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order to gain immigration benefits is an abuse, the courts did not agree, and forced a 
change in the primary legislation of the UK. 
b. Marriages of Convenience 
As the UK has stated aims to reduce the numbers of immigrants to the country, one 
method of achieving this has been to attack ‘abuse’ of the family immigration route.  
Particularly, the notion of ‘marriages of convenience’ has been much debated, and the 
potential for abuse of immigration law in order to live within the UK has effected 
changes in the law.  The Immigration Rules outline how the UK defines relationships 
of convenience, but here focus is only upon marriages of convenience.  Prior to the 
2012 updates to the Immigration Rules, the UK government outlined how it intended 
to approach marriages of convenience, or ‘sham marriages’, making clear that the 
Secretary of State was concerned about this as abuse of immigration law.
95
 
The Council of the European Union defines marriages of convenience as marriages 
concluded “with the sole aim of circumventing the rules on entry and residence of 
third-country nationals and obtaining for the third-country national a residence permit 
or authority to reside”.96   The Council Resolution’s definition of a marriage of 
convenience is narrower than the definition of a ‘sham marriage’ in section 24(5) of 
the Immigration and Asylum Act,
97
 which defines such a marriage as one entered into 
“for the purpose of avoiding the effect of” UK immigration law, which is potentially 
much broader.
98
  Marriages of convenience remain valid marriages for the purposes of 
UK law;
99
 it is just the immigration consequences (and potential for criminality) which 
change.  A finding that a marriage is one of convenience gives the UK grounds for 
refusing entry and residence rights to the spouse relying upon rights derived from their 
partner.  The European Commission has issued guidance on this,
100
 in relation to 
Union citizens’ marriages, but it is possible that the UK’s approach to assessing 
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whether a marriage is one ‘of convenience’ goes beyond what is proportionate in 
relation to TCN/domestic citizens’ partners.   
Finding that marriages aim solely to circumvent the rules of entry and residence is 
complicated: it requires consideration of many factors, including cultural influences, 
and the judgments of single assessors can be determinative of individuals’ rights.  It is 
for this reason that careful guidance has to be in place, and assumptions about marriage 
must be avoided.
101
  The UK Statement of Intent recognised that cases must be 
assessed on an individual basis, and that entry clearance officers and caseworkers must 
“remain alert and sensitive to the extent to which religious and cultural practices may 
shape the factors present or absent in a particular case...”102  The difficulties faced by 
individual assessors to determine accurately whether a given marriage is genuine or of 
convenience are very real, and the Home Office updates its guidance regularly. 
i. The UK’s previous approach to countering marriages of convenience: 
Certificates of Approval 
To counter marriages of convenience and “a suspected increase in the abuse of EC law, 
as a ‘legal loophole’ to circumvent UK immigration rules”103 whereby individuals 
were bringing disingenuous TCN spouses into the UK, the UK introduced a scheme of 
certificates of approval, under which permission had to be granted before an individual 
residing in the UK could marry a person subject to immigration control
104
 within the 
UK.  The scheme was introduced by the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004,
105
 and 
aimed to control marriages within the UK where one partner was a TCN.  It was 
justified by the Home Office to protect against “an improper advantage [that could be] 
obtained by persons subject to immigration control, who were marrying British 
citizens and EEA nationals and in so doing improving their immigration position.”106   
However, the scheme, which was one of various UK efforts to prevent “not only the 
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entry of those who may have entered a sham marriage, but immigration through 
marriage generally”107 like older restrictive schemes, has now been repealed.108  The 
UK has been active in its response to ‘abuse’ of immigration law, much more so than 
the EU, where cases in which the issue could have been raised do not consider it.
109
  
The need for the EU to balance respect for the core freedoms of movement and 
integrationist aims with political sensitivity is almost the opposite of UK aims to 
restrict numbers of immigrants. 
The Baiai decision of the House of Lords led to amendments of the requirements of 
potential TCN-spouses having to ask permission to marry within the UK,
110
  unless the 
marriage was to be conducted by the Church of England, pay a fixed fee of £295 and 
the citizen residing within the UK have ‘sufficient leave to remain’ in order to obtain a 
certificate permitting marriage.  The Court of Appeal in Baiai had made declarations 
of incompatibility with Article 12 ECHR,
111
 which were not followed by the House of 
Lords, save as to the discrimination between civil and Anglican marriages.  The House 
of Lords did, however, dismiss the Secretary of State’s appeal against the decision that 
the certification scheme was a disproportionate interference with the Article 12 ECHR 
right to marry.  As Richard Drabble QC, Eric Fripp and Charles Banner submitted, 
“The scheme function[ed] in a manner which is impervious to or careless of the 
distinction between marriage on the one hand and sham marriage on the other”112 so 
while the aim of preventing sham marriages could justify some legal intervention, it 
could not justify the disproportionate impact upon other marriages.  The House of 
Lords recognised that the fundamental right to marry was not absolute, but that it was a 
strong right, and measures limiting it must constitute a legitimate aim and be 
justifiable.
113
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The House of Lords followed ECHR case-law in requiring the balancing of the rights 
of the individual with the interests of the community.
114
  The court found that “It is 
open to a member state, consistently with article 12, to seek to prevent marriages of 
convenience.”115  However, the conditions imposed did not determine the genuineness 
of a marriage, so were disproportionate.  Following the Baiai judgment, the UK 
suspended the requirement to pay fees for the marriage certificate of approval, and a 
scheme was set up to repay fees to applicants who, at the time their application was 
made, met a financial hardship test.   
A later incarnation of the original certificate of approval scheme came before the 
European Court of Human Rights, in O’Donoghue,116 and was also disproportionate: 
“under all three versions applicants with “sufficient” leave to remain qualified without 
any investigation of the genuineness of their proposed marriages.”117  The entire 
scheme was open to criticism for a lack of compliance with ECHR requirements.
118
   
The general principle of proportionality requires that measures are appropriate and 
necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by legislation, but 
additionally that where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, the 
legislature has chosen the least onerous option, and the disadvantages caused must not 
be disproportionate to the aim pursued.     
ii. The Current UK Approach to Assessment of Potential Marriages of 
Convenience 
Assessing the validity of marriages can be extremely difficult- certain types of 
marriage may seem more likely to be marriages of convenience from a UK perspective 
than others, such as proxy marriages, which are not able to be conducted under UK 
law.  As long as the requirements of the law under which the marriage was conducted 
are executed properly, proxy marriages are valid, as applied in CB,
119
 where the 
tribunal emphasised that it was the validity of the marriage as governed by the lex loci 
celebrationis, rather than law of the country of domicile, which was important.
120
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More complicated, however, is the assessment of whether a marriage is genuine when 
it does not follow the accepted ‘marital norms’ in relation to parties living together, or 
sharing resources etc., which can often be expected.  However, there is no requirement 
inherent in a concept of marriage that spouses must live in the same household: 
“[m]ost couples marry because they intend to live together but that is not axiomatic as 
demonstrated by couples who choose to maintain separate households, “living apart 
together”.”121   Shared resources and a common household can be useful indicators of a 
genuine marriage, but cannot be the only indicators- families may need to live apart for 
work or other reasons, and, in relation to EEA spouses, the tribunal in  PM
122
 
recognised that a restrictive test in relation to assessing the phrase ‘residing with’ for 
the purposes of acquisition of permanent residence under Regulation 15(1)(b) would 
not be compatible with the approach of the Court of Justice; residence within the same 
state- i.e. the UK, sufficed,
123
 just as it ought to for spouses under the Immigration 
Rules. 
iii. Proving a marriage is one ‘of convenience’ 
The Secretary of State must prove that a marriage is ‘of convenience’- it is not for 
couples to demonstrate that they are not in a marriage of convenience.  The standard of 
proof applied is the normal civil standard- ion the balance of probabilities a marriage 
must be shown to be of convenience: and “[t]he important matter to note is that a 
marriage [of convenience] must be concluded with the sole aim of circumventing 
immigration rules in order to be a marriage of convenience. A marriage where there is 
additional aim, is not such a marriage.”124   
An assessment of a marriage as a relationship of convenience is fatal to the TCN 
partner’s entitlement to family reunification on the basis of the Immigration Rules.  
The UK appreciates the importance of ensuring that mistakes are avoided, although 
suggestions for ensuring this is achieved in practice are not fool-proof, such as 
“Interviewing the couple separately, or with their family members. For sham, this 
could be used to check if the couple really know each other and if family members can 
verify that the relationship is genuine. For forced marriage, interviews could be used to 
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check that the marriage is consensual.”125  If the couple do not actually know each 
other very well, due to the marriage being a consensual arranged marriage, then the 
application interviews may make it seem likely to the authorities that the marriage is a 
sham, despite this not being the case.  The challenge the UK faces is to ensure that its 
assessments respect the ECHR right to family life, while allowing the government to 
remain to be seen to be tackling abuse of national immigration law.
126
   
As Charsley and Benson noted- there is no “binary divide” between marriages entered 
into for good or bad reasons- “An immigration motive for marriage must be seen in 
that context. Immigration status may add to a potential spouse's attractions without it 
being the only reason for marriage”,127 which makes accurately proving marriages are 
actually of convenience very difficult.  The courts have shown that schemes introduced 
by the Secretary of State have been disproportionate in relation to assessing the 
genuineness of marriage, and have relied upon the ECHR to do this: European 
principles from both the ECtHR and the CJEU are relevant to national Immigration 
Rules, and have helped to protect individuals’ rights to family life. 
3. The Potential for Europeanisation of Immigration Law 
a. The Immigration Rules 
In exercising her competence over immigration and making changes to the 
Immigration Rules, the Secretary of State for the Home Department can sidestep 
Parliament by not formally submitting the changes to parliamentary scrutiny.  MM 
emphasised that this means that all provisions have not been debated before 
Parliament.
128
  The Munir
129
 and Alvi
130
 cases consider the circumstances in which the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) needs to present changes to the 
Immigration Rules to Parliament under Article 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971: 
“"The Secretary of State shall from time to time (and as soon as may be) lay 
before Parliament statements of the rules, or of any changes in the rules, laid 
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down by him as to the practice to be followed in the administration of this Act 
for regulating the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom of persons 
required by this Act to have leave to enter...”131 
The distinction to be drawn between acting on her prerogative and issuing guidance for 
immigration for which Parliamentary approval is not needed, and creating new 
Immigration Rules- for which approval is needed- is vital for the legitimate application 
of the Secretary of State’s current Immigration Rules.  Munir found that “it is the 1971 
Act itself which is the source of the Secretary of State's power to grant leave to enter or 
remain outside the immigration rules. The Secretary of State is given a wide 
discretion… to control the grant and refusal of leave to enter or to remain… [The 
provisions] provide clearly and without qualification that, where a person is not a 
British citizen, he may be given leave to enter or limited or indefinite leave to remain 
in the United Kingdom. They authorise the Secretary of State to grant leave to enter or 
remain even where leave would not be given under the immigration rules.”132  The 
decision in this case was that the changes made by the Secretary of State were under 
her prerogative, and so not subject to the Article 3(2) requirement of being laid before 
Parliament,
133
 as they did not constitute new rules and so did not merit consideration 
by Parliament. 
Assuming the introduction of the financial requirements is simply guidance, rather 
than a new rule, and hence not needing Parliamentary approval under the Immigration 
Act 1971, it is difficult to see how the Secretary of State for the Home Department has 
already determined the application of proportionality considerations.  The statement 
that it is “the Department’s view that the new Rules on family life and private life are 
compatible with ECHR Article 8”134 cannot remove the possibility of a judicial finding 
that this is not the case.  This is despite the fact that proportionality is not a traditional 
common law concept.
135
 
Where rules have explicitly taken proportionality into account, as the Immigration 
Rules have, the role of the courts is explicitly excluded from reviewing the 
proportionality of application, so potentially could shift from reviewing the application 
and likely results in an individual case, to reviewing the proportionality of the rules 
themselves.  The Statement of Intent “intended [the Immigration Rules] to fill [the] 
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public policy vacuum” whereby courts were previously left to glean Parliament’s 
understanding of proportionality without explicit guidance, through the Secretary of 
State’s position on proportionality being inbuilt to the legislation.136  This is contrary 
to the normal balancing acts courts apply in relation to proportionality assessments, 
but, of course, more conducive to legal certainty.   
b. European Developments  
Peers identified that the Commission intended to update the Family Reunification 
Directive, highlighting the main changes,
137
 and showing that, generally, the rights of 
TCN residents would be strengthened by the EU.  Taking Chakroun into consideration, 
the rights of TCN residents seem to be slowly becoming more similar to those of 
Union citizens.  This would represent a move towards greater equality of rights, which 
Pobjoy and Spencer highlight as an excellent aim in itself,
138
 but, with the potential 
increasing of rights of TCN residents within the EU, the unaffected residents of EU 
Member States, their domestic citizens potentially suffer under more stringent rules 
with regard to family reunification, and the treatment of TCNs in the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark obviously would remain unaffected. 
c. Sustainability of the UK’s restrictive approach 
Given progressive developments within EU law in relation to both the rights of Union 
citizens, as discussed in Chapter One, and TCN residents as discussed above, the UK’s 
restrictive approach to the family members of its own citizens seems out of step with 
the developing rights of other EU Member States.  In relation to maintaining a strict 
approach to TCN residents’ families, the UK may have a stronger argument to put to 
domestic citizens than against restricting the rights of domestic citizens far more than 
of their mobile Union citizen counterparts.  Reverse discrimination, when highlighted 
in such a way, can put pressure on the governments of Member States which are 
obliged to treat Union citizens more favourably than they choose to treat their own 
citizens to change such laws in order to ensure that the citizen who does not move is 
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not penalised: “there are still significant gaps in the protection of migrants in the 
domestic context”.139 
4. Conclusions  
The Directive on Family Reunification has been interpreted with the CJEU taking a 
‘Union citizenship’ approach in Chakroun - the Court followed its principles of 
applying proportionality assessments to the requirements imposed by Member States 
and identified that the strict application of a rule making it extremely difficult for 
under 23 year olds to be joined by a spouse was disproportionate.
140
  The rights of 
TCNs under EU law in all Member States but the UK, Ireland and Denmark require 
similar, though slightly more restrictive criteria to be met by the sponsor than under 
Directive 2004/38, and are rights only within the host state- so these are rights for 
stationary TCNs, as opposed to moving Union citizens.   
The UK’s Immigration Rules apply to both TCNs and UK citizens, and have been 
subject to many changes, with 2012 introducing an immovable requirement of an 
income of £18,600 per annum by the sponsor, or significant savings to counter any 
shortfalls.  The proportionality of these Rules has been assured by the Home Office’s 
Statement of Intent, but the UK’s attempt to remove the jurisdiction of the domestic 
courts in proportionality assessments in all but exceptional circumstances is unlikely to 
succeed.  Though the Secretary of State can introduce guidance and rules under her 
prerogative under the Immigration Act of 1971, she should not dictate to the courts 
how the general principle of proportionality works in individual cases.   
In cases where applicants fall only slightly short of the £18,600 requirement, it seems 
inherently disproportionate to require they have £16,000 plus 2.5 times the value of the 
shortfall in savings, without being able to consider owning a home, or the fact that the 
spouse has a high-earning potential if family reunification rights were to succeed.  
While not an interference with the Article 12 ECHR right to marry, the income 
requirement can clearly interfere with the right to enjoy family life in the UK.  The 
difficulty in families overcoming this obstacle, as the Right Honourable Lady Justice 
Arden reminds us, is that proportionality, though an ancient concept, does not come 
from common law.
141
  This means that, in order to challenge the legislation, the more 
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burdensome test of Wednesbury unreasonableness would have to be passed,
142
 unless 
the UK judiciary find that the Immigration Rules are not compatible with the UK’s 
obligations under the Human Rights Act. 
The insistence upon the artificial division of labour between a couple - and the 
recognition of only the resident’s earnings if the TCN spouse to be sponsored is highly 
skilled may prove difficult for Courts to apply strictly: Blake J in MM found this 
condition the most striking of the Rules, and it does not seem to serve much 
purpose.
143
  Just as the refusal to recognise third party support makes little sense if the 
government’s aims are accepted as being simply to reduce reliance upon social 
security, the potential for a spouse to work should not be ignored.  However, as the 
Secretary of State intended, legal certainty is improved if the requirements are strictly 
applied, and there would be little risk of a spouse becoming dependent upon social 
security if they had the massive savings required under the Rules where the income is 
insufficient. 
Discussion of the UK’s approach to marriages of convenience was intended to 
highlight the focus within the UK of ‘tackling’ migration through family routes, and 
having to advance different schemes to make this acceptable before the courts.  
Additionally, it highlights the difficulties in accurately assessing the genuineness of 
marriages.  There is nothing inherently wrong with TCN partners joining their UK 
domestic national spouse, or a TCN spouse residing within the UK and being subject 
to certain conditions- but the approach of the UK put relationships under scrutiny 
which meant that the Certificate of Approval Scheme could not be compatible with the 
ECHR right to marry, even though a number of ‘sham’ marriages may be abusing 
immigration law. 
The EU’s approach to the rights of TCNs and Union citizens alike to family 
reunification underlines the great respect for family life and family reunification which 
the Court of Justice shows, its Union citizenship based reasoning is no longer restricted 
to Union citizens, and the Court is consistent in its application of proportionality 
assessments.  However, the CJEU does not act alone, and the other institutions also 
play a part in developing the legislative framework in which family reunification 
within the EU is possible.  The EU seems to recognise, much more than the UK 
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legislature, that integration of residents is important: Union citizens or TCNs are more 
likely to settle within a Member State and work there happily and productively if their 
family members are able to join them.  Family reunification seems to be key to 
integration, and high financial requirements seem likely to preclude this possibility for 
many within the UK.  As such, alternate routes to family reunification under EU law as 
interpreted by the CJEU are the subject of Chapters Four and Five. 
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Chapter Four 
Residence Rights from beyond Directive 2004/38:  
Complex cross-border links and developing theories 
As had been made clear in Chapter Three, UK law concerning TCN immigration is 
more onerous than EU law, even where the sponsor is a UK citizen.  A UK citizen 
working within the UK is not necessarily entitled to be joined by TCN family members 
- family members have no guarantees under immigration law without substantial 
earnings or savings on the part of the UK citizen, and the challenges families face to 
demonstrate residence rights are far more burdensome than the requirements placed 
upon Union citizens residing within the UK under Directive 2004/38.
1
  This chapter 
explores the potential for residence rights outside of the Citizens’ Directive, but still 
under EU law, and assesses how the UK has adapted to the requirements placed upon 
it to comply with developing CJEU case law.  It aims to show that, since the 
introduction of the more onerous Immigration Rules in 2012, the UK has been less 
willing to recognise EU rights of residence for its citizens’ family members.  As 
entitlements under EU law can be more generous than UK policy, when a link can be 
established so as to make EU law relevant, a UK citizen (as a Union citizen), should 
take advantage of such a link, and this chapter considers the efficacy of UK legislation 
to enable UK citizens to do so. 
This chapter does not consider the citizenship article, Article 20 TFEU, as this is 
discussed separately in Chapter Five.  Instead, it assesses the ways in which the CJEU 
has been able to find rights of residence for the family members of Union citizens 
based upon what were initially somewhat vague notions of respecting a Union citizen’s 
ability to exercise free movement rights under the Treaty.  The idea of the purely 
internal rule, or ‘wholly internal situation’ is in the background to many of the 
decisions considered in this chapter, making clarity of reasoning by the CJEU very 
important, to establish exactly when Union citizens can rely upon EU law, and to make 
the principles workable for domestic courts. 
                                                     
1
 Council Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004, on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, 77–123 
89 
 
This chapter tracks the development of case law, identifying patterns which can be 
applied within domestic courts.  In doing so, it primarily considers the development of 
‘return’ cases in relation to residence rights, although Union citizens’ rights to social 
security and educational grants following their return to a given Member State have 
also been developed by the Court.
2
  The essential element triggering the applicability 
of EU law in many of the cases discussed below is the potential to discourage the 
enjoyment of free movement rights, and there is an important temporal consideration 
in these cases: enjoyment of free movement is not simply a right of Union citizens at a 
given time in the present, it is something which is reflected in their past, and 
potentially, future, too.  If a Union citizen would have been discouraged from 
exercising the right to free movement had they known what the result would have been 
upon their return, they can potentially rely upon EU law to change this result, and 
similarly, if a law means that a Union citizen is unlikely to be able to avail themselves 
of their rights as Union citizens in the future due to a particular law, it may not be 
permitted under EU law.   
The second section considers rights of residence directly from Treaty provisions (other 
than Article 20 TFEU), as, in addition to Article 21 TFEU, Treaty Articles seemingly 
unlikely to contain residence rights have been shown to do so to great effect.  The third 
section assesses some of the rights upon which family members can rely contained in 
secondary legislation other than Directive 2004/38, and shows why the Directive, with 
its various economic requirements, cannot be a comprehensive source of residence 
rights for all Union citizens at all times.   
1. Return cases 
Surinder Singh
3
 predated the introduction of Union citizenship and involved a UK 
national and her TCN husband who moved to Germany to live and work before 
returning to the UK, where Mr Singh was granted limited leave to remain.  The couple 
began divorce proceedings with a decree nisi pronounced in July 1987, and the UK 
refused to grant Mr Singh indefinite leave to remain as the spouse of a UK citizen 
following this pronouncement.  His limited leave expired in May 1988 and deportation 
proceedings commenced.  The divorce was not finalised until February 1989.  The UK 
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argued that the right of entry and residence was under domestic law and so was subject 
to UK rules, but the CJEU found that the Mrs Singh’s work in Germany altered this, 
stating that a national of a Member State might be deterred from leaving their home 
state in order to exercise their right to work or to be self-employed in another Member 
State if “the conditions of his entry and residence were not at least equivalent to those 
which he would enjoy under the Treaty or secondary law in the territory of another 
Member State.”4  The CJEU further found that the movement of family members was 
particularly important for ensuring that Member State nationals are not deterred from 
exercising free movement rights.
5
  Mr Singh was thus entitled to enjoy “at least the 
same rights” as if his spouse had entered and resided in another Member State.6   
The case did not meet with universal acclaim, and Watson criticised the Court’s 
solution, suggesting that it would have been more logical for the Court to have 
addressed the rights of returning migrant workers more directly, ruling “that they 
should be no more and no less in quantum or quality that those which he or she had 
when he left home to seek his or her fortunes abroad.”7  However, this was not the 
approach taken by the CJEU, and it was not a one-off, being affirmed in Eind.
8
  In this 
decision, the Court applied Surinder Singh and made clear that a national of a Member 
State can be deterred from leaving that Member State to exercise a right to work within 
another Member State “if he does not have the certainty of being able to return to his 
Member State of origin, irrespective of whether he is going to engage in economic 
activity in the latter State.”9  Craig and De Bùrca summarised this: “a citizen is less 
likely to travel if he believes that he will not be able to later return to his home country 
with his family.  This is so even if the members of the EU citizen’s family included a 
third country national who did not have a right to reside in his home country when he 
initially left, and it was not material in this respect that the EU national returning home 
did not intend to engage in economic activity”10  The intention of the EU citizen who 
moved to work upon return to their home Member State was unimportant in Eind,
11
 
instead, as Bierbach noted, the Court’s focus was upon the rights of the ‘citizen of the 
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Union’, who had replaced the ‘Community national’ previously in the central role in 
case law on TCN family members’ residence rights.12 
The potential for family members’ lack of rights of residence in one state deterring a 
Union citizen’s movement to another gives a potential link to EU law, and means that 
situations which seem to be internal to one Member State are not necessarily so.  The 
Surinder Singh approach has been seized upon by some UK citizens hoping to escape 
the newly restrictive rules introduced in 2012 concerning family reunification for UK 
citizens who have no link to EU law.
13
  The availability of the Surinder Singh ‘route’ 
means that the UK is less able to control who may live within its territory, if UK 
nationals decide to avail themselves of the right to exercise one of their fundamental 
freedoms within another Member State.   
It was important, then, that the CJEU had confirmed that there is no abuse of law 
where the intention of an individual when exercising their right of free movement was 
to activate residence rights within another state.  The Court did this in Akrich,
14
 where 
it made clear that “the motives which may have prompted a worker of a Member State 
to seek employment in another Member State are of no account as regards his right to 
enter and reside in the territory of the latter State provided that he there pursues or 
wishes to pursue an effective and genuine activity”.15  Akrich preceded the 
implementation deadline of Directive 2004/38, and, while Faull stated that it “can be 
said not to be a reading of the Directive at all”,16 as a general principle, the approach of 
the CJEU still stands.
17
    
The UK authorities have recognised the potential for residence based upon Surinder 
Singh, but have not made it simple for family members to learn about it: information 
contained in the ‘EEA family permit’ section of the newly updated government 
                                                     
12
 Jeremy B. Bierbach, 'Right of residence affirmed for a family member who is a third-country national 
upon the return of a Union citizen to the member state of which he is a national, even when the Union 
citizen no longer carries on any effective and genuine economic activities. Grand Chamber decision of 
11 December 2007, Case C-291/05, Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. R.N.G. Eind' 
(2008) 4 European Constitutional Law Review 344, 346 
13
 See Catrin Nye, 'The Britons Leaving the UK to get their Relatives In' BBC 25 June 2013, at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23029195 last accessed 21 March 2014 
14
 Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] ECR I-09607 
15
 ibid para 55 
16
 Jonathan Faull, ‘‘Prohibition of Abuse of Law’: A New General Principle of EU Law,’ in Rita de la 
Feria and Stefan Vogenauer (eds), Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law? 
(Hart Publishing 2011) 292 
17
 This is discussed further in relation to the determination of what constitutes ‘genuine’ exercise of 
Treaty rights in Case C-456/12 O v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v B, Judgment of the Court, 12 March 2014, nyr 
92 
 
services and information website states that British citizens are ineligible for EEA 
family permits for their family members,
18
 and it is only in the separate Guidance on 
EEA family permits that the Surinder Singh route is mentioned.
19
  The website thus 
has the potential to mislead British citizens and their family members seeking to 
understand how EEA family permits work; unless a UK citizen already had knowledge 
of Surinder Singh, it would be easy to assume that, as stated on the EEA family 
permits page, only EEA nationals from states other than the UK are capable of being 
joined by family members who are eligible for an EEA family permit.  This difficulty 
is not the only one a UK citizen and family member face in having their rights as 
returning Union citizen and family member recognised. 
Recent updates to the Immigration (EEA) Regulations,
20
 which came into force on 1 
January 2014, amended Regulation 9 in relation to the family members of British 
citizens, so as to read:  
“(1) If the conditions in paragraph (2) are satisfied, these Regulations apply to a person who is 
the family member of a British citizen as if the British citizen (“P”) were an EEA national.  
(2) The conditions are that—  
(a) P is residing in an EEA State as a worker or self-employed person or was so 
residing before returning to the United Kingdom;  
(b) if the family member of P is P’s spouse or civil partner, the parties are living 
together in the EEA State or had entered into the marriage or civil partnership and 
were living together in the EEA State before the British citizen returned to the United 
Kingdom; and  
(c) the centre of P’s life has transferred to the EEA State where P resided as a worker 
or self-employed person.”21  
 
Each condition is problematic.  The first requires the Union citizen to have been a 
worker or self-employed within the host Member State, which is no longer in line with 
EU law following O and B.
22
  The second condition restricts the family members to the 
spouse or civil partner of a Union citizen, which was not the Court’s approach in Eind 
– where a dependent child was considered to be a family member and entitled to rely 
upon a derivative right of residence.  The third condition most encapsulates the UK’s 
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hardening approach.  The transfer of ‘the centre of [the UK citizen]’s life’ to another 
Member State is not something Surinder Singh necessarily requires.  The test is 
expanded upon in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Amendment: 
“7.11 …The new regulation 9 of the 2006 Regulations introduces a requirement that the British 
citizen must have transferred the ‘centre of their life’ to another member State before their 
family members can benefit from the Singh provisions. Whether or not a British citizen has 
transferred the centre of their life to another member State will be assessed by reference to a 
number of criteria, including the length of residence, the degree of integration and whether or 
not the British citizen has moved their principal residence to that other [M]ember State.  
7.12 These changes have been made to ensure that there has been a genuine and effective use 
of free movement rights in the other [M]ember State before such rights may apply by analogy 
upon return to the UK. The Singh judgment sought to prevent a possible deterrent to the 
exercise of free movement rights; such a deterrent can only occur if the British citizen intends 
to exercise rights genuinely and effectively in another member State. This paragraph will also 
have the effect of preventing abuse by those British citizens who move temporarily to another 
member State in order to circumvent the requirements of the usual immigration rules for their 
family members upon return to the UK.”23  
The aim of ensuring that there has been a ‘genuine and effective use of free movement 
rights’ is compatible with the CJEU decisions in Surinder Singh and Eind, but the UK 
amendment goes further than this.  Its linking of ‘abuse’ with the exercise of free 
movement rights when UK/Union citizens move to another Member State ‘in order to 
circumvent the requirements’ appears to be the reason for the introduction of the more 
onerous test.  The UK seemingly equates genuine exercise of EU freedoms as 
excluding any such exercise where there could be a separate motivation of having an 
effect upon immigration rights upon return.   
This appears to be contrary to EU law as the CJEU has emphatically stated that the 
motive for exercise of a free movement right is irrelevant: it is the genuineness of the 
exercise of Treaty rights which Member States are entitled to investigate.
24
  This was 
established long before Surinder Singh was decided – for example, Levin demonstrated 
that taking up a part-time low-paid job with the aim of gaining worker status still 
entitled the worker to be recognised as such, as long as there was ‘effective and 
genuine’ work.25  The Court considered the purpose for the movement, or the 
objectives of the (then) EEC national, Ms Levin, and did not find that the objective of 
movement had to be solely to accept offers of employment within another Member 
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State, provided the pursuit of employment was genuine: “the motives which may have 
prompted the worker to seek employment in the member state concerned are of no 
account and must not be taken into consideration.”26   
The CJEU later showed that the acquisition of Union citizenship with intent to benefit 
from EU law is not abuse of EU law.  In Chen,
27
 the motivation of giving birth in 
Ireland in order to gain Irish nationality and hence Union citizenship with the ability to 
move and reside within the EU was no abuse of law – Irish or EU.  The CJEU has been 
reluctant to limit the recognition of exercise of Treaty freedoms to those freedoms 
exercised purely for their own sake: working solely for money or work, etc.  Union 
citizens do not necessarily only have one motivation for any exercise of a Treaty right, 
and there is no justification for the UK to exclude genuine exercise of Treaty freedoms 
with the intent of avoiding the Immigration Rules.  Furthermore, by limiting its 
recognition to when a UK citizen has transferred their entire lives to another Member 
State, the UK has gone beyond the Court’s approach in Surinder Singh or Eind, where 
neither case contained any reference to a desire on the part of the Union citizen to 
remain permanently or indefinitely within the host Member State before their return, 
which is something that such a transfer could require.  Similarly, a transfer of life 
requirement was not the approach of the CJEU in the recently decided O and B case.
28
   
Exercising a Treaty freedom with another aim cannot be prevented under EU law, and 
should not be treated any differently than exercise of a Treaty freedom for the sole 
purpose of enjoyment of that freedom by the UK rules.  The Regulation 9 factors for 
assessing whether there has been a transfer of the centre of life include period of 
residence, location of the UK citizens’ “principal residence” and the degree of 
integration in the host Member State.  O and B goes some way to showing that the UK 
approach of assessing the transfer of the centre of life must be incorrect, though the 
decision emphasised the importance of a ‘genuine’ exercise of rights under the Treaty, 
as well as a ‘genuine’ family life within the host Member State.29  In relation to 
assessing genuine exercise of Treaty freedoms, the UK considerations of length of 
residence and integration into the host state appear to be in line with the approach of 
the CJEU. 
                                                     
26
 ibid para 22 
27
 Case C-200/02 Chen [2004] ECR 1-09925, paras 34-37 
28
 O and B, n17 above 
29
 ibid paras 50-51 
95 
 
Both parties in O and B were TCN nationals with sponsors from the Netherlands and 
there was an element of movement to another Member State.  Mr O was Nigerian and 
lived in Spain, where he was regularly visited by his Dutch wife on holidays, though 
she retained her place of residence in the Netherlands being unable to find work in 
Spain.  Mr B was a Moroccan national and had resided within the Netherlands with his 
partner from 2002 – 2005, whereupon he was declared to be undesirable within the 
territory of the Netherlands due to use of a false passport.  He then moved to Belgium 
and lived in an apartment rented by his partner.  She resided there every weekend, and 
they married in July 2007. 
The CJEU agreed with the referring court that Directive 2004/38 established no 
derived right of residence for TCN family members in the Member State of which the 
Union citizen is a national.
30
  The Court emphasised that the reason for which 
residence rights of TCNs may be derived from Article 21(1) TFEU was the fact that a 
refusal to allow such a right of residence would interfere with the Union citizen’s 
freedom of movement by discouraging him from exercising rights of entry into and 
residence within the host Member State.  The Court reaffirmed the ‘return’ principle 
applied in Surinder Singh and Eind, and determined that this was capable of 
application to family members of Union citizens who had resided in another Member 
State exercising rights under Article 21(1) TFEU,
31
 rather than simply to family 
members of workers or the self-employed.  The reason for this was that the obstacle to 
be removed – the genuine deterrence of a Union citizen exercising their rights to free 
movement - was the same, whichever Treaty freedom was exercised.   
The Court emphasised that the Union citizen and TCN family member’s residence in 
the host Member State must have been ‘sufficiently genuine’ so as to count as family 
life, and the length of and reason for residence in the host state is relevant, which is not 
dissimilar from some of the UK’s conditions for assessing derived rights of residence.  
The Court observed that residence under Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/38 (residence 
for up to three months) does not demonstrate an attempt to create or strengthen family 
life in the host Member State, so residence to family members following Article 6 
residence in another Member State would not have to be granted in the home Member 
State. 
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Residence under Article 7(1)-(2) of Directive 2004/38 would be, in principle, capable 
of developing genuine family life, so Article 21(1) TFEU can enable that family life to 
continue within the home Member State through the recognition of a derived right of 
residence to the TCN family member.  The Court found that where a right of 
permanent residence had been granted within the host Member State, a Union citizen 
returning to their Member State of origin is entitled to be accompanied by a TCN 
family member who had also been granted the right of permanent residence within the 
host state.
32
  O and B took up AG Sharpston’s call to provide clear clarification as to 
the circumstances in which rights of residence may be derived from Article 21(1) 
TFEU,
33
 and based its approach very much upon Directive 2004/38.  The CJEU 
established the idea that residence of a Union citizen and family member under 
Articles 7 or 16 of the Directive can give rise to residence rights under Article 21(1) 
TFEU upon return to the home Member State.  The Court referred to the periods of 
residence in Surinder Singh and Eind (2.5 years and 1.5 years respectively), but did not 
suggest a minimum period of residence in a host Member State for a TCN family 
member to qualify for residence rights in reliance upon Article 21(1) TFEU within the 
Union citizen’s home state.   
The focus in O and B was to protect genuine family life which has been ‘created or 
strengthened’ within the host Member State and to prevent the refusal of residence 
rights for a family member restricting a Union citizen’s exercise of free movement 
rights.
34
  While the assessment in relation to genuine family life in the host Member 
State is left to the national court, the CJEU has made clear that temporary, intermittent 
residence does not qualify for TCN residence rights upon return under Article 21(1) 
TFEU, that a right of permanent residence in the host Member State does qualify, and 
that residence under Article 7 Directive 2004/38 can also qualify.  The CJEU 
emphasised that residence within the host state to create or strengthen family life must 
have been as family members, and followed Directive 2004/38’s definition of family 
member – so Mr B, who married his Dutch wife after she had resided in the host state 
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with him, had not been residing as a family member during that time, due to not yet 
being the spouse of a Union citizen.
35
   
In determining when this could apply, the Court suggested that the conditions to be 
fulfilled to grant TCN family members rights of residence within a returning Union 
citizen’s state of origin should not be more strict than those applied by Directive 
2004/38 under the circumstances where a Union citizen and family member live in a 
host Member State: the Directive should be applied by analogy.
36
   This may require a 
returning UK citizen to be able to fulfil the Article 7 of Directive 2004/38 conditions, 
to ‘qualify’ by analogy.  This requires clarification as it would represent a different 
approach from that taken in Eind, where the nature of the residence of the Union 
citizen in their home state was not of consequence.  It is unclear whether O and B 
requires UK citizens to show they would have qualified for residence had they held the 
nationality of another Member State, such as through working or having sufficient 
resources, and thus would have been able to bring family members to join them had 
they had the nationality of another Member State, or whether simply having genuinely 
created or strengthened family life in another Member State and returning to the 
Member State of nationality means no greater burden can be put upon the family 
member intending to join the UK citizen within the UK than upon a family member 
joining a qualified Union citizen in a host Member State. 
As identified above, O and B extended Surinder Singh from economically active 
Union citizens to any Union citizen genuinely exercising their right to free movement 
within another Member State, so the UK’s Regulation 9 requirement of being a worker 
or self-employed person in another Member State is now out of date, and thus should 
not be applied where there is genuine movement and residence under Article 21 TFEU 
and a genuine family life was enjoyed in the host state.  Given how recently O and B 
was decided, there has not yet been judicial consideration of how the Regulations 
conform to the requirements of EU law.  An additional discrepancy in approach is 
apparent in relation to the third criterion: though the CJEU in O and B was at pains to 
emphasise that, firstly, the exercise of Treaty right must be genuine and, secondly, 
family life must be genuine, it did not require so complete a move as an entire transfer 
of the Union citizen’s life to the host state.  This condition within the UK Regulations 
remains without foundation if applied strictly.   As the Court found in Prinz, 
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integration is important to establish genuine residence, but sole conditions, such as 
transfer of centre of life, may not be permitted under EU law.
37
  What is most 
discernible from the developments from Surinder Singh to O and B is the Court’s 
concern not to deter genuine exercise of movement, and a recognition that familial 
residence rights can be vital to such movement.  The Court has also been able to ensure 
residence rights for family members where there has not necessarily been much 
exercise of free movement rights by the Union citizen.  Such cases are discussed next. 
2. Rights of residence in reliance upon Treaty provisions 
In Carpenter,
38
 the CJEU reduced the effect of the purely internal rule from a different 
angle.  Guild tersely suggested that “Part of UK identity rights and duties is either not 
to marry a foreign national irregularly in the UK or if this is irresistible, not to seek to 
have the spouse live with the national in the UK.”39  Mr Carpenter did not comply with 
Guild’s suggested ‘duty’, and sought to rely upon EU law to enable his Filipina spouse 
to reside with him in the UK.  Mr Carpenter remained as a resident within the UK at 
all times, so Surinder Singh was inapplicable, but he was self-employed and provided 
some services to other Member States, exercising his rights under Article 56 TFEU, 
and thus a link to EU law was found.   
The Court held that a refusal to grant his TCN spouse a right of residence could 
interfere with Mr Carpenter’s exercise of his rights under EU law.  In addition, the 
Court also considered the effect of Mrs Carpenter’s deportation on Mr Carpenter’s 
right to respect for his family life – finding that this may constitute an infringement of 
his right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8(1) ECHR,
40
 and that 
deportation did not strike a ‘fair balance’ between the competing interests of respect 
for family life and maintenance of public order.
41
  Article 56 TFEU read in light of 
Article 8(1) ECHR precluded Mrs Carpenter’s deportation,42 and demonstrated a 
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willingness on the part of the Court to rely upon fundamental rights arguments to 
strengthen the exercise of free movement rights.
43
    
Spaventa identified three main theories used to explain the scope of the free movement 
provisions: the discrimination theory, the double burden theory and the market access 
theory.
44
  Her assessment of the developing approach to the cross border rule was 
thorough, considering developments in Gebhard,
45
 where a restrictions placed upon 
establishment as a lawyer in Italy had to be non-discriminatory, justified, suitable for 
attaining the objective, and not go beyond what was necessary:
46
 essentially, 
limitations on the right to establishment had to be proportionate.  The broadening 
approach to what fell within the ‘services’ definition, in addition to what Spaventa 
described as a more ‘interventionist’ approach in Carpenter,47 leads to the current 
confusion over when situations have sufficient proximity to EU law.  This is discussed 
in detail in Chapter Five in relation to reliance upon Article 20 TFEU, but when Union 
citizens may rely upon rights of residence from other Treaty rights is discussed below. 
Carpenter was extended by the recent decision of S and G,
48
 which was decided on the 
same day as O and B;
49
 in this case, the TCN family members claimed rights of 
residence based upon their familial relationship with Dutch citizens currently working 
within another Member State, as frontier workers.  The sponsor of S, a Ukrainian 
national, was her Dutch son-in-law, who resided in the Netherlands and made regular 
trips to Belgium for work.  The sponsor of G, a Peruvian national, was her Dutch 
husband who had established a business in Belgium and who travelled there daily to 
work.  The Court’s decision in S and G is of interest for two main reasons: firstly, it 
took the logical step to extend Carpenter to Article 45 TFEU workers, rather than 
simply service providers under Article 56 TFEU.
50
  Secondly, it reaffirmed the Court’s 
preference for determining residence based upon economic activity rather than Union 
citizenship.
51
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The Union citizen sponsors had a current link to another Member State – they were 
frontier workers, against whom the Court has already established there can be no 
discrimination due to their exercising the fundamental freedom to work in another 
Member State.
52
  The CJEU agreed that Directive 2004/38 was not applicable to S and 
G, as it establishes no derived right of residence for TCN family members in the 
Member State of which the Union citizen is a national.
53
  Instead, the Court referred to 
Carpenter,
54
 and found that the interpretation of Article 56 TFEU was transposable to 
Article 45 TFEU.
55
  The Treaty right to work within another Member State was 
interpreted as “conferring on a third country national who is the family member of a 
Union citizen a derived right of residence in the Member State of which that citizen is 
a national, where the citizen resides in that Member State but regularly travels to 
another Member State as a worker within the meaning of that provision, if the refusal 
to grant such a right of residence discourages the worker from effectively exercising 
his rights under Article 45 TFEU, which it is for the referring court to determine.”56 
As the CJEU was able to transpose the Carpenter approach to ascertaining rights of 
residence, it found that there was no reason to consider Articles 20-21 TFEU: the 
Court said these Articles “find specific expression in Article 45 TFEU in relation to 
freedom of movement for workers”,57  which echoed earlier case law.58  It is still easier 
for the CJEU to find residence rights for Union citizens who have been economically 
active in another Member State, rather than simply Union citizens who have resided in 
another Member State, which is why O and B is noteworthy  - it represents more of a 
development for family reunification than the work/service based decisions which 
preceded it.  In those decisions, the enjoyment of ‘family life’ was not assessed in the 
same way by the Court – it was not the subject of the decision, which it was in O and 
B.  Instead of simply assessing deterrent to the exercise of Treaty freedoms, the CJEU 
introduced a link between creating or strengthening family life while exercising the 
right to live in another Member State in accordance with Directive 2004/38’s 
provisions, and the right to return to a home state with the family member with whom 
a Union citizen enjoyed family life.  This case relied upon Article 21 TFEU, which 
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was earlier used to great effect to secure the residence rights of Union citizens falling 
outside the scope of the Directive.     
The Article 21 TFEU right to move to and reside in another Member State is capable 
of direct effect - and was relied upon directly in cases such as Baumbast and Chen.
59
  
Direct reliance upon Article 21 TFEU has been capable of granting rights of residence 
to Union citizens who do not fulfil the conditions of secondary legislation, as shown in 
Baumbast, and their family members, such as in Chen.  In Baumbast, as discussed in 
Chapter One, Mr Baumbast was able to rely upon Article 21 TFEU to limit the 
‘limitations and conditions’ contained in secondary legislation.60  As Mr Baumbast 
was a mobile Union citizen, his residence would not fall under the UK Immigration 
rules, so is less relevant for family reunification in the UK than Chen.   
Under Directive 2004/38, a Union citizen must be a ‘qualifying’ citizen to bring family 
members to reside within the host state, i.e. they must fulfil one of the Article 7 
conditions of residence.
61
  In situations where parents are TCNs, and the only Union 
citizens are children, there are immediately obvious difficulties if reliance upon the 
Directive is to be attempted – TCN ascending line family members must be dependent 
upon the Union citizen under Article 2(2)(d) to benefit from a derived right of 
residence, rather than, as would mostly be the case with a Union citizen child, the other 
way around with dependence upon the TCN adults.  The latter case illustrates the 
difficulties which Catherine, an Irish citizen with Chinese parents, and her mother 
faced to demonstrate a right to reside within the UK.  Catherine had been born in 
Northern Ireland, and moved to Wales, so never actually left the UK, though she was 
granted Irish nationality due to the ius soli principle applying at the time of her birth.  
As Catherine was a child, she did not personally possess sufficient resources, though 
the Court of Justice found that there was no restriction as to the origin of resources, so 
the resources of her TCN parents could suffice.
62
   
Beyond finding that Catherine could rely upon a right of residence from Article 21 
TFEU and Directive 90/364,
63
  the Court found that failing to grant her mother (and 
carer) a right to reside would “deprive the child’s right of residence of any useful 
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effect.”64  In order to make the child’s right of residence meaningful, her mother had to 
be able to reside also, so where Article 21 TFEU and Directive 90/364 “grant a right to 
reside for an indefinite period in the host Member State to a young minor who is a 
national of another Member State, those same provisions allow a parent who is that 
minor’s primary carer to reside with the child in the host Member State.”65   Hofstotter 
saw the Chen decision as part of a continuing judicial activism with regard to Union 
citizenship,
66
 and the decision uses the Union citizenship of a child to great effect.  Its 
focussing upon the useful effect of the residence rights of such a child, can be seen as 
an antecedent to the Court’s bolder decision in Ruiz Zambrano,67 which is the subject 
of the next chapter. 
The incorporation of Chen into UK law took a long time, it was only 8 years later that 
the rights of ‘primary carers’ of EEA minor children came to be reflected in the 
Immigration EEA Regulations.  When the decision was incorporated, the right of 
residence was kept separate from that of family members: it was classified as a 
‘derivative right of residence’ under Regulation 15A.68  The conditions include the 
parent being the primary carer of an EEA national under the age of 18 residing ‘as a 
self-sufficient person’ within the UK, and unable to remain in the UK should the 
parent/carer be required to leave.
69
  Such a derived right of residence is not capable of 
leading to a right of permanent residence within the UK,
70
 and it is not clear whether 
this is in accordance with EU law.  ‘Legal’ residence for the acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence under Article 16 of Directive 2004/38 does not have to be 
residence by a Union citizen under the Directive,71 but cannot be under domestic law 
of their state of origin.
72
   
Chen type residence for a Union citizen is not under domestic law, but under EU law – 
as self-sufficiency of the Union citizen has been established through the funds of the 
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parent/carer.  The potential for the derivative right of the primary carer to lead to 
permanent residence has not been considered by the CJEU, but it seems likely that, as 
it is residence with a Union citizen in accordance with EU law, the CJEU would be 
able to find such a right should be granted, though the familial relationship not falling 
within the Directive’s definition could prove problematic if Article 16(2) was 
interpreted as only meaning family members as defined by the Directive.
73
  The 
alternative, that upon the Union citizen’s 18th birthday their parent/carer be required to 
leave, does not seem to be in line with the approach of the CJEU in O and B to 
enjoyment of genuine family life.   
As Horsley said, "The Court remains free to engage with the Treaties’ empowering 
norms in order to legitimize its efforts to influence the development of EU law”;74 in 
relation to Union citizens’ rights of residence and those of their family members, this 
is certainly true: the CJEU has been able to find reasons for protecting ‘genuine’ 
family life and protecting the exercise of free movement rights.  While the Court 
should not circumvent the limits on Article 21(1) TFEU entirely, its interpretations in 
case law have meant that Union citizens’ family members can rely upon rights of 
residence within the Union citizens’ state of origin, rather than having to rely upon 
domestic law.  Dougan suggested that, had the court ‘been bent on a campaign of 
unilateral policymaking’ it had the legal tools to do so - indirect judicial review and 
personal circumstances assessment – which could have circumvented the preferences 
of the Union legislature.
75
  Thankfully, for the sake of legal certainty at least, the CJEU 
has refrained from any unilateral attack on clear secondary legislation in the realm of 
residence rights, and has focussed its attentions on developing meaningful 
opportunities to realise Treaty rights – taking particular care in O and B to expand 
upon the scope of the rights. 
3. Rights of Residence from a Secondary Source Other than Directive 
2004/38 
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Directive 2004/38 offers an incomplete codification of residence rights, so this section 
seeks to explore an alternate source of rights contained in secondary legislation.  This 
section mostly concerns the scenario whereby a Union citizen worker has a child in 
education and the Union citizen leaves or loses their employment and thus is not likely 
to have resources or be able to support their family under the conditions required by 
the Directive.  This scenario gives a sense of the reasons for which the rights of 
residence discussed below are not included in Directive 2004/38: the Directive 
maintains a focus upon economic activity or resources in order to establish residence.  
Much as it represented a step towards granting Union citizens residence rights due to 
their holding the citizenship of an EU Member State, the Directive assesses the 
finances of the individual Union citizen and family members, and the impact of their 
likely residence upon the host Member State.  As a mobile Union citizen is not always 
economically active or financially secure, the Directive cannot cover all situations 
where EU law is an important source of residence rights.  This section focuses upon 
children and their carers or guardians, which is something of a recurring theme; the 
Court’s ingenuity in developing non-traditional rights of residence especially with the 
aim of protecting children’s rights has allowed for flexibility in its approach, and a link 
to be forged between Union citizenship and the right to family life within the EU. 
Focus is upon the rights developed from the repealed Article 12 of Regulation 
1612/68
76
 now contained in Article 10 of Regulation 492/2011,
77
 in order to show an 
important development of the CJEU pre-Maastricht and which perhaps could show a 
penchant on the part of the Court to advance the rights of Union citizen children in 
unexpected ways.  The residence rights in this section demonstrate situations where the 
requirements placed upon the Union citizen by the Directive are not met,
78
 and some, 
or all family members would have no right to reside within the host Member State 
unless residence rights were found elsewhere. Traditionally, rights of residence and 
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rights to equal treatment for family members were granted in order to facilitate a 
worker’s mobility;79 now, however, there are broader aims which the CJEU values.  
If a Union citizen no longer fulfils the requirements contained in Article 7 Directive 
2004/38 then their family members’ rights of residence within a Member State, too, 
may be lost.  In certain circumstances, however, they can remain: Article 12(3) 
Directive 2004/38 states that the death or departure of the Union citizen “shall not 
entail loss of the right of residence of his/her children or of the parent who has actual 
custody of the children, irrespective of nationality, if the children reside in the host 
Member State and are enrolled at an educational establishment, for the purpose of 
studying there, until the completion of their studies.”80  Under Article 12 of Regulation 
1612/68 children of an EU worker were entitled to access to a State’s general 
educational system.  Article 12 read as follows:  
“The children of a national of a Member State who is or has been employed in 
the territory of another Member State shall be admitted to that State's general 
educational, apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the same 
conditions as the nationals of that State, if such children are residing in its 
territory. 
Member States shall encourage all efforts to enable such children to attend 
these courses under the best possible conditions.”81 
Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 was not repealed by Directive 2004/38, but by 
Regulation 492/11, which transposed Article 12 word for word into its Article 10.   
The text does not seem to provide a right of residence for children to facilitate their 
access to education, or a right of residence for a primary carer: following a literal 
reading, the Article is purely concerned with access to education for children residing 
in a host Member State’s territory.  However, case law derived a right of residence 
from the Article, and this was not subject to the conditions of sufficient resources: in 
Gaal, the CJEU found that the conditions placed upon family members’ residence 
rights by Articles 10-11 of Regulation 1612/68 could not be read into Article 12 of 
Regulation 1612/68,
82
 and so do not apply to Article 10 of the new Regulation.  Article 
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10 of Regulation 492/11 does not require a Union citizen to be employed within the 
territory of the Member State at the time of their children’s reliance upon this right of 
access to education - past employment of a Union citizen also suffices.   
As Baumbast and R illustrated, for a child and carer to benefit from rights of residence 
under Article 10 of Regulation 492/11, the Union citizen adult who had been working 
need not remain with the family – in R, the Union citizen husband did not live with his 
family, and was later divorced from his TCN wife, though this did not impact upon the 
rights which the family were able to derive from the Regulation.  The family had had a 
right to live with the Union citizen husband when he had been a worker, and part of the 
family, but there was no requirement for them to live permanently with that worker,
83
 
and the rights of a child to continue their education within a host state would not be 
effective without a carer also having a right to reside.   
Ibrahim and Teixeira
84
 were decided after Directive 2004/38 was implemented, and 
both cases relied upon Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 to find a right of residence for 
the primary carer of children in education.  Ibrahim concerned the Somali wife of a 
Danish national who worked in the UK from October 2002 – May 2003 before 
claiming incapacity benefit until March 2004, whereupon he left the UK, to return in 
December 2006.  Ms Ibrahim joined her husband in February 2003, with the couple’s 
three Danish children, and a fourth child was born in the UK.  The eldest two children 
attended state schools, and Ms Ibrahim separated from her husband when he left the 
UK in 2004; she remained in the UK though she was never self-sufficient and lacked 
comprehensive sickness insurance.  She was dependent on social assistance to cover all 
expenses and upon the NHS for health needs.  A housing assessment offer refused Ms 
Ibrahim’s application for housing assistance in February 2007, finding that neither she 
nor her husband was resident in the UK under EU law, a decision which was 
confirmed by the housing review officer in March 2007.  Ms Ibrahim appealed, 
arguing that as the mother of EU children and their primary carer, that she has a right 
of residence in the UK under Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 as the children were in 
school and her husband is a Union citizen who worked in the UK. 
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Teixeira also concerned the mother of a Union citizen child, but Ms Teixeira was a 
Portuguese national, and worked in the UK from 1989 – 1991, with her daughter, 
Patricia, being born in 1991.  Ms Teixeira and her Portuguese husband divorced, and 
both remained within the UK.  Ms Teixeira worked during some of the time her 
daughter was in education, with her last period of employment ending in early 2005.  
Following a court order, Patricia lived with her father from June 2006, but could 
contact her mother as she wished.  In November 2006, she enrolled upon a childcare 
course at the Vauxhall Learning Centre, and in March 2007, went to live with her 
mother.  Ms Teixiera applied for housing assistance for homeless persons, basing her 
right of residence on Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, which was rejected by the 
London Borough of Lambeth at initial assessment and review stage, and Ms Teixeira 
appealed to the County Court, with the case being referred to the CJEU. 
The Court rejected arguments that the Directive introduced more stringent 
requirements (including the possession of a separate right of residence) to allow 
children in education to continue to benefit from the right to access education.
85
  For 
O’Brien, the cases made clear “that Directive 2004/38 was not a closing chapter” in the 
free movement and national solidarity ‘saga’.86 The Court in Ibrahim said “That 
independence of Article 12 from Article 10 of that regulation [1612/68] formed the 
basis of the judgments of the Court... and cannot but subsist in relation to the 
provisions of Directive 2004/38.”87   
The CJEU in both cases was careful not to limit or reduce the pre-existing rights of 
Union citizens.  Ibrahim and Teixeira thus successfully relied upon a right of residence 
for economically inactive persons not wholly covered by the Directive; they “address a 
novel interaction of old and new secondary EU legislation in the light of established 
ECJ case law, notably Baumbast and R”.88  The application of the (now) Article 10 of 
Regulation 429/11 has led to protection of children’s rights to access education and 
recognises that to attend educational courses it is important to allow a carer to reside 
with a child in order to achieve the best conditions for learning.  However, Stalford and 
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Drywood have suggested that “any proclivity towards endowing children with direct 
rights has been primarily driven by a desire to protect the mobility and residence rights 
of their parents.”89   
While it is far more likely for adults rather than children to exercise their rights of free 
movement and residence, it is not only the migrant Union citizen who benefits from 
Article 10 Regulation 429/2011 protection.  The Regulation does not require a Union 
citizen to be a worker at the time of reliance upon it, or even require a Union citizen to 
remain within the family, so it is broader than a free movement enhancing provision, 
and aims to facilitate the education and integration of family members of children 
Union citizens as well as protecting mobility and residence rights of parents.  The 
Court defined ‘children’ for the purposes of Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 broadly, 
which also applies to Article 10 of Regulation 429/2011, and does not apply any age 
criterion: children need not be under 21 years of age or remain dependent upon a 
Union citizen to benefit from the Article.  Instead, the question is whether a ‘child’ is 
in full-time education,
90
 with education including tertiary education.
91
  This reflects the 
importance of access to education and also means that the Article 10 of Regulation 
429/11 rights are not interpreted restrictively.   
However, Regulation 15A of the UK implementing Regulations which incorporates 
the Ibrahim and Teixiera decisions does require a child to be under the age of 18,
92
 and 
also that the child be the child of a Union citizen.
93
  This latter condition should not be 
applied in practice: while often a child in the situation of those in Ibrahim or Teixeira 
will be the child of a Union citizen, they need not be – Article 2(2) of Directive 
2004/38 includes the child of a non-EU spouse of a Union citizen as a family member, 
and such a child should also be protected by Article 10 of Regulation 429/11 should 
the Union citizen ‘parent-in-law’ leave the host state. 
4. Conclusions 
The Surinder Singh case itself has become something of a cause célèbre within the 
UK.  However, the newly introduced requirement of transferring the centre of life to 
another Member State is not required by the CJEU, though potentially the ‘genuine’ 
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family life discussed by the Court in O and B mean that the new conditions could be 
interpreted in a manner which was compatible with the Court’s approach.  If, however, 
the UK takes a more restrictive approach, it would be acting contrary to EU law. 
The development of the Court’s jurisprudence for returning citizens in the recent O and 
S decisions continue to strengthen the Court’s protection of Treaty rights across all 
time-frames, as in – previous or future movement, exercise of free movement rights, is 
also worthy of protection and establishes rights of residence for family members.  In 
relation to Carpenter, Guild said that “Citizenship, human and cultural rights and 
constitutional principles” could not get his wife a right of residence within the UK – 
“Only his capacity as an economic actor can give him the result he wants.”94  While 
the economic link to exercising the Treaty freedoms has an enduring hold, the CJEU 
has softened its approach and found ways to extend from the Carpenter search for a 
link to EU economic activity.   
The Court’s recognition of Union citizen’s rights and the importance of protecting 
‘genuine’ family life means that there is a possibility that Union citizens at home can 
be joined by their TCN family members following a period of living abroad under 
Articles 7 or 16 Directive 2004/38.  This is particularly relevant for UK citizens, where 
the Immigration Rules are inflexible and have become more stringent, with strict 
minimum income requirements placed upon the UK spouse.  The EU potentially offers 
Union citizens from the UK who have moved abroad - for a more than transient time – 
the right to continue their family life within the UK without having to show earnings 
of £18,600.  As O and B suggested, the requirements which should be placed upon of 
Union citizens returning to their home Member State in order to have a TCN family 
member’s right of residence recognised under Article 21(1) TFEU, should be no more 
than would have been required had the Directive applied.  This means any genuine 
work suffices - £18,600 per annum as required by the UK Immigration Rules would 
not be necessary.  
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Chapter Five 
Residence Rights from Article 20 TFEU:   
The Court’s bravest leap?  
As discussed in Chapter Four, the Treaty can be an important source of residence 
rights for Union citizens and their family members not falling within the scope of 
Directive 2004/38.
1
  This Chapter considers the prospect of successful reliance upon 
Article 20 TFEU as a source of residence rights within the EU.
2
  The Treaty Article 
granting Union citizenship is not a free movement provision: it makes no reference to 
movement or to another Member State and is not an obvious source of rights of 
residence.  Nonetheless, such a right was found in the groundbreaking Ruiz Zambrano 
case,
3
 which only became possible in light of Rottmann,
4
 in which the CJEU based its 
decision on the concept of Union citizenship.   
Ruiz Zambrano did not contain a cross-border link of any sort; it involved the Court 
finding a right of residence for Union citizen children within their home Member State, 
based upon Article 20 TFEU.  As such, it represents a separate source of residence 
rights, and one capable of circumventing the restrictive UK Immigration Rules for 
TCN family reunification.  This chapter assesses when Article 20 TFEU is capable of 
providing a source of residence for Union citizens and their family members not falling 
within the scope of the Directive due to not having moved, or to those who do not 
fulfil the conditions of national legislation to gain residence rights within the UK, and 
to whom other rights of residence are unavailable.  The potential relevance of the 
fundamental right to family life is considered throughout this chapter; the Ruiz 
Zambrano judgment notably failed to mention fundamental rights, despite the 
seemingly obvious potential of a fundamental rights element to the case. 
The first section of this chapter discusses the Ruiz Zambrano case itself – outlining its 
facts and the reasoning provided by the CJEU.  It assesses the decision’s impact upon 
the purely internal rule, and considers the extent to which Union citizenship has 
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extended the traditional boundaries of EU law.  The second section assesses the scope 
of reliance upon the Ruiz Zambrano principle, in order to explore how family 
residence rights can be found in reliance upon Article 20 TFEU.  This section also 
assesses the coherency of the principle, and highlights tension with fundamental rights 
law.  The third section builds upon the second’s assessment of coherency and 
considers how the UK has approached the practical assessment of rights of residence 
based upon Article 20 TFEU.  This is done with focus upon the practical implications 
for families, as well as consideration of legal arguments put forward by legal 
representatives as to when Ruiz Zambrano does should or could apply and the 
corresponding domestic courts’ decisions.  In this way this chapter is able to assess 
what a fundamentally important step in Union citizenship case law means within the 
UK. 
1. The Ruiz Zambrano Case 
Ruiz Zambrano was decided by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU in March 2011.  The 
judgment is short and has left many questions unanswered.
5
  The facts of Ruiz 
Zambrano were decidedly unusual and are as follows: a Colombian couple with a child 
moved to Belgium and sought asylum, which was refused, though they were not 
deported to Colombia due to civil war there.
6
  Subsequent attempts to regularise the 
family’s residence were unsuccessful.  The family stayed in Belgium and two children 
were born who attained Belgian nationality due to being born within the country and 
that they would otherwise have been stateless. Mr Ruiz Zambrano secured 
employment but did not hold a work permit.  The authorities found out that he had 
been working without a work permit and terminated his employment; Mr Ruiz 
Zambrano appealed against the decision not to grant him unemployment benefits.   
The CJEU had to determine whether Articles 18, 20 and 21 TFEU separately or in 
conjunction could confer a right of residence on minor Union citizens within their 
home state, regardless of movement; whether the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
conjunction with the Treaty articles granted any rights of residence to the parents of 
minor Union citizens within the country of the child’s origin; and if the Treaty articles 
and Charter provisions must be interpreted as negating the need for a work permit of 
the parents of such children.  Mr Ruiz Zambrano argued that: “he enjoys a right of 
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residence directly by virtue of the EC Treaty or, at the very least, that he enjoys the 
derived right of residence, recognised in Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] 
ECR I-9925 for the ascendants of a minor child who is a national of a Member State 
and that, therefore, he is exempt from the obligation to hold a work permit.”7  
All of the Member States which submitted observations to the Court argued that there 
could be no rights for the family under EU law as the Union citizens - the children 
born in Belgium - had never moved, thus could not come within the situations 
envisaged by the Treaty.
8
  The Court found that Directive 2004/38 did not apply, as its 
Article 3(1) specifically requires movement between states,
9
 but in five short 
paragraphs
10
 the Court determined that the Union citizenship of the two younger 
children was enough to find a right of residence, and work permit, for “a third country 
national with dependent minor children in the Member State where those children are 
nationals and reside, and also a refusal to grant such a person a work permit, has such 
an effect”11 as to deprive the citizens of the “genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights”12 conferred due to their Union citizenship.  The work permit had to be granted 
in order to provide ‘such a person’ (i.e. carer) to provide themselves and their family 
and ensure the Union citizen were able to remain within the EU:
13
 
“the answer to the questions referred is that Article 20 TFEU is to be 
interpreted as meaning that it precludes a Member State from refusing a third 
country national upon whom his minor children, who are European Union 
citizens, are dependent, a right of residence in the Member State of residence 
and nationality of those children, and from refusing to grant a work permit to 
that third country national, in so far as such decisions deprive those children of 
the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights attaching to the status of 
European Union citizen.”14 
The CJEU decision meant that the Colombian parents, and their eldest child, were 
entitled to a right of residence (and access to employment for the parents) without the 
need to show sufficient resources, health insurance, or a cross-border element,
15
 basing 
the decision solely on the nationality of the two younger children.  The alternative 
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finding, that the TCN parents had no right to reside under EU law, would have meant 
that the Union citizens could have been compelled to leave the territory of the Union, 
thus having an adverse impact upon their free movement rights.  Arguably, they would 
have travelled to another Member State, so not have had to leave the Union at all, but 
there would have been no possibility for a Chen right of residence.
16
  In that case the 
Chinese mother of an Irish national was able to reside within the UK with her Union 
citizen daughter and provide for her, as she had sufficient resources not to become a 
burden upon the host state and comprehensive sickness insurance so Article 21 
TFEU
17
 and Directive 90/364
18
 provided a right of residence for the Union citizen 
child, who did not have to personally be self-sufficient, and her mother, who did not 
have to be dependent upon her child.    Children are normally dependent upon their 
parents to provide for them, so usually the rights of Union citizen children to reside 
within a given Member State are dependent upon the right to reside of their parent(s),
19
 
rather than the other way around.  In Ruiz Zambrano, however, the family were not 
self-sufficient- Mr Ruiz Zambrano’s appeal against the refusal to grant him 
unemployment benefit triggered the case- and there had not been any movement to 
trigger Directive 2004/38.  
The analysis in the remainder of this section focuses on how, or why, Union 
citizenship was able to bring the situation, which traditionally would have been seen as 
a matter purely internal to Belgium, within the scope of EU law, and hence the CJEU 
judgment effectively requiring Belgium to facilitate the residence and work of the 
Colombian parents.  Bobek presented a view contrary to many,
20
 that the Ruiz 
Zambrano decision “is not devoid of an understandable reason, giving clear and 
transposable guidance to [national courts]”,21 which has been justified as far as the UK 
courts are concerned – they have relied upon the decision, although its brevity was a 
challenge, the courts did not see the decision as an ‘illegitimate’ expansion of EU law 
through citizenship without substantive reasons. 
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a. Ruiz Zambrano and the Purely Internal Rule 
Traditionally, there must be a link with EU law to trigger its application - some cross-
border economic activity - and traditionally, there is no such link when the situation 
was purely internal to one Member State.
22
  The doctrine was developed from 
discussion in Knoors,
23
 to its application in Saunders,
24
 and the Court has since 
broadened the connecting factors which cause a case to come within the scope of EU 
law.  This is noticeable in Carpenter, where the Court relied upon the cross-border 
trigger of Mr Carpenter’s business with other Member States to find that the decision 
to deport his wife was an interference with the exercise of his right to respect for 
family life,
25
 which could be an obstacle to his exercise of his fundamental freedom to 
provide services to other Member States.
26
  O’Leary highlighted developments in the 
1980s which she identified as precursors of, “even catalysts for”, the development of 
Union citizenship- these being the expansion of the type of situations regarded as 
governed by EU law, and the transformation of the Article 18 TFEU principle of equal 
treatment “from a tool designed to enhance mobility and complete the internal market 
to a semi-autonomous value forming a central part of the EU's goals.”27   
O’Leary recognised calls for the revision or abandonment of the purely internal rule in 
light of the introduction of Union citizenship,
28
 identifying the key criticism of the 
Court’s approach: it “centres on the fact that insistence on cross-border movement to 
trigger application of the provisions of the TFEU on free movement contradicts the 
claims made by the court relating to that status, ignores the qualitative change in the 
EU's objectives to which the introduction of that status is testament, and creates 
situations of reverse discrimination for static Union citizens which conflict with the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality in art.18 of the TFEU.”29  
However, O’Leary justified the continued application of the purely internal rule, as its 
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“raison d’être remains valid”, though Union citizenship has transformed the landscape 
within which the Court must apply the purely internal rule.
30
 
In Ruiz Zambrano, however, the CJEU did not even attempt to locate a cross-border 
trigger for its reliance upon EU law, thereby limiting the application of the purely 
internal rule in relation to Article 20 TFEU.  Indeed- finding that Union citizenship 
only applies when a border is crossed would have been to go against the aims of a 
borderless-EU: “The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and 
justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is 
ensured...”31  Union citizens are always Union citizens, even when they have yet to 
exercise their right to free movement.  The genuine enjoyment test, which instead 
provided the link to EU law in Ruiz Zambrano, is a potential encroachment on the 
purely internal rule in relation to Union citizen’s rights.32  Reliance upon Article 20 
TFEU and Union citizenship to bring matters within the personal scope of EU law is 
not unique to this case; Spaventa analysed earlier cases since the introduction of Union 
citizenship
33
 and concluded that “nationality alone” was sufficient to fall within the 
personal scope of the Treaty.
34
  Kochenov agreed that Union citizenship 
“overwhelmingly enlarged the scope ratione personae of EU law”,35 and Ruiz 
Zambrano quite possibly extends the scope of Union citizenship’s ability to bring 
matters within the scope of EU law as far as is permissible.   
Lenaerts identified five methods of bringing situations within the scope of EU law,
36
 
and Ruiz Zambrano comes under the most difficult method to reconcile with the 
traditional approach and respecting Member State autonomy, as it merely requires a 
‘sufficient connecting factor’ to EU law.  Ruiz Zambrano involved no movement, and 
there was not even the potential of reliance upon any dual-EU nationality to suggest 
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some kind of link, which has been attempted before the CJEU with varying degrees of 
success.  In identity cases involving children, such as Garcia Avello and Grunkin and 
Paul,
37
 EU law has been successfully relied upon, unlike cases involving adults with 
similar problems with legislation controlling names within Member States.
38
  This is in 
some respects similar to the success of Ruiz Zambrano, which involved dependent 
children, and the subsequent cases before the Court, all of which have failed and 
involved reliance upon an adult EU citizen to bring the situation within the remit of 
EU law- such as McCarthy and Dereci.   
For Kochenov and Plender, the Court’s early reluctance to rely upon Union citizenship 
as a rights bearing status was more at odds with its teleological approach to 
interpreting EU law than in finding it did affect the application of law- as they point 
out, “[n]o other Part of the Treaty has ever been presented by the Court as unable to 
affect the division of competences between the EU and the Member States.”39  They 
thus suggest that the separation of Union citizenship and the internal market 
“represents a return to the Treaty text”.40  This ‘return’ was not made in one step by 
Ruiz Zambrano.  The Court’s reliance upon Union citizenship to find rights for 
individuals is discussed in the second section, but in relation to the purely internal rule, 
Rottmann
41
 was a crucial development and paved the way for Ruiz Zambrano. 
Rottmann also involved a situation which may have seemed to be wholly internal to 
one Member State but was found to come within the scope of EU law.  The case was 
discussed in detail in Chapter One, and essentially involved the Court adding a 
requirement of proportionality analysis to the revocation of citizenship of a Member 
State where this would leave the Union citizen stateless: the CJEU found that “by 
reason if its nature and consequences”,42 the factual situation came within the scope of 
EU law and therefore that the decision to withdraw naturalisation has to observe the 
principle of proportionality in light of EU law.
43
  Through bypassing the ‘traditional’ 
analysis and not requiring a cross-border link to establish the relevance of EU law, the 
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CJEU developed a different, and potentially more sophisticated, test to determining the 
application of EU law.   
Instead of searching for a cross-border element alone, the Court looked for links to EU 
law, considering the effect of national measures on the rights of the individuals.  The 
CJEU examined the circumstances and consequences of EU law not being relevant in 
Rottmann- i.e. the removal of Member State citizenship and hence Union citizenship 
from an individual, and the consequent effects on them and their family members.  
Adam and Van Elsuwege viewed Rottmann as the first time the Court “explicitly 
moved away from the dogma that a cross-border element is required to trigger the 
application of EU law”.44  In both Ruiz Zambrano and Rottmann, the individuals 
concerned would have faced harsh consequences had the Court not found that EU Law 
was relevant.  This is something which O’Gorman saw as key to the decisions - the 
Court acknowledged the severity of the interference with Union citizenship rights in 
Ruiz Zambrano, which he linked to the Court’s earlier approach in Garcia-Avello, 
where potential professional and private disruption due to the national naming 
legislation meant that there was a connection to EU law.
45
 Potentially, then, it was the 
avoidance of undesirable consequences, rather than any logical application of Article 
20 TFEU, which prompted the decision in Ruiz Zambrano.  Lansbergen and Miller 
suggested the judgment “prioritised individual justice over legal certainty and the 
consistent application of settled principle”,46 and legal certainty is something which 
can be lacking in EU law, and which makes interpretation of its doctrines difficult- 
direction has to come from the CJEU,
47
 and Ruiz Zambrano lacks a strong sense of 
direction, as it feels more responsive than thoroughly reasoned.  Peers and Berneri 
noted that in some of the subsequent decisions where Ruiz Zambrano did not apply, 
the CJEU found alternate options were open to the applicants.
48
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The use of Union citizenship as almost a ‘stop-gap’ in cases where individuals before 
the national courts risk either having to leave the EU (as in Ruiz Zambrano) or losing 
Union citizenship (due to the potential removal of Member State nationality in 
Rottmann) means that the Court has risked losing coherency over its development of 
Union citizenship, and injustice may result, or at least inconsistency.  Taken alone, 
Ruiz Zambrano has massive potential, but the CJEU quickly established limits for its 
application, which are discussed in the second section of this chapter in relation to the 
application and limits of the Ruiz Zambrano principle.   
As it stands, it appears that reliance upon rights contained in the Treaty are no longer 
conditional upon proving a cross-border link with the Treaty but rather on a relatively 
vague ‘genuine enjoyment’ test, which is analysed further below, along with the cases 
which have limited its application.
49
  The introduction of this extraordinary doctrine, 
which the CJEU has not yet adequately explained, changes the focus of national courts 
in cases where there are not obvious links to residence rights under EU law.  Ruiz 
Zambrano now requires domestic courts to consider the ‘genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of a Union citizen’s rights’ in addition to their standard assessments of other 
connecting factors to EU law.  Assessing the interference with genuine enjoyment on 
the basis of the Ruiz Zambrano decision itself would be almost impossible, as the 
brevity of the decision means that interpretation or application of it could not be 
certain.  As such, the later decisions of the CJEU are of vital importance for explaining 
the unpredicted decision.   
2. The Scope of Application of Ruiz Zambrano: The Impact within 
Citizenship Case law 
Lansbergen and Shaw viewed the Court’s statements of Union citizenship as a 
fundamental status as “decidedly aspirational rather than empirical”50 in 2010, but the 
Court’s reliance upon Union citizenship in Ruiz Zambrano extended residence rights to 
the family members of static Union citizen children, who would otherwise have been 
beyond the scope of Treaty protection.  This case represents a truly fundamental use of 
Union citizenship.  Ruiz Zambrano has shown that, for some applicants hoping for 
residence rights, Union citizenship alone can potentially provide the necessary link to 
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EU law, and the purely internal rule may not apply.  For Kochenov, Union citizenship 
‘finally’ became able to shape the material scope of EU law.51   
The ‘fundamental status’ of Union citizenship had been demonstrated in earlier 
judgments,
52
 but this was more as a ‘back-up’ to existing rights such as Article 18 
TFEU.  In Ruiz Zambrano, the effect of Union citizenship was on a different scale: it 
did not remove a condition on residence or find that the strict application of a rule was 
disproportionate in relation to Union citizens’ rights,53 but instead was the foundation 
upon which all of the relevant rights were based.  This is the reason for which its 
potential is so important to ascertain – immigration does not fall within the EU’s 
competence and the UK fiercely guards its immigration laws.  The rights discovered in 
Ruiz Zambrano threaten the Member States’ ability to determine their immigration 
rules with certainty.
54
  Van Eijen and de Vries suggest it has provided a ‘new route to 
the promised land,’ extending the protection of Union law where no economic link 
could be established,
55
 as well as relying upon Union citizenship as more than a ‘back 
up’ to strengthen pre-existing rights.  
a. Extent of the Doctrine According to the CJEU 
Cases which followed Ruiz Zambrano before the Court have been less successful in 
showing interference with the substance of the rights of a Union citizen.  In none of the 
subsequent cases has the interference with the rights of a Union citizen been enough to 
ensure successful application of the Ruiz Zambrano doctrine, though this was not 
clear-cut at the time, and the Court has been criticised for its lack of “effort to establish 
a sound methodological or dogmatic basis for the new category of substantive 
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citizenship rights”.56  McCarthy, Dereci, O and S, Iida and Alopka57 all failed to rely 
upon rights under Article 20 TFEU, and it remains to be seen whether there will be 
many instances of successful reliance beyond the very specific facts of Ruiz Zambrano.   
In McCarthy, the Jamaican husband of a British-Irish dual citizen was refused a right 
of residence within the UK, but this did not mean that Mrs McCarthy was compelled to 
leave the territory of the EU to join him in Jamaica.  The disruption to family life was 
inadequate to interfere with the substance of Mrs McCarthy’s rights as a Union citizen, 
so her claim failed.  As a dual citizen, Mrs McCarthy’s residence in the UK was lawful 
due to her being a citizen within the host state, and the newly acquired Irish nationality 
did not provide a cross-border link to trigger residence rights as her residence had 
never been on the basis of EU law.   
Similarly, in Dereci, the TCN family members of adult Austrian nationals who had 
never exercised their right to freedom of movement were unable to prove the substance 
of the Union citizens’ rights were interfered with by a decision not to allow the TCN 
family members to remain in Austria.  In this case AG Mengozzi’s View aimed to 
provide “a better understanding of the implications”58 of Ruiz Zambrano, and 
Tryfonidou noted that the judgment attempts to provide further guidance on the 
interpretation of the ‘Zambrano principle’, rather than focussing on applying it to the 
facts of the case.
59
 In interpreting Ruiz Zambrano, the CJEU emphasised that the 
principle applied only “to situations in which the Union citizen has, in fact, to leave 
not only the territory of the Member State of which he is a national but also the 
territory of the Union as a whole”.60  The principle, then, appears to have narrow 
application,
61
 as being forced to leave the Union requires a great deal of pressure - 
seemingly it is limited to cases of absolute dependence by a Union citizen on a TCN 
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who lacks a right of residence in the Union citizen’s state of nationality.  Hailbronner 
and Thym suggested that only parents will be able to enjoy a right of residence derived 
from Article 20 TFEU and the Union citizenship of a child,
62
 but this was not even 
accurate in relation to Ruiz Zambrano, where the elder Colombian sibling remained 
unmentioned, but presumably also derived a right of residence to remain with the 
family in Belgium. 
In O and S; and L, the CJEU examined whether a TCN step-parent of a Union citizen 
could derive a right of residence from the Union citizenship of the child.  In O amd S, a 
Ghanaian national residing in Finland with a Finnish child married a TCN man after 
her relationship with the child’s father broke down.  The joined case, L, concerned an 
Algerian national residing in Finland with a Finnish child and TCN child, and the 
application was for her TCN husband, the father of her second child of Algerian 
nationality, to join the family in Finland.  In both cases the Finnish children’s fathers 
were still in Finland.  The TCN mothers of the children possessed permanent residence 
permits, so under law there would be no obligation for them, or their Union citizen 
dependants, to leave the Member State or EU as a whole.  The situation was not 
automatically assimilated to a purely internal one, but the CJEU held that it was for the 
national court to establish whether a refusal to grant residence permits on the basis of 
family reunification with the Union citizen child concerned a denial of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by the status of Union citizenship.  
The Court emphasised that ‘genuine enjoyment’ requires a Union citizen being forced 
“to leave not only the territory of the Member State of which he was a national but also 
that of the European Union as a whole.”63  This is one reason for which Article 20 
TFEU gave rise to no right of residence in Alopka,
64
 where a Togolese national with 
French children (born in Luxembourg) was refused a right of residence in 
Luxembourg, as there was no risk that the Union citizen children would have had to 
leave the EU: the family could have returned to France. 
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National courts thus only have a limited margin of appreciation,
65
 and situations where 
there is already an adult with a right to reside in the host Member State capable of 
looking after the Union citizen child, like McCarthy, do not currently fall within the 
scope of EU law.  There is no reason for which a TCN step-parent would be treated 
differently from a parent of a Union citizen, if their residence were essential to ensure 
the genuine enjoyment of the rights of the Union citizen- “it does not follow from the 
Court’s case law that their application is confined to situations in which there is a 
blood relationship.”66  If the mothers of the Finnish children had been incapable of 
providing adequate care, and their Finnish fathers were unable or unwilling to provide 
care for them, then it would have been possible for the TCN step-fathers to claim that 
their residence within Finland was essential to ensure the enjoyment of the children’s 
rights as Union citizens.   
b. When does Ruiz Zambrano apply? 
Union citizenship is now a possible tool for mitigating the strict requirements of the 
secondary legislation limiting the primary right to free movement and residence 
contained in Article 21 TFEU.  Just as proportionality assessments achieved this in 
Baumbast, Union citizenship has added a new layer of consideration.  As Union 
citizenship is an entire source of rights of residence independent of all else, its 
application is in need of clarification, in order to ensure that the Citizens’ Directive, 
supposedly aiming to clarify and strengthen the rights of citizens, does not become 
only a small part in a much wider web of residence and free movement rights open to 
citizens. 
The ‘genuine enjoyment’ test itself is difficult to apply - and is not a genuine test at all 
- it does not provide certainty, but leaves discretion to national courts.  Kochenov saw 
this as sending “contradictory signals as to the essence of the EU citizenship status and 
the role it ought to play in the system of EU law.”67  Indeed, if Union citizenship now 
holds the key to residence rights for the family members of certain static citizens, this 
has to be enunciated clearly, just as the rules for mobile Union citizens are outlined in 
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Directive 2004/38 in detail.
 68
  Obviously, the CJEU faces the difficulty that it cannot 
legislate, nor can it provide answers to questions which are not asked of it, but in 
answering those which do appear in the future, it should take pains to recognise links 
with fundamental rights, or say there are none if it believes this to be the case, rather 
than saying nothing like in Ruiz Zambrano. 
McCarthy shed some light on when the doctrine cannot apply, though there discussion 
focussed on Article 21 TFEU, due to the attempt to create a cross-border link, rather 
than Article 20 TFEU.
69
  Van den Brink criticised the judgment as making an artificial 
distinction between the facts and those in Ruiz Zambrano,
70
 in relation to sufficient 
interference with the rights of a Union citizen.  However, despite the Court not 
discussing the family situation of Mrs McCarthy, and the reason for which she was not 
in employment, due to her providing care for her disabled child, the overall outcome of 
the case sits comfortably with Ruiz Zambrano: Mrs McCarthy did not have to leave the 
EU due to a refusal to allow her husband to enter and reside within the UK.  McCarthy 
also provided more information regarding the limits to the scope of application of 
primary and secondary Union citizenship law,
71
 but did not say that an adult Union 
citizen would never be able to benefit from the doctrine to be joined by his/her spouse, 
or reduce the scope of Ruiz Zambrano through failing to extend it to the TCN spouse 
of a UK/Irish dual national residing within the UK.   
There may well be situations as yet unexplored where an adult could require the care 
or support of the TCN spouse to remain within the EU,  instances of disability could 
potentially provide the necessary level of interference with the right to remain. 
However, normally, static Union citizens do not benefit from rights of family 
reunification under EU law, and normally the option would be open to them to travel 
to another Member State to trigger EU law should they so desire.
72
  If the substance of 
one’s rights as a Union citizen can be considered in a more expansive way than they 
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are currently, then the scope of application of Ruiz Zambrano could extend.  For 
instance, instead of maintaining the focus solely on residence within the EU, in Mrs 
McCarthy’s case, a potential claim that she was unable to work within the EU due to 
the UK not granting residence to her husband could have had more merit.  As Mrs 
McCarthy was a full-time carer, if her husband were able to take over these duties then 
she would be able to exercise her freedom to work within a Member State of the EU.  
The difficulty with this, however, lies in the fact that Mrs McCarthy would not 
genuinely be operating one of her fundamental freedoms to work if she did work- 
because, as a dual-British-Irish national she was in one of her ‘home’ states.  She 
would have had to have given up one of her nationalities to make this possible.  If the 
CJEU ever did extend its interpretation of the substance of rights to include the 
operation of fundamental freedoms within a home state then the scope of Ruiz 
Zambrano could be extended hugely, with great impact upon national immigration 
rules, so the likelihood of this happening is slim. 
Questions of proportionality do not enter into the Ruiz Zambrano test- the CJEU has 
not developed a doctrine which allows a small amount of interference with a small 
amount of the Union citizens’ rights, instead, it is all or nothing, with no 
proportionality assessments required.  This means that people who just fail to meet the 
exceptionality requirement still have their rights as Union citizens interfered with in a 
significant way, but are left with no redress under EU law, as there would be no 
jurisdiction for intervention.  Perhaps this is where a coherent and reasoned link to 
fundamental rights law is most required.  The difficulty, however, is that the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights would only apply if the Ruiz Zambrano threshold had been 
passed, and EU law therefore became relevant.  Nonetheless, Member States all have 
to adhere to the ECHR,
73
 and Article 8 rights to family life incorporate proportionality 
assessments.  While not expecting the Court to “slice the Gordian knot” of reverse 
discrimination, which Lansbergen and Miller suggested was “a source of friction that 
inhibits the full and smooth absorption of European Union free movement rights into 
domestic systems",
74
 the application of Ruiz Zambrano does highlight something of a 
vacuum in protection for static citizens who lack the rights to family reunification of 
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their mobile Union citizen counterparts, and are also unable to rely upon EU law like 
citizens who have passed the exceptionality requirement of Ruiz Zambrano. 
Using Union Citizenship instead of Fundamental Rights 
The Court in Ruiz Zambrano did not develop fundamental rights arguments, in contrast 
to Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion, where “the term "fundamental right" 
featured no less than 101 times...  By contrast, the Court's judgment mentioned the 
same term only on 4 occasions when it repeats or summarizes the preliminary 
reference of the Belgium court.”75  The different approach is obvious, and Hailbronner 
and Thym suggest that the judges “opted quite deliberately not to activate human 
rights”.76  Why they would do this, given the CJEU’s willingness to apply fundamental 
rights in other settings, and the introduction of the EU’s own Charter of Fundamental 
Rights,
77
 is difficult to fully explain, unless there was simply no agreement within the 
Court, save about the answer to be reached.  This question is addressed more fully in 
Chapter Six, where the limitations of the Charter are assessed.  Judges of the CJEU 
have to be politically astute, and as Smismans discussed, the relevance of fundamental 
rights to EU law and policy is not an inherent link,
78
 despite impressive advancements 
since the Treaty of Rome.  Advocate General Sharpston’s approach was more 
fundamental rights-friendly, and more generous to the claimants.  Though it was not 
followed, Opinions “enter the acquis jurisprudential and can be used as ‘persuasive 
weight’ in future cases.”79   
Fundamental rights protection applies across the scope of EU law, though Hailbronner 
and Thym said Ruiz Zambrano “does not considerably extend the scope of EU human 
rights”.80  However, in a way, the decision did extend the application- without the 
genuine interference principle, the situation would not have fallen under the scope of 
EU Law at all, so the Charter of Fundamental Rights, though not discussed in Ruiz 
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Zambrano itself, potentially becomes relevant solely due to it.
81
  Had the CJEU made 
Union citizenship and a genuine enjoyment test merely the trigger for fundamental 
rights, rather than the source of a right of residence under Article 20 TFEU, Ruiz 
Zambrano would have been far less exceptional.  However, as the British case Sanade, 
said “A claim under art.8 of the Convention did not need to be exceptional”,82 whereas 
successful reliance upon Ruiz Zambrano has to show exceptional circumstances, so is 
far less likely to succeed, and thus less likely to cause political upset due to 
encroachment upon the competence of Member States in relation to their immigration 
laws. 
Extending the relevance of the Charter to the situation of the nationals of one Member 
State residing within that Member State, while not extending it to other citizens of that 
state leaves open the potential for reverse discrimination where the exceptionality 
required by Ruiz Zambrano is not met.  Reverse discrimination is not unacceptable 
under EU law,
83
 and the fact that static Union citizens can now potentially rely upon 
their status as Union citizens to trigger EU law, and hence fundamental rights 
protection, makes the discrimination against other citizens more notable.  Fundamental 
rights have altered the approach of the CJEU to the fundamental freedoms across the 
years, including in MRAX,
84
 according to Judge da Cunha Rodrigues,
85
 who also 
viewed Union citizenship and fundamental rights having “common destinies” as the 
values upon which the EU should be based.
86
  The interplay between Union citizenship 
and fundamental rights is discussed in much greater detail in Chapter Six. 
3. Ruiz Zambrano within the UK: When to Apply the Principle 
The CJEU’s development in Ruiz Zambrano had not been anticipated by the UK 
judiciary.  In the 2007 Court of Appeal decision in Liu and Others,
87
 where a number 
of adult TCN applicants sought to claim a right of residence in the UK by virtue of a 
connection with a child who was a Union citizen, Lord Justice Buxton said “It is to be 
hoped that the professions, and the Legal Services Commission, will take good note… 
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and that these appeals will be the last occasion on which the AIT, and this court, is 
troubled with these issues.”88  Liu was not referred to the CJEU, as the Court of Appeal 
was sure this was unnecessary.  Since the CJEU determined there was a potential for 
rights of residence of TCNs based upon the residence of a Union citizen, there have 
been a number of references to Ruiz Zambrano situations within UK courts and 
tribunals, and the Home Office is keen to show that it has implemented the Ruiz 
Zambrano requirements.
89
   
There has been successful reliance on Ruiz Zambrano in the UK,
90
 which demonstrates 
that the unexpected decision in relation to Article 20 TFEU is not simply limited to 
Colombian asylum seekers with children in Belgium.  The UK cases have 
demonstrated that, at times, family members are able to persuade UK courts of the 
interference with the substance of the rights of Union citizens.  However, like those 
before the CJEU, most cases attempting to rely upon Ruiz Zambrano have failed.
91
  
There is a sense of unpredictability as to when the fundamental right to family life or 
Ruiz Zambrano principle may help claimants, and in Otomunde the tribunal said as a 
result of Ruiz Zambrano, “national courts must engage with the question whether 
removal of a particular parent will 'deprive [the child] (sic) of the genuine enjoyment 
of the substance of the rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen'”, but 
failed to engage with that question- focussing analysis on the fundamental rights and 
proportionality aspects of the case instead.
92
   
Yeo reported Otomunde as an example of the difficulties facing judges in assessing the 
impact and proportionality of a removal decision on affected children,
93
 and that Ruiz 
Zambrano was discussed as obiter.  However, the Upper Tribunal said “We conclude 
that either requiring Tolu [a Union citizen child] to live in Nigeria or depriving him 
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o[f] his primary carer would undermine his rights of residence”,94 which does not seem 
to be obiter.  Instead, Otomunde seems to be a case which could have been decided 
much more easily than it was: the Upper Tribunal undertook detailed proportionality 
assessments, following ‘EU principles of proportionality’ and Article 8 ECHR 
balancing, following the decision that the substance of Tolu’s rights as a Union citizen 
would be interfered with if his TCN parent was not allowed to remain within the UK.   
The factors which concerned the tribunal in Otomunde were the acts of fraud by and 
subsequent imprisonment of the claimant, Tolu’s father and primary carer.  While Ruiz 
Zambrano does not give an absolute right to reside, in that it does not apply to all 
Union citizens at all times, and cannot guarantee derivative rights of carers or TCN 
parents, the CJEU has not subjected the test to proportionality assessments.  Once the 
substance of a Union citizen’s rights are sufficiently threatened, it is essential that they 
are protected, and Article 20 TFEU provides the means by which protection is 
available.  As Fortin suggested, Ruiz Zambrano arguably “achieves far greater 
certainty for these immigrant families than does the decision in ZH”95- that being a 
decision of the Supreme Court regarding the importance of a child’s best interests, and 
proportionality balancing acts.
96
  As such, residence upon Article 20 TFEU provides 
more certainty than fundamental rights protection, once the difficult hurdle of showing 
genuine interference with the enjoyment of rights as a Union citizen has been passed. 
a. Level of Interference with the Rights of Union Citizens  
In Sanneh,
97
the Gambian mother of a British child was not entitled to benefits while 
her residence status was being investigated; she was granted a right to work during the 
course of her appeals against the refusals to pay benefits, and was provided with 
accommodation by the Council after she was given notice to quit on rented 
accommodation.  She was given a small allowance while her entitlement to child tax 
credit, child benefit and income support was determined.
98
  The QBD was quick to 
point out that the decisions to refuse interim payments were lawful under domestic 
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law,
99
 so the case had to be challenged on the basis of giving effect to the British 
daughter’s rights as an EU citizen.  Counsel for the appellant relied upon the House of 
Lords decision in Factortame
100
 to support the validity of providing interim relief to 
protect EU rights,
101
 but the Secretary of State denied that Ruiz Zambrano confers 
rights to means tested benefits.
102
 
Though her situation may have been difficult in the interim period, she and the child 
were not compelled to leave the UK, so the level of compulsion required to breach 
Article 20 TFEU rights was not present.  The Queen’s Bench Division underlined that 
Ruiz Zambrano was primarily concerned with the rights of the Union citizen children, 
and the derivative rights of Mr Ruiz Zambrano to reside and work were necessary to 
ensure his children could stay within Belgium, and hence the EU.
103
  Just as in 
McCarthy, the likelihood of a lesser income due to not having a working spouse with 
whom to reside in the UK did not mean that Mrs McCarthy was forced to reside 
outside of the state, a reduced income did not compel the parties to leave the UK in 
Sanneh.
104
  Nothing less than being forced to leave the territory of the EU has been 
deemed to breach the Article 20 and 21 TFEU rights of Union citizens by the CJEU in 
Dereci, O and S, and McCarthy, and the British courts have followed.
105
  The 
threshold for reliance upon Ruiz Zambrano is high, and in Sanneh, a concession that 
the Claimant would never in practice leave the UK due to economic pressure
106
 
acknowledged the futility of the claim.  EU law was not engaged as the British child’s 
rights as a Union citizen were never in jeopardy. 
Cases in which a TCN spouse of a British national with British children is appealing 
against deportation
107
 have been approached in a manner consistent with Dereci and O 
and S.  In Harrison, Mr Drabble (counsel for the appellants) contended that 
interference with the enjoyment of a right to reside could trigger Ruiz Zambrano rights, 
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but the Court of Appeal disagreed.  Deprivation of rights and interference with the 
enjoyment of a right are different entirely, and if Ruiz Zambrano and Article 20 TFEU 
automatically provided a source of rights for the parents or carers of all Union citizens 
where there was a risk of interference with their enjoyment of residence within their 
home state, then Member States’ control over third-country immigration would be 
greatly affected.  Economic considerations which may make it desirable for a British 
national to reside with their TCN spouse as a family unit do not mean that they are 
compelled to leave the territory of the entire EU if the spouse is not allowed to remain, 
and the children’s rights to reside being rendered less enjoyable if one parent were to 
be deported would not make Ruiz Zambrano apply either.   
b. The Effect of Successful Reliance  
In Pryce, the Jamaican mother of two British citizens (and one older non-British child) 
appealed against a finding that she was subject to immigration control, due to a right of 
residence as the sole carer for British citizen children derived from Article 20 TFEU 
and Ruiz Zambrano.
 108
  The local authority conceded her appeal but the Secretary of 
State intervened and the case was brought before the Court of Appeal as a test case on 
the emerging concept of the Ruiz Zambrano-carer.  Ms Pryce was estranged from the 
British father of her British twins.   The Court of Appeal stated that the Council and 
Ms Pryce were in agreement that applicants with valid Ruiz Zambrano claims are not 
subject to immigration control,
109
 which the earlier judge had not recognised.  Counsel 
for the Secretary of State sought assurances that application of the Ruiz Zambrano 
principle could not become automatic, and that it should remain exceptional.
110
  As the 
parties had agreed that Ms Pryce’s situation fell under the Ruiz Zambrano principle, 
the Court of Appeal did not discuss the facts in detail, but emphasised that whether an 
applicant has a Ruiz Zambrano claim is “clearly fact-sensitive.”111 
Essentially, the Court of Appeal had little to determine in relation to Ms Pryce’s 
reliance upon Ruiz Zambrano and the Article 20 TFEU of her two younger children; 
instead, the Court of Appeal’s decision was important for UK Immigration Law 
because it recognised a right not to be subject to immigration control from Ruiz 
Zambrano, with a broader relevance than the case at hand.  The Immigration and 
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Asylum Act 1999 s115 says anyone “subject to immigration control” is excluded from 
access to most non-contributory benefits,
112
 so, having demonstrated adequately that 
she could rely upon Ruiz Zambrano, Ms Pryce demonstrated that she was not subject 
to immigration control, and thus her eligibility for homelessness assistance, and other 
benefits.  The nature of the Ruiz Zambrano right of residence is wholly different from 
that of the rights of residence under Directive 2004/38, where self-sufficiency or 
working are key,
113
 and there is no immediate right to equal treatment in relation to 
access to the social security system of the Member State.
114
   
c. Applying Ruiz Zambrano beyond EU borders 
The UK Upper Tribunal recently took Ruiz Zambrano beyond the territory of the 
Member States- recognising in MA and SM
115
 that there is no reason to restrict judicial 
recognition of the rights of Union citizens to when they are residing within the EU.  
The Upper Tribunal considered the two cases together, but despite both involving 
British children residing in a third country with a TCN parent at the time of the 
application of entry clearance for the TCN parent, there were important distinctions 
between them, and the bases of the rights of residence of the respective spouses of the 
British citizens ended up wholly different.  MA, the first appellant, was a Turkish 
national, married to a man from Iran who naturalised as a British citizen after being 
granted indefinite leave to remain within the UK following a successful asylum claim.  
The couple had a British citizen son who lived with his mother in Turkey, despite a 
brief period living with his father, which proved too difficult due to the father’s post-
traumatic stress disorder, so the son returned to Turkey where his mother could 
provide better care.  
SM, the second appellant, is the Thai wife of an unemployed British national.  The 
couple have two British children, the oldest attends Primary School and resides in the 
UK with his father, and the younger resides with his mother in Thailand.  The Entry 
Clearance Officer (ECO) was not satisfied the family could maintain itself without 
recourse to public funds (the husband was in receipt of child tax credit, jobseeker’s 
allowance and child benefit), so refused entry clearance.
116
  The ECO considered 
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Article 8 ECHR, and concluded that the sponsor could maintain a relationship with his 
family abroad through visits to Thailand, and wrote “you have failed to provide a 
satisfactory explanation as to why your sponsor cannot reside with you and your child 
in Thailand.”117  The husband claimed he would be able to obtain work if his wife were 
in the UK, due to her being able to take over household duties and take the children to 
school, giving him increased hours in which to work. This was essentially an argument 
similar to Carpenter, as discussed in Chapter Four, where a husband’s exercise of his 
right to provide services under Article 56 TFEU would have been interfered with had 
his wife not been granted a right of residence.  The CJEU has yet to extend Carpenter 
in relation to Article 20 TFEU, and the Entry Clearance Manager reviewing the case 
found that the sponsor had made no efforts to obtain work, and many lone parents 
manage to work and care for their children.
118
    
The Upper Tribunal considered the law relating to Union citizenship in relation to both 
appeals, adopting Hickinbottom J’s six point summary of the law in Sanneh: 1) all 
Member State nationals are Union citizens, and these have the right to enjoy the 
substance of the rights that attach to the status of Union citizens; 2) Union citizens 
must have the freedom to enjoy the right to reside in the EU, genuinely and in practice. 
For minors, that freedom may be dependent upon leave of an ascendant relative to stay 
within the EU.  However, the rights of a Union citizen child will not be infringed if he 
is not compelled to leave – so when there is another ascendant relative who can care 
for the child; 3) national courts must determine as a question of fact whether a Union 
citizen is compelled to leave the EU following a TCN relative upon whom they are 
dependent; 4) nothing less than compulsion engages Articles 20-21 TFEU.  A 
diminishment in standard or quality of life does not necessarily engage EU law, unless 
there is compulsion to leave the EU; 5) the CFREU only applies when Member States 
are implementing EU law, otherwise Article 8 ECHR considerations apply in relation 
to national law; 6) ‘exceptional’ means the Ruiz Zambrano principle will not be 
regularly engaged.
119
 
Following its earlier decision in Campbell,
120
 the Upper Tribunal considered that Ruiz 
Zambrano principles can have relevance to entry clearance cases, as refusals to 
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recognise entry rights can lead to the denial of the genuine enjoyment of the substance 
of the rights conferred by the status of a Union citizen.  Building on this, the Upper 
Tribunal found no reason in “EU law terms” why Ruiz Zambrano could not be relied 
upon by a parent or primary carer “of a minor EU national living outside the EU as 
long as it is the intention of the parent, or primary carer, to accompany the EU national 
child to his/her country of nationality”.121  The appellants had agreed that the 
Immigration (EEA) Regulations implementing Directive 2004/38 were not applicable 
to their cases.
122
  
Determining the first appeal, the Upper Tribunal found that the father of the British 
national did not have the capability to look after the Union citizen child, there was no 
evidence of other relatives within the UK, and that “it is no answer to the appellant’s 
claim under the Ruiz Zambrano principles that AP could exercise his right of residence 
in the EU by being adopted or otherwise placed in the care of Social Services”.123  The 
tribunal found that a refusal to admit the appellant mother to the UK would deprive her 
British son of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of his rights associated with his 
status as an EU citizen, so, on the exceptional facts of the case “denying the appellant 
in the first appeal a right of entry and residence to the United Kingdom would lead to a 
breach of Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”124  The 
Upper Tribunal followed this finding with a brief outline of the reasons for which 
Article 8 ECHR would have been engaged leading to a finding of non proportionate 
interference, had the Ruiz Zambrano principle not applied.
125
 
In determining the second appeal, the Upper Tribunal did not find that the Ruiz 
Zambrano principle applied: the appellant’s husband was residing in the UK and 
caring for the elder child, so the younger child could join him without difficulty, there 
being no suggestion the sponsor was incapable of looking after two children.  This 
means that, while living without their mother in the UK could make life difficult for 
the sponsor and the children, refusing to admit her would not deprive the children of 
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the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their rights as Union citizens.
126
  The facts 
of the second appeal were not exceptional enough to make Ruiz Zambrano applicable.   
However, the Upper Tribunal continued with Article 8 ECHR analysis, finding the 
ECO’s decision was an action concerning children undertaken by an administrative 
authority, so that Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child came into 
play.
127
  The tribunal began with the assumption that the best interests of a child are 
usually best served by being with both parents, and that family life existed in the case, 
and the decision entailed consequences “of such gravity so as to engage Article 8.”128  
Proportionality assessments including economic considerations and the likelihood of a 
permanent breakdown in physical relationship between the appellant and her children 
if entry clearance were refused were considered.  The Upper Tribunal summarised this 
with “The position is a plain one. If the scales tip in favour of the ECO, it will have the 
effect of separating a mother from her two children one of whom for which she has 
been the principal carer and the other who has suffered as the result of their 
separation.”129  The Upper Tribunal found that there was a compelling need for the 
family to be reunited in the best interests of the children, and the “harm that would 
flow from their continued split is sufficient to tip the scales in favour of the appellant 
coming to the UK due weight having been given to the competing economic factor of 
limiting the demands made on the public purse.”130  In this way, the second appellants 
also escaped the application of the UK’s Immigration Rules. 
MA and SM highlights the difficulty of reliance upon Ruiz Zambrano principles: just as 
there was no application of the Ruiz Zambrano principle in McCarthy, a TCN spouse 
cannot expect to rely upon the principle to join an able sponsor within the UK, even if 
there are children involved, as in the case of the second appellant.  In the case of the 
first appellant, the situation was more exceptional, as the naturalised British citizen 
was unable to provide care for his son.  Had the father been born a British citizen and 
hence been more likely to have had family to support him and to help provide for the 
children, the principle may not have applied, as the wider family could have helped 
adequately to ensure that the child’s rights as a Union citizen were respected.  This is 
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not to say that the principle only applies to naturalised Union citizen parents, or TCN 
parents (as in Ruiz Zambrano itself), but meeting the exceptionality criteria is arguably 
more difficult for parents with no disability born with the nationality of the Member 
State and brought up there, as the case of the second appellant shows. 
The Upper Tribunal’s willingness to explore the potential of Article 8 in this case is 
something which the CJEU refrained from doing in Ruiz Zambrano, despite the 
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston considering fundamental rights in detail.
131
  It 
is a shame that Ruiz Zambrano failed to fully engage with the fundamental rights 
aspects of the case- the CJEU missed the opportunity to develop a coherent link 
between Union citizenship rights and fundamental rights to family life.  Reliance upon 
Union citizenship almost seems like the reasoning was to avoid reliance upon 
fundamental rights, and thus the enraging of Member States and their national courts 
due to bypassing their immigration rules, but the effect is still to bypass national 
immigration rules, despite the limited scope for application.  As Costelloe wrote, 
Union citizenship transcends economic purposes- “Some citizenship rights seem to be 
more akin to fundamental (i.e. human) rights, rather than economic freedoms”,132 
which is why the CJEU has been unwilling to go boldly into unchartered territory: it 
has neither the competence nor the taste for national immigration control, save in the 
most exceptional circumstances.  That is despite the interpretation and development of 
EU doctrines taking on expansive approaches and unpredictable growth. 
d. Union citizens in Member States other than their own 
While the Upper Tribunal has extended the application of the Ruiz Zambrano principle 
to allow TCN residents to enter the UK so as to ensure the fundamental rights of Union 
citizen children (UK nationals) are respected, it is still a doctrine restricted to one 
Member State.  No Union citizen from a Member State other than the UK can 
successfully claim that a TCN carer, spouse or parent not being able to reside with 
them within the UK would force them to leave the territory of the EU as a whole, as 
the option would remain for them to return to the Union citizen’s home Member State, 
which is in line with the Alopka decision of the CJEU.
133
  If a Union citizen had to 
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leave the UK to return to their home state, but needed a TCN carer to reside with them 
so as to enable the residence, it is against the home state which a Ruiz Zambrano claim 
must be made, not against the initial state of residence.  The exceptionality of Ruiz 
Zambrano in relation to other sources of residence under EU law is notable, and befits 
a doctrine whose application is only to be in the most exceptional circumstances. 
4. Conclusions 
Ruiz Zambrano establishes a Union citizen’s right of residence within the territory of 
the EU, and thus in their own Member State.  The degree of interference with the 
substance of a Union citizen’s rights, and whether these rights extend beyond the right 
to be within the EU, are some of the many questions left unanswered.  While the Court 
has not only not extended the principle in the cases which followed Ruiz Zambrano, 
but instead restricted it, so that thus far it has only successfully been relied upon in 
relation to the Union citizenship rights of children, there may well be cases where adult 
Union citizens’ rights are sufficiently endangered so as to justify a relative of theirs 
should remain with them within the EU. 
Ruiz Zambrano has the potential to bypass national immigration rules, and has done so 
successfully for TCN family members of UK children.  The impact of Union 
citizenship in relation to family residence is thus immense: the unique rights based 
upon Article 20 TFEU have, however, mostly been linked in consideration before the 
UK courts with fundamental rights questions.  While the application of Ruiz Zambrano 
remains exceptional and has not been extended - other than territorially - the 
consideration of the two potential sources of rights to help families remain together 
seems to make sense in practice.  The CJEU seems likely to face cases trying to extend 
its scope beyond the fairly restrictive application we have seen so far,
134
 though these 
are unlikely to be easy to predict.  The exceptionality criterion within Ruiz Zambrano 
is far removed from Article 8 ECHR considerations, and the source of residence 
derived from Article 20 TFEU and Union citizenship will no doubt be further 
developed by the CJEU as Union citizenship increasingly grows in relevance and as 
the fundamental status of Member State nationals. 
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Guild et al. paraphrase the Rolling Stones in their consideration of Ruiz Zambrano: 
“EU citizens cannot always get what they want – but if they try real hard, national 
authorities must give them what they need.”135  Distinguishing between desirability 
and dependency in case law is definitely a useful approach, and one potentially linked 
quite closely to Strasbourg’s approach to successful Article 8 ECHR cases – where 
there is essentially no option for a family to live elsewhere.  This is discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter Six  
The Lisbon Treaty and Fundamental Rights:  
The Charter of Fundamental Rights and pledge of ECHR Accession 
When assessing the sources of rights to reside under EU law, in addition to rights of 
residence derived from free movement law, it is important to consider the right to 
family life derived from fundamental rights law.  In the UK courts, family 
reunification cases often require consideration of immigration law as well as human 
rights, as was apparent in Chapter Three and Five.  However, the CJEU has not shown 
that it can adopt such an approach to family rights easily.  This chapter explores the 
reasons for this, as the Court has otherwise been very active in developing fundamental 
rights protection within the EU.  The EU did not initially have its own fundamental 
rights legislation, and the Treaty of Lisbon brought important constitutional changes in 
this respect.
1
  The Treaty follows its predecessors' aims:
2
 to provide an area of 
freedom, security and justice, and ensure the free movement of persons.
3
  It 
strengthened fundamental rights protection within the EU, through both the formal 
recognition that the Charter of Fundamental Rights is of equal status to a Treaty,
 4
 and 
the promise of EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.
5
  It is 
currently difficult to estimate what the full impact the Treaty will have on fundamental 
rights protection and Union citizens will be, as the promised accession has yet to 
happen and the extent of the Charter’s protection is yet to be fully explored.   
This chapter will assess the scope for reliance upon fundamental rights provisions by 
exploring the constitutional status of those provisions.  Chapter Five introduced the 
CJEU’s reluctant approach to potential links between Union citizenship and 
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Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, 13-46, and 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), OJ C 83, 
30.3.2010, 47–403 
2
Koen Lenaerts, 'The contribution of the European Court of Justice to the area of freedom, security and 
justice' (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 255, 256 – the objective is somewhat 
recent, introduced with Maastricht , the Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C191/1, and Treaty of 
Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and related acts [1997] OJ C340/1, and enshrined with the Lisbon Treaty  
3
 Article 3(2) TEU 
4 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 83/02, 30.3.2010,  398-403; Article 6(1) 
TEU 
5
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols 
No. 11 and No. 14, (European Convention on Human Rights) Rome, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, signed on 4 
November 1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953, henceforth “ECHR”.  Article 6(2) TEU 
declares the EU will accede to the ECHR 
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fundamental rights to family life in case law, with focus upon Ruiz Zambrano.
6
  This 
chapter considers the extent to which the Lisbon Treaty is likely to be able to provide 
increased protection of fundamental rights for Union citizens in relation to family life.  
This chapter considers the Charter as representing a shift away from the originally 
economic focus of the EU; in recognising the emphasis on families and social rights in 
the Charter, the EU refined its impact on families.  While the EU lacks formal 
competence for family law, its regulation of families has increased since its inception, 
and the impact of fundamental rights upon family life is important to assess the rights 
accorded to Union citizens in relation to family reunification, which is why the status 
and scope of such rights need to be considered.  This Chapter takes a critical view of 
the approach of the CJEU to interpreting the scope of application of the Charter, and 
aims to show that the Court has not applied the activism for which it was so criticised 
in relation to developing a meaningful status for Union citizenship to determining 
when the Charter applies.   
While acknowledging there are sound reasons for the Court not to go beyond the scope 
of EU law, it is argued that in failing to link the Charter with the protection of the 
rights of Union citizens, and in failing to acknowledge that certain situations fall 
within the scope of the Charter’s application, the Court has deviated from its approach 
to finding a link to EU law as evidenced in Ruiz Zambrano, and has failed to include 
situations which could fall within the scope ratione materiae as coming within the 
Article 51 CFREU delimitation.  As such, the Court has failed to strengthen Union 
citizens’ rights to family life under EU law, or even to respect fundamental rights in 
situations which could be interpreted as falling within the scope of EU law if the 
approach taken to interpreting the Treaty based provisions extended to the Charter.
7
   
The first section of this chapter discusses the historical development of fundamental 
rights protection within the EU: from general principles to the introduction and 
changing legal status of the Charter, to the Lisbon commitment to EU accession to the 
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7
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ECHR, and creation of a ‘culture’ of human rights.8  This is done with a focus on the 
ability of citizens to rely upon fundamental rights in relation to EU law, and where 
fundamental rights standards actually come from, rather than the content of those 
rights in great detail.  In this respect, the strictly ‘legal story’ is not enough – the 
judicial dialogue between the ECtHR and CJEU extends far beyond their reading of 
the other’s decisions to regular meetings between members of the courts,9 and, as the 
EU does not contain homogenous states, individual Member States’ concerns and 
interests are important.   
Acknowledging the political environment in which the Court acts, this chapter’s 
second section assesses the approach of the CJEU in relation to the application of 
fundamental rights based upon the ECHR and the CFREU.  Particular attention is paid 
to the burgeoning case law on applicability of the Charter, as when the Charter applies 
is not wholly clear.  This chapter intends to show that the Charter is not being applied 
to cases where Union citizenship could be determinative of rights, particularly in 
relation to family residence rights, and that the Court has failed to link the Charter 
firmly to the rights of Union citizens.  The third section of this chapter considers the 
UK’s approach to the CJEU doctrine in relation to the Charter, so as to enable 
understanding of the role fundamental rights can play in relation to family 
reunification in practice and to consider whether the Charter has the potential to bring 
Union citizens any additional  rights of residence. The fourth section considers the 
impact of EU accession to the ECHR, and whether this will, as Polakiewicz 
considered, ‘square the circle’ of fundamental rights protection within the EU.10 
1. The EU and Fundamental Rights Protection 
In the original Community treaties, there were no provisions for human rights 
protection, which was neither a failure on the part of the Community nor an omission.  
The Community’s aims at its genesis were economic, and to ensure peace, rather than 
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to build a rights-based community.
11
  As Von Bogdandy stated, “The European legal 
order started as a functional legal order”12 – and functionality required a focus on the 
economies of Member States, rather than their protection of fundamental rights.  Case 
law focused on border controls and obvious obstacles to inter-state trade.
13
 
In the mid twentieth century states took steps towards cooperation in relation to human 
rights protection outside of the fledgling EU.  The preamble to the Council of Europe 
Statute of 1949
14
 affirmed the need for unity between European countries in order for 
them to make progress.  Alston and Weiler found that the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights and the ECHR which followed shortly after “enabled the work of building a 
European community to proceed without a separate human rights foundation.”15  
Though separate, Nicol noted that “from the outset, the issue of human rights was 
interweaved with the desire for broader European union.”16  For the purposes of this 
thesis, the complex interweaving between the rights which families invoke to remain 
together within a given Member State and fundamental rights law have to be borne in 
mind – Union citizenship is also a non-original feature of the EU, and it is not always 
simply rights to free movement or national immigration law upon which families may 
need to rely to live together: as Chapter 5 discussed – sometimes Union citizenship 
itself can suffice.  Awareness of complementary sources of rights, such as the 
fundamental right to family life, contained in Article 8 ECHR is thus essential. 
Article 8 ECHR states that: 
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
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country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health of 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”17 
This Article does not give an absolute right, as is clear from the second paragraph, and 
what constitutes respect for family life has been interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights with different emphases over the years.
18
  For the purposes of this 
chapter, however, the importance is in the commitment by states to building human 
rights protection, rather than how this was interpreted by the Strasbourg court.  
Politicians and states committed to European unity sought greater uniformity in 
relation to the protection of fundamental rights- “[f]or them, the ECHR was but the 
‘first step on the road leading to a united Europe.’”19  Human rights agreements 
between states pre-dated the creation of the Community and remained external to it.  
This was criticised as paradoxical due to the Community’s defence of human rights20 - 
though human rights agreements were beyond the competence of the early European 
Community.  The linkage of fundamental rights and EU law was not a single decisive 
move taken by the Member States of the Union, but many steps taken by the CJEU and 
Member States and their representatives over a number of years. 
a. Case law developments within the EU 
According to Beitz, “The practice of human rights as it has developed so far can only 
be understood as a revisionist appurtenance of a world order of independent, territorial 
states”,21 revisionist in that human rights practice has, across the world, impacted upon 
the independence of states.  Though Beitz did not discuss the EU in particular, the 
influence of the Court of Justice in relation to human rights protection within its 
Member States can be seen as furthering the influence of human rights within Member 
States.  Long before the protection of fundamental rights became an integral part of 
Community law, the CJEU made inroads into providing human rights protection at a 
Community level with its decisions in Stauder
22
 and Internationale 
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Handelsgesellschaft.
23
 These cases were to underline the view of individuals as rights 
holders within the EU, which is no mean feat for an originally economic union. 
Maas noted the potential for excessive court activism to “energize opponents” such 
that “the result of litigation intended to produce social reform may be to strengthen the 
opponents of such change.”24  Perhaps predictably, the Court’s increased protection for 
rights at Community level faced opposition from the German and Italian constitutional 
courts,
25
 and the CJEU declared its “famous formula”26 in Nold II: 
“...fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, the 
observance of which [the Court] ensures.   
In safeguarding these rights, the [C]ourt is bound to draw inspiration from 
constitutional traditions common to the member states, and it cannot therefore 
uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognized 
and protected by the constitutions of those states. 
Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
member states have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply 
guidelines which should be followed within the framework of community 
law.”27 
This formula was intended to be a compromise and to appease the constitutional courts 
of the Member States through persuading them the principles by applied the Court 
originated from the Member States.
28
  It provided the Court with the legal tools to 
apply fundamental rights considerations to cases before it, and relied upon Member 
States’ constitutions to establish what the contents of these rights were.  The ECtHR 
has had no “official legal relationship” with the EU,29 though the EU has had to 
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consider its importance at various times, despite not being a signatory to the 
Convention.  Indeed, the CJEU did not only find general principles from the Member 
States’ constitutions: in Rutili,30 the Court explicitly recognised the ECHR as a source 
of general principles.
31
    
The CJEU re-emphasised in Wachauf that fundamental rights form “an integral part” 
of the law of the Community, and that international treaties (including the ECHR) can 
“supply guidelines to which regard should be had in the context of Community law.”32  
Booker Aquaculture followed the Wachauf approach that Member States had to apply 
fundamental rights protections flowing from EU law ‘as far as possible’ when 
implementing Union law.
33
  The ERT and Familiapress cases
34
 emphasised that the 
obligation was not simply when Member States implemented Union law, but when 
they acted within its scope – whether implementing EU law directly or not, and 
including national law derogation from EU law.
35
  The Familiapress case was between 
private parties, rather than against a Member State, so the horizontal potential of EU 
fundamental protection has long been relevant.  Spaventa discussed various horizontal 
situations and noted that the ever expanding scope of Treaty rights-provisions and the 
general principles doctrine “created a complex web of intersecting jurisdictions where 
domestic, Union and European Convention rights concur, as well as sometimes 
compete, with one another”.36   
The concept of ‘general principles of law’ was open to criticism for lack of certainty: 
the protection was never fully incorporated into a Treaty provision,
37
 and balancing 
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constitutional traditions, rights and outcomes gave the CJEU a broad discretion.
38
  
Furthermore, the CJEU could hardly argue that it was best placed to understand the 
constitutional traditions of each Member State.  While it may not have been judicial 
law-making as such, the fundamental rights general principles application was quite 
obviously judge-led law.
39
  As there was no Treaty basis for fundamental rights 
protection within the EU, Avbelj thought the void left the Court no option but “to 
literally invent human rights protection on the Community level by invoking the 
mentioned general principles of law formula...”40  As the Court developed its stance, 
the pressing need for human rights protection at EU level became more obvious.  
According to Alston and Weiler, judicial recourse was an “important, even 
foundational, dimension of an effective human rights regime.  But while it is 
necessary, it is not sufficient”.41  The theory was developed while lacking a legislative 
base, and thus also lacking legal certainty.  The application of general principles 
remains relevant in EU law, despite increased bases for guarantees.
42
  The 
development of this theory showed a level of CJEU activism and efforts to enhance 
fundamental rights protection which, it is suggested below, has not been continued 
since the Lisbon Treaty.
43
  
b. Searching for Legislative Guarantees: The Possibility for EU Accession to 
the ECHR 
The potential for EU accession to the ECHR was first proposed by the Commission in 
1979,
44
 but the commitment was made much more recently.
45
  The Court determined 
in Opinion 2/94 on EU accession to the ECHR
46
 that unilateral accession was not open 
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to the EU.  In finding that there was not competence under the Treaty to accede to the 
ECHR, and that accession would be “of constitutional significance and would 
therefore be such as to go beyond the scope of Article [352 TEU],”47 the Court 
highlighted that only Treaty amendment could bring about such a change.  A lack of 
unanimity between the Member States at the time meant that could be no such Treaty 
amendments.  The reason protecting fundamental rights within the EU was so 
important was to ensure that its institutions were subject to the same principles and 
constraints as Member States and that they did not breach individuals’ rights.48 
c. The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Opinion 2/94
49
 paved the way to the creation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
Following the Court’s negative answer, states considered alternative options for 
fundamental rights protection.  The German Presidency
50
 of the EU Council proposed 
a Charter for the Union in the Presidency Conclusions of 1999: “at the present stage of 
development of the European Union, the fundamental rights applicable at Union level 
should be consolidated in a Charter and thereby made more evident.”51  The incoming 
Presidency was set the task of drafting this,
52
 and the resulting Charter of Fundamental 
rights was solemnly proclaimed on 7 December 2000. 
The Charter of Fundamental rights is the newest EU mechanism for fundamental rights 
protection, and its impact was difficult to predict.
53
  As a published Charter, it was far 
easier to locate and understand than the ‘general principles’ doctrine the CJEU 
developed over many years, and making rights more accessible was one purpose for 
creating the Charter.
54
  Different motivations were suggested as prompting the EU to 
adopt the Charter rather than to accede to the ECHR, such as to protect its autonomy or 
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to create a Bill of Rights for the EU.
55
  Whatever the motivations, the Charter provided 
a clearly demarcated outline of fundamental rights for the EU and gave a legislative 
basis for judicial determinations,
56
 though at the time it was proclaimed it lacked 
binding effect.  Despite giving a “written legal basis for the Community standard of 
protection of human rights”,57 the would-be status of its provisions was not known at 
the time of drafting: the Convention set the task of drawing up the Charter “was not 
given any instruction pertaining to its normative status. Its response was to try to 
formulate a Charter that could become legally binding by drafting the text as if it were 
to be incorporated in the treaties.”58   
Eicke regretted that the European Council did not go further at the time, and undertake 
to make the Charter stronger; the declaration “expressly [left] open the question of 
“whether and, if so, how the Charter should be integrated into the treaties”.”59  He 
considered that there were “already sufficient such solemn declarations (whether joint 
or unilateral) as to the importance of fundamental rights.”60  One of the difficulties at 
the time was that human rights law guarantees as developed by the CJEU were “equal 
if not more extensive than that provided for by most national constitutions”,61 and as 
the EU lacked competence to harmonise fundamental rights protection for the Member 
States, accusations of overstepping the boundaries or competence creep could emerge.  
Even without a binding status, the Charter represented a shift away from the economic 
focus of the EU; in recognising the emphasis on families and social rights in the 
Charter, the EU refined its impact on families.  As McGlynn emphasised, while the EU 
lacks formal competence for family law as such, its regulation of families has been 
growing since the 1960s.
62
  Fundamental rights in general are not the focus of this 
thesis, but their impact of the right to family life is important to assess the rights 
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accorded to Union citizens in relation to family reunification, which is why the status 
and scope of such rights need to be considered. 
Douglas-Scott noted that “EU institutional presidents were not even given the time to 
complete their speeches”63 when the Charter was proclaimed, underlining its lack of 
importance.  She also highlighted that “for its first six years, the CJEU refused to cite it 
as an authority in its judgements[sic], preferring instead to refer to the ECHR.”64  
While this could have meant that the Court felt that its pre-existing approach to 
respecting fundamental rights was adequate, it made clear that the EU still lacked a bill 
of rights, and that the Charter’s legal status was not sufficiently strong to ensure the 
protection of individuals’ rights.  In the UK, the Charter’s influence was downplayed, 
with Keith Vaz MP stating that he believed the Charter to be “no more binding than 
the Beano”.65  The Charter seemed unlikely to be a useful source of Union citizens’ 
rights.  This somewhat echoed the approach of the CJEU and the UK to the 
introduction of Union citizenship too – neither was quick to recognise the full potential 
of Union citizenship as a source of rights but this only gradually became apparent 
through developments in case law.   
The European Court of Human Rights actually referred to the Charter before the Court 
of Justice did,
66
 with the (now) General Court
67
 and Advocates General also quicker to 
the mark than the CJEU.
68
  While, as Timmermans argued, the Strasbourg Court and 
Court of Justice can strengthen each other’s case law and further legitimise the other’s 
efforts,
69
 this would not be the case where the legislation of one court’s jurisdiction is 
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only referred to the other court.  A level of mutual respect between the courts as shown 
in Bosphorus,
70
 where the ECtHR accepted the CJEU protection was equivalent to the 
protection ensured under the ECHR, means that the courts do not attempt to control 
each other, though they undoubtedly can influence each other’s interpretations of 
fundamental rights.  The CJEU first referred to the Charter in Parliament v Council 
and Commission,
71
 where it emphasised that the Charter had no legally binding effect. 
d. Effect of Lisbon: Changing Status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Just as the developing idea of economically inactive individuals being rights-holders 
became more of a legal reality in the Maastricht Treaty with the introduction of Union 
citizenship, the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ legal status was changed by Treaty 
amendment.  The legal status of the Charter changed with the Lisbon Treaty: it gained 
equal Treaty status in Article 6(1) TEU.  The drafters were careful to limit the 
Charter’s scope in Article 51 CFREU to instances in which Member States were 
implementing EU law.  Groussot et al. suggested the reason for the restrictions in 
Article 51 being, in simplistic terms, a result of the influence of “national 
representatives from influential countries such as the United Kingdom [being] 
concerned that the European Court of Justice might be tempted to emulate the US 
Supreme Court.”72  Additionally, Article 51(2) CFREU stated that the Charter did not 
extend the scope of EU law in any way, or establish new powers.  The change in legal 
status thus did not seem likely to herald much change in the implementation of rights 
protection.  Nonetheless, Lenaerts and Gutierrez-Fons identified three main functions 
for the Charter as primary law.  These were: to serve as an aid to interpretation; to be 
relied upon as providing rounds for judicial review, and to continue to operate as a 
source for ‘the discovery’ of general principles of EU law.73   
As mentioned above, the CJEU was not the first court to refer to the Charter, but it has 
made reference to it since the Lisbon change in status.  De Búrca assessed the CJEU’s 
engagement with the Charter since 2009, examining the number of references to it in 
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decisions, and engagement with arguments based on its provisions.
74
  She found that 
the Court’s role in human rights adjudication, however, is not limited to the increased 
protection for the Charter, but also as “a consequence of the continued scope of EU 
law and policy.”75  The evolution of the Court of Justice from the court presiding over 
mostly economic matters, the ‘ever closer union’ aimed for in Treaties has expanded 
its jurisdiction to matters far beyond its original scope.  What the Charter adds to EU 
general principles protection is discussed below. 
2. Scope of Application 
The scope of application of the Charter is limited to when Member States or their 
institutions are implementing EU law
76
 – it does not have universal scope.77  This is 
where the Court’s interpretation of what falls within the field of EU law has particular 
resonance, and where, it is argued, it has failed to approach cases before it in a manner 
consistent with finding a link to EU law as in Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano, or even 
Carpenter
78
, and where it has so far missed the important opportunity to take the 
symbolically important step of tying Union citizenship and fundamental rights 
protection together within EU law.   The phraseology of Article 51 CFREU suggests 
that there has been an intentional divergence from the approach taken in ERT and 
Familiapress,
79
 where fundamental rights obligations under EU law had to be applied 
simply within its scope, whether Member States were implementing EU law or not. 
Despite its limited scope, the Charter does have universal application within its scope - 
it is not simply for Union citizens, or Union citizens and their family members - it is 
applicable to every person regardless of their nationality, when Member States act to 
implement EU law.  The CJEU has not attempted to extend the scope of 
implementation of EU law in order to make the Charter applicable, as the Fransson
80
 
and Melloni
81
 cases demonstrate.  Sarmiento said that these decisions indicated “that 
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the Charter has been the source of very significant changes in EU law”,82 and this can 
be seen in the effect of the Charter upon the CJEU and constitutional courts’ decisions.  
However, its being determinative or even applicable to the outcomes of cases is rare, 
which is significant.  Fransson and Melloni are in the minority of references asking 
about the Charter’s applicability in that the Charter was applicable on their facts.  
Fransson concerned tax evasion, and the question whether the criminal case against 
Mr Åkerberg Fransson had to be dismissed as he had already been prosecuted for 
providing false information in his tax returns and should not be punished twice as this 
would infringe Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR and Article 50 of the Charter.   
The CJEU determined that tax penalties came within the scope of EU law.  The 
required link was that the proceedings related to Mr Åkerberg Fransson’s obligations 
to declare VAT, and Member States are obliged under Article 325 TFEU to counter 
illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the European Union.
83
  The Court 
recognised that the national legislation on tax penalties and criminal proceedings had 
not been adopted to implement EU law, but found that its application was “designed to 
penalise an infringement… and is therefore intended to implement the obligation 
imposed on the Member States…”84 Conversely, Advocate General Cruz Villalón had 
found that the matter was not within the scope of EU law, and outlined in detail the 
reasons for which matters do and should fall within its scope.
85
  Van Bockel and 
Wattel suggest that the Court’s finding that Fransson falls within the scope of the 
Charter “does not follow unambiguously from its earlier case law on the scope of 
application of general principles of EU law, and appears to give the Charter a wider 
scope of application.”86  The link between Union law and domestic activity has been 
viewed as ‘tenuous’,87 but in adopting a broad approach the CJEU ensures that the 
rights of Union citizens are respected under the Charter as far as possible. 
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In most references concerning the Charter, the CJEU has not found that the matter fell 
within the scope of EU law.  In Romeo,
88
 the Court found it did not have jurisdiction to 
assess the purely internal situation identified: the case concerned a decision to reduce 
Ms Romeo’s pension entitlement and to recover earlier amounts paid.  Ms Romeo 
brought an action to annul the decision before the Sicilian Corte dei conti, alleging 
failure to state reasons for the measure “since it was not possible, inter alia, to ascertain 
the matters of fact and law justifying the reduction in her pension and the recovery of 
the sums overpaid.”89  The potential link to EU law was the interpretative obligation 
placed upon the Italian authorities to apply the principles of EU law laid down in 
Article 296 TFEU and Article 41(2)(c) CFREU when applying domestic law.   
The CJEU recognised that it was ‘clearly in the European Union’s interests’ that 
concepts taken from EU law should be interpreted in a uniform manner,
90
 but did not 
find that the EU law would have been ‘directly and unconditionally applicable’ so as to 
create uniformity in relation to purely internal situations, so that there was no “clear 
European Union interest in a uniform interpretation of provisions or concepts taken 
from European Union law, irrespective of the circumstances in which those provisions 
or concepts are to apply.”91  The Charter thus was irrelevant to the Italian authorities’ 
approach to Ms Romeo’s pension rights and the CJEU found it did not have 
jurisdiction.  Equally, in Vinkov
92
 there was no application of the Charter in relation to 
financial penalties or points in relation to traffic offences as Bulgaria was not 
implementing EU law in relation to the penalties.
93
   
In the Siragusa
94
 decision, the Court was similarly reluctant to find the Charter 
applicable to an environmental matter: Mr Siragusa had made alterations to his 
property within a conservation area without the appropriate permission, for which he 
applied after completing the work.  Article 167 of Legislative Decree No 42/04 lists 
the consequences of non-compliance with the obligations under Legislative Decree No 
42/04, the Italian Code of Cultural Heritage and the Landscape. Article 167(4) thereof 
states that the competent administrative authority is to assess the compatibility of the 
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work in question with the landscape conservation rules where work carried out without 
landscape compatibility clearance has resulted in an increase to the floor space, as was 
the case with Mr Siragusa’s work.  The Legislative Decree presumed that work which 
increased the floor space was unacceptable.
95
 
The Soprintendenza adopted an order requiring the site to be returned to its former 
state as the work Mr Siragusa had undertaken was ineligible for permission as it was 
not compatible with the applicable conservation rules.
96
  Mr Siragusa contested the 
decision, and the Court referred to the CJEU on the applicability of EU law to the 
landscape protection provisions:
97
  
‘Do Article 17 of the Charter … and the principle of proportionality, as a 
general principle of [EU] law, preclude the application of a provision of 
national law such as Article 167(4)(a) of Legislative Decree No [42/04], under 
which a landscape compatibility clearance (autorizzazione paesaggistica) may 
not be issued by way of retrospective regularisation in any cases where human 
activity has resulted in an increase in floor area and volume, regardless of 
whether a specific appraisal has been undertaken as to whether the activity in 
question is compatible with the features of the landscape of the particular site 
which merit protection?’98 
The Court found that there was not sufficient link to EU law to allow the Charter to be 
invoked: despite Mr Siragusa’s reference to various EU texts, the court did not find the 
matter fell within the scope of EU law: “there is nothing to suggest that the provisions 
of Legislative Decree No 42/04 which are relevant to the case before the referring 
court fall within the scope of EU law. Those provisions do not implement rules of EU 
law...”99  The Court’s decision was that the EU aims to protect fundamental rights 
within the scope of EU law; that the reason this is pursued is to avoid varying levels of 
protection at domestic and EU level so as to undermine the unity or effectiveness of 
EU law, and that the situation involving Mr Siragusa’s land did not establish 
jurisdiction for the CJEU.
100
  The Court thus referred to the scope of EU law as well as 
the implementing requirement, potentially leaving future cases to determine which is 
to be the requirement for application. 
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Determining when a matter falls within the scope of EU law/implementation in 
borderline situations is complex, and the CJEU has perhaps not given sufficient 
reasoning for its decisions to be applied by national courts with ease.
101
  It remains to 
be seen, for instance, whether the VAT–link with EU law is especially generous: 
Fransson recognised that the legislation in question was not implementing EU law, but 
the Charter applied, while the Court found that provisions in Siragusa were not 
implementing EU law but sharing its aims fell outside the jurisdiction.  The Siragusa 
decision was in line with the text of Article 51 CFREU and Article 6 TEU, but 
emphasises the disconnect between Union citizens’ actions within their home Member 
States and protection under the Charter.   As yet, the CJEU has not applied Charter 
rights in cases turning on points of ‘Union citizenship’ law: simply being a Union 
citizen residing in your home state is not enough – the court has not found this is a link 
to Union law.   
In Dereci,
102
 it firmly emphasised that the Charter was only applicable when Member 
States were implementing EU law,
103
 and left the examining refusals in light of 
fundamental rights law to the referring court, under the Charter if the referring Court 
found the situation was covered by EU law, or under the ECHR if it did not find the 
matter was covered by EU law.
104
  The CJEU thus did not oblige the Member States to 
undertake any analysis of the situation other than that which they were obliged to 
undertake in national law, as all Member States are parties to the ECHR.  This is 
hardly the active approach to ensuring individuals freedoms which Snell identified in 
the Court’s approach to free movement case law,105 and shows an unwillingness to link 
the fundamental Charter rights to Union citizenship independently of any obvious 
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‘movement’ factor, which would in turn mean a Member State was implementing EU 
law in relation to the individual.
106
 
While Union citizenship ‘links’ to EU Treaties have been found and have been relied 
upon by individuals in cases without other connecting factors
107
 – with one major step 
being taken in Carpenter,
108
 and recognition of ‘fundamental’ Union citizenship rights 
in Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano
109
 – the scope of these fundamental rights of Union 
citizens do not include fundamental rights as defined in the Charter, though Article 45 
CFREU does echo the Treaty rights of freedom of movement and of residence of 
Union citizens which are key to the decisions.  Currently, “It is only under the very 
exceptional circumstances that an EU citizen is deprived of the substance of his 
citizenship rights by being, in fact, forced to leave the EU territory altogether (Ruiz 
Zambrano) that no prior connection to EU law is required.”110  The CJEU has not laid 
down simple tests for national courts to follow to determine when Member States are 
acting to implement EU law, and Besselink’s description of a “concoction of 
formulations”111 still applies.  
The requirement within Article 51 CFREU of Member States ‘implementing’ EU law 
potentially removes the Union citizen from the CFREU equation somewhat: in Ruiz 
Zambrano, the Court did not find that Belgium was implementing EU law in the 
finding that the matter fell within the scope of EU law.  There was no suggestion that 
Belgium was implementing Article 20 TFEU rights in relation to the Union citizen 
children when assessing their parents’ rights of residence.  ‘Implementing’ may prove 
to be a different test, and one which is at a greater distance from Union citizens at the 
periphery of EU law.  The Court’s reluctance to find a ‘Union citizenship’ link to EU 
law in residence cases is notable: without such a link the Charter does not apply, and 
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the issue of compatibility with fundamental rights would lie under the ECHR and/or 
national law.  However, in Ruiz Zambrano, the sole case where Union citizens’ 
residence has been successfully based upon a ‘Union citizenship’ link to EU law, there 
was no mention of the Charter.
112
  The Court’s reluctance to tie fundamental rights and 
Union citizenship together was discussed in Chapter Five, but for the purposes of this 
chapter, while Article 20 TFEU provided an adequate link or ‘trigger’ for Union law 
for the Ruiz Zambrano family to base residence rights upon, it seems that the Court is 
more willing to find an economic link to Union law as a trigger for Charter protection, 
than a social or family link.  However, as Thym said, “Citizenship and fundamental 
rights cannot be held apart permanently”,113 and it seems possible (if not inevitable) 
that the CJEU’s approach to VAT triggers of EU law could extend to free movement 
of persons in the future.  This would certainly add to the concept of Union citizenship, 
if not in substance, as rights would typically by protected at national level, certainly 
symbolically. 
Nonetheless, the CJEU emphasised that where “a legal situation does not come within 
the scope of European Union law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and 
any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for 
such jurisdiction”.114  Van Bockel and Wattel distinguished between different 
categories of situations to which the Charter may be applicable: those in which 
Member States act as agents of EU law and those in which Member States derogate 
from EU law in free movement cases, with the former category dividing further into 
“case law on directives that require implementing legislation, and case law on 
regulations that are directly applicable”.115  None of this is necessarily helpful for 
Union citizens hoping to rely upon rights to be joined by family members in reliance 
upon EU law without an obvious cross-border link.  Unless a Union citizen can bring 
themselves within one of these categories, their rights of family reunification will not 
include any claims to rights of family life under the Charter. 
a. Interpretation of Charter Rights 
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Article 52(3) of the Charter specifies that “In so far as this Charter contains rights 
which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the 
same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent 
Union law providing more extensive protection.”   In relation to family rights, Article 
7 CFREU is virtually identical to Article 8(1) ECHR,
116
 and in McB, the Court 
emphasised that the meaning and scope of Article 7 CFREU must match Article 8(1) 
ECHR and its interpretation by the ECtHR.
117
  As Timmermans highlighted, the 
Charter is a much newer codification of fundamental rights,
118
 and the CJEU could 
interpret the rights it intends to protect in a more expansive manner: Charter rights 
may well exceed the base level of protection afforded by the Strasbourg Court under 
and in terms of the ECHR.
119
  DEB confirmed that provisions of the Charter with 
parallel rights already set out in the ECHR may be relied upon to give at least as good 
as, and in principle greater, protection than that currently afforded to the ECHR rights 
under Strasbourg jurisprudence  
Similarly, once the Court in Fransson decided that the issue fell within the scope of 
EU law, the CJEU reiterated that the standards to be applied in the Charter 
corresponded to those of the ECHR, but emphasised that the ECHR was still separate 
from the EU:  
“[the ECHR] does not constitute, as long as the European Union has not 
acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated into 
European Union law. Consequently, European Union law does not govern the 
relations between the ECHR and the legal systems of the Member States, nor 
does it determine the conclusions to be drawn by a national court in the event 
of conflict between the rights guaranteed by that convention and a rule of 
national law.”120   
The case thus emphasised the different, and competing, sources of fundamental rights 
protections which ensure individuals’ fundamental rights are protected within the EU.  
The phraseology of some Articles of the Charter is different from the corresponding 
rights in the ECHR, and this may well allow for different interpretations, despite the 
aim that rights should be interpreted in conformity.  The ECHR must now be seen as a 
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minimum standard, and further guarantees for individuals’ rights must be 
advantageous for them.  As McGlynn suggested, the Charter drafters must have had 
reason to deviate from the ECHR rights, so the interpretations ought to be of the new 
text,
121
 with the old as a minimum standard to be maintained and built upon. 
However, Article 53 CFREU does not necessarily ensure the most generous standard 
of fundamental rights protection available applies within the scope of EU law; a ‘lower 
standards’ interpretation as was considered by Peers, who favoured a ‘higher 
standards’ approach and suggested the former could lead to a potential ‘breach of 
Member States’ ECHR obligations’.122  However, Article 53 CFREU states that 
nothing in the Charter shall restrict or adversely affect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as recognised in their respective fields of application by EU 
law/international law/Member State constitutions.
123
  Liisberg assumed that this 
provision was merely to reassure Member States that the Charter would not replace 
their national system of fundamental rights protection with an EU version.
124
   
Melloni required the CJEU to consider this point.
125
  The case was decided on the same 
day as Fransson, and concerned a European Arrest Warrant for Mr Melloni, who lived 
in Spain and had been sentenced to 10 years in prison in absentia in Italy for 
bankruptcy fraud.  Italian sentences given in absence cannot be appealed against, but 
the Spanish Constitutional Court had established that the availability of review of the 
judgment rendered in absentia was a condition of surrender in the case of serious 
offences.   Under the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision Article 4a(1),
126
 a 
different standard applied: as Mr Melloni had been represented in the hearings, his 
rights to a fair trial were not infringed under the European standard.   
In Melloni, the CJEU had to determine whether Spanish law was able to add a 
condition of appeal to the EAW criteria, or whether the lower standard of protection 
should apply.  The CJEU stated that “It is true that Article 53 of the Charter confirms 
that, where an EU legal act calls for national implementing measures, national 
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authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of 
fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as 
interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not 
thereby compromised.”127 While the uniformity of EU law is indeed important, it is 
striking that it cannot allow Member States to follow their own constitutional traditions 
in relation to when and what fundamental rights protections they require.  The Opinion 
of AG Bot
128
 reached the same conclusions as the Court, but de Boer criticised the 
Opinion for essentially conflating the application of Articles 51 and 53 CFREU-
129
 
which should not be correct.  The CJEU focussed on primacy rather than the clause 
‘their respective fields of application’ which in turn is problematic: enforcing the 
lowest standard of rights protection over higher standards goes against the Court’s 
general principles approach, though in relation to the EAW it makes practical sense.   
In relation to free movement law, the EU has permitted Member States to be more 
generous towards Union citizens – for example in relation to the possible derogation in 
respect of access to benefits in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 – these are 
restrictions which Member States may adopt, and the phraseology reflects this: “the 
host Member State shall not be obliged to confer entitlement…” rather than ‘the 
Member State must not confer entitlement’.  Obviously, this has the potential to lead to 
a lack of uniformity across the Member States if some choose not to derogate from the 
right to equal treatment, but the aims of the Directive – to facilitate the exercise of the 
right of free movement and residence
130
 are adhered to.  The difference in Article 53 
CFREU is the focus upon primacy: unity is a valued characteristic, and, particularly in 
relation to the EAW, one standard should logically be applied.    
The application of Melloni alongside the Treaty obligation under Article 4(2) TEU to 
respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties “as well as their national 
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional”131 will 
potentially be of interest in the developing application of the Charter’s standards of 
fundamental rights protection.  As the Court has not yet applied the Article 7 CFREU 
to family life to cases involving Union citizens, it is not appropriate for speculation on 
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their scope here.  However, the limitations in Article 53 CFREU potentially reduce the 
importance of a lack of reliance on the Charter by the CJEU in Ruiz Zambrano: had 
the Court determined a certain fundamental rights principle was applicable – such as 
the availability of another country in which the family could reside, i.e. any other 
Member State or a state outside of the EU, the potential rights of the family under the 
Charter may have been less than those recognised in reliance upon Article 20 TFEU, 
so the Charter may not have strengthened the family’s stance.  Obviously, this is 
speculation as the Court did not engage with the Charter and instead relied solely upon 
Article 20 TFEU, but future cases involving residence rights and the Charter will 
hopefully illuminate any potential for residence rights protection under the EU’s new 
fundamental rights legislation.  
b. Application of the Charter in the UK 
As this thesis is exploring the scope of the implementation of rights to family life in 
practice within the UK as well as being concerned with theoretical developments, it is 
appropriate to consider how the Charter is approached in the UK.  In Zagorski,
132
 the 
High Court recently considered the effect of the Charter within the UK.  The case 
involved an application for judicial review against the Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills brought by Texan death row inmates awaiting execution for the 
Secretary of State refusing to impose a control on the export of Sodium Thiopental 
from the UK to the USA.  The drug was the anaesthetic used prior to the lethal 
injections in the Texan executions.  Despite the High Court finding that the situation 
was one in which the UK was implementing EU law,
133
 the court did not find that the 
Charter conferred any rights upon the Claimants – it did not provide protection beyond 
those found in the ECHR, which were also not applicable.
134
  The High Court did not 
go beyond its interpretative obligations in relation to the Charter, and its approach in 
Zagorski was later echoed by the UK Supreme Court.
135
  
However, the Charter’s current legal status and effect within Member States is not 
widely appreciated within the UK - even amongst members of the UK judiciary - as 
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demonstrated in the recently decided High Court case of AB,
136
 where Mr Justice 
Mostyn expressed surprise that the Charter had been referred to by counsel:  
“When I read this in the skeleton argument on his behalf I was surprised, to say 
the least, as I was sure that the British government (along with the Polish 
government) had secured at the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty an opt-out 
from the incorporation of the Charter into EU law and thereby via operation of 
the European Communities Act 1972 directly into our domestic law.”137   
It is clear that the UK courts do not have a uniform understanding of the status of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, and its status and scope must be clarified in order to 
ensure the uniform application of the Charter’s protections.   
The legal effect of Protocol 30
138
 required clarification to promote consistency and 
develop understanding within the UK.  Though some hailed it as an ‘opt out’ clause, 
and, according to Mostyn, it being “absolutely clear that the contracting parties agreed 
that the Charter did not create one single further justiciable right in our domestic 
courts”,139 the Protocol is properly read as a clarification/repetition of Article 51(2) 
CFREU that the Charter is not to extend EU competences.  In Saeedi v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, Mr Justice Cranston held that, given the wording of 
the Polish and United Kingdom Protocol the Charter “cannot be directly relied on as 
against the United Kingdom, although it is an indirect influence as an aid to 
interpretation”.140  The approach taken by Cranston was not correct: and the Secretary 
of State did not seek to support the finding before the Court of Appeal. When the case 
was referred to the CJEU to become NS,
141
 the CJEU demonstrated the correct 
application of the protocol.   As Denman contended, though the Protocol was 
addressed to the UK and Poland, its contents are of general application – it does no 
more than set out some implications of the way the Charter will take effect.
142
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In NS,
143
 the CJEU made clear that Protocol 30 “explains Article 51 of the Charter 
with regard to the scope thereof and does not intend to exempt the Republic of Poland 
or the United Kingdom from the obligation to comply with the provisions of the 
Charter or to prevent a court of one of those Member States from ensuring compliance 
with those provisions.”144   The case also illustrated ‘challenges’ in the CJEU applying 
fundamental rights law to cases before it: Carrera, de Somer and Petkova highlight 
these as ensuring alignment with Strasbourg decisions to avoid overriding the 
Bosphorus doctrine, the issue of non-state third parties before the CJEU, and 
divergences in national rules across Member States.
145
  De Búrca considered that the 
combination of the binding force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in combination 
with the expanding scope of EU competences “heralds a growing role for the Court as 
a human rights tribunal”146 and this role is being recognised by the UK courts, though 
greater clarity in CJEU decisions and reasoning behind finding links to EU law would 
be of benefit.  CJEU case law requires adherence by national courts, and, other than 
misunderstanding the legal status of the Charter and Protocol 30, the approach of the 
UK courts has not been contrary to that of the CJEU.  The approach of the courts, 
however, is not the entire story in relation to the UK’s implementation of the EU’s 
increased fundamental rights protection: the UK executive is also an important actor 
and must be mentioned in relation to implementation. 
c. Approach of the UK government  
In October, the UK issued a ‘Review of the Balance of Competences in relation to 
Fundamental Rights Law’, calling for evidence with a January 2014 deadline.147  
When the results are published, it is to be hoped that the Review will lead to more 
widespread recognition that the UK has obligations under this Charter and that the 
Charter has effect only when the UK is implementing EU law, rather than as an all 
encompassing source of rights.  However, the government is mounting a challenge to 
the implementation of Charter rights within the UK.  This challenge is in the form of 
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an appeal against the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) decision in 
Benkharbouche,
148
 which was decided by Mr Justice Langstaff, President of the EAT.   
The appeals to the EAT considered whether a cook and member of domestic staff 
employed in the UK by foreign diplomatic missions could bring an employment claim 
for unfair dismissal against the foreign countries whose mission it was, despite being 
met by an assertion of State Immunity under the State Immunity Act 1978.
149
  Neither 
foreign state was an EU Member State, nor were the employees EU citizens.  The EAT 
regarded itself bound by the supremacy of EU law and the directly effective Charter 
rights to disapply the State Immunity Act, despite having no jurisdiction to do so under 
the Human Rights Act 1998.
150
 The Tribunal were not bound to apply human rights 
law against the effect of the State Immunity Act under domestic law, simply because 
Section 3(2)(b) of the HRA makes it clear that the Tribunal’s interpretation under that 
Act does not affect “the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
incompatible primary legislation”. 
The European Court of Human Rights had explored the inter-relationship of State 
Immunity and Article 6 ECHR in Fogarty v United Kingdom.
151
 In that case state 
immunity was considered by the Strasbourg Court to be a proportionate and therefore 
justifiable limitation on the Article 6 rights of the applicants concerned, so the EAT in 
Benkharbouche were not following ECtHR case law in the decision.  The Charter, 
rather than the ECHR, was the most useful source of rights for the appellants – its 
Article 47 recognising the same principle as Article 6 ECHR, which had no direct 
effect within the UK.  The Charter, however, creates directly effective rights when the 
UK acts within the scope of EU law.
152
  The situation was held to fall within that 
scope, and so the Charter was applicable.  The effect of the Charter was that the 
provisions of the State Immunity Act which would otherwise have rendered the 
employment law claims by the staff inadmissible were disapplied, as provisions of 
domestic law which conflict with general principles of EU law must be disapplied 
where the substantive rights in issue fall within the material scope of EU law: UK 
courts must disapply a provision of domestic law which stands in its way, regardless of 
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whether the dispute takes place between private persons. Langstaff ruled that the 
obligation is limited to the material scope of EU law, i.e. rights under statutory 
provisions which implement Directives or Regulations, rather than employment rights 
in general.
153
 
Given the ramifications of the Benkharbouche decision, both parties were given 
permission to appeal.  This case clearly demonstrates the potential of the Charter: it 
gave individuals rights which they did not have otherwise and meant that primary UK 
law can be disapplied in order to ensure compliance with the Charter.  The Charter’s 
strength in relation to domestic UK law is particularly apparent: as the ECHR is not 
directly effective within the UK,
154
 the Charter has filled a gap in human rights 
protection when situations fall within the scope of EU law.  Another notable omission 
in fundamental rights law development is the inconsistency of all Member States being 
signatories to the ECHR but this not being binding upon the EU.  This is the subject of 
the next section.  
4. Commitment to Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 
The Article 6(2) TEU pledge of accession to the ECHR is groundbreaking: the EU will 
be the first non-Member State to sign up to the ECHR.  However, the impact of 
accession is likely to be minimal, at least in the short term; given that the institutions 
of the EU are already subject to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, which, as 
Lasser highlighted,
155
 has been greatly influenced in its development by the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, accession is unlikely to make many immediate 
substantive changes to the law.  Former Advocate General Jacobs noted: 
“The ECJ has treated what is perhaps the most fundamental treaty in Europe, 
the European Convention on Human Rights, as if it were binding upon the 
Community, and has followed scrupulously the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, even though the European Union itself is not a party to the 
Convention.”156 
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This approach of the CJEU means that its interpretation of Convention rights should be 
largely unchanged by accession, save as to where a more generous approach is deemed 
appropriate under the Charter.   
Gragl discussed at length the influence of the ECtHR upon the development of EU 
fundamental rights protection, highlighting the key problem the EU faced: “neither 
court had the legal competence to protect human rights at EU level.”157  The CJEU and 
ECtHR have an overlapping scope ratione personae yet neither was able to dictate 
how fundamental rights law should be interpreted within the EU until the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights gained binding status with the Lisbon Treaty.  Accession further 
provides a solution to the key problem of lack of comp.  So far, the EU has not 
acceded to the ECHR, but has finalised an Agreement on EU Accession.
158
  
This Agreement’s compatibility with the Treaties is not certain: the European 
Commission requested that the CJEU give an opinion on compatibility.
159
  The 
Opinion is still in progress; when it is given, the CJEU will determine the Agreement’s 
compatibility under Article 218(11) TFEU, which states that if the CJEU does not find 
the agreement is compatible it may not enter into force without amendment or Treaty 
revision.  The Accession Agreement
160
 paves the way for the ECHR to have a new 
legal status in the EU:
161
 Gragl discussed how, following settled case law,
162
 
international agreements rank between primary and secondary EU law,
163
 thus, the 
Convention will be binding on the EU and its institutions both internally and 
externally, and will enjoy supremacy over the Member States’ legal orders.164 
Gragl suggested that, “as emphasized by the ECJ itself in its Opinion 2/94… a 
“constitutional” rank for the Convention would have been more appropriate than 
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simply labelling the Convention as a mere international agreement.”165  As Convention 
rights form EU general principles of law, and are already a substantial and integral part 
of EU law, accession to the Convention will not be like the EU signing up to a new 
international agreement which would require significant change and disruption.  As 
such, the level of legal recognition accorded to the Convention should not be of huge 
importance: the general principles theory relies upon the Charter for inspiration, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights refers to it, CJEU case law makes reference to it, and 
Member States are already signatories.  While it may not be on par with Primary EU 
legislation in a legal sense, in the constitutional reality of the EU and how all parties 
will approach it, the Convention is very much a Primary source of rights for the 
citizens of the EU.  
Nonetheless, the way the Charter and Convention will interact is open to interpretation.  
The Charter will be on a higher plane than the Convention,
166
 though the latter 
arguably forms the basis of the Charter and much of the general principles doctrine 
developed by the Court.  However, through accession, the EU will be able to be held to 
account by the Strasbourg court.  As such, the importance of the prior involvement 
mechanism
167
 is particularly great for the CJEU, as a method of ensuring that the Court 
remains the ultimate interpreter of EU law, and the Strasbourg court is not asked to 
adjudicate on EU law without Luxembourg having been referred to.  The CJEU would 
not wish to be excluded from adjudicating over questions of EU law, or to be forced to 
apply the Strasbourg approach without having been asked where questions turn on EU 
law.   
While Williams criticised the EU’s focus in relation to improving human rights being 
on structural and practical reform, rather than “re-evaluating its principled 
foundations”,168 in a sense the EU has created its own principles over many years and 
recognised those of Member States, so there is no need to start afresh: the rights it 
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advances are mature and fit for purpose.  The Charter does not match Convention 
rights word for word, and has updated them where appropriate.  Accession marks a 
structural change, but also a fundamental one: no more will the possibility for the 
anomalous case to occur where EU institutions can act incompatibly with fundamental 
rights principles while Member States are bound.  As the EU institutions are powerful 
and influence the lives of EU citizens and third-country nationals within the EU, this is 
certainly a positive step towards fundamental rights protection.  
The effect of Article 53 ECHR is very different from Article 53 CFREU; the former 
acts as a ‘safeguard for existing human rights’, ensuring that nothing in the Convention 
shall limit or derogate from human rights and fundamental freedoms otherwise 
protected.  This means that, outside the scope of the Charter, the ECHR ensures that it 
is always the minimum standard to be applied: it never sets a maximum or rigid level 
of protection which is deemed to be appropriate.  This reflects the differences in the 
scope of the Charter and Convention, and also that the EU is not a human rights 
organisation: it requires uniformity of its laws, thus ever increasing fundamental rights 
protection for individuals which may interfere with uniformity cannot be permitted.   
5. Conclusions 
The CJEU made inroads into providing human rights protection in case law long 
before legislative action was taken by the Community which provided the foundations 
for later developments.  The general principles theory developed by the Court still 
serves to inform decisions it takes and those of national courts: this is where the CJEU 
showed its activism in relation to fundamental rights.  The general principles theory 
strengthened the rights of Union citizens and their families, and, through the 
development of fundamental rights principles, the EU signified a move away from 
emphasising economic factors above all else – families became more than consumers 
and were able to be “recognised as persons in their own right and granted rights on 
their own terms.”169 
The promise of EU accession had a long gestation period, and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights pre-dates the accession pledge, adding an additional layer of 
protection for individuals when Member States are acting within the scope of EU law.  
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While the Charter aimed to make citizens’ rights more visible, its status was somewhat 
unclear initially: it was a ‘solemn political declaration’, and not incorporated in a 
Treaty, which Picard saw as vital to making rights more visible.
170
  With the Lisbon 
amendments, the Charter gained equal Treaty status, and thus the improved visibility 
of rights came with an additional enforceability: indeed, it fundamentally changed the 
“situation regarding protection” of human rights within the EU.171   
Determining when the Charter applies has been complex: in borderline situations, the 
Court has found links to EU law which the Advocate General giving the Opinion did 
not recognise,
172
 but failed to acknowledge where fundamental rights potential has 
been raised in other cases.
173
  The consistency which must be hoped for in the future is 
currently lacking.  The potential for developing sound links in ‘citizenship’ cases has 
not yet been realised: in relation to rights to family reunification, the Charter has added 
little as yet.  The CJEU has seemed unwilling to take the next (not-inevitable) step
174
 
to link the Charter of the EU with its people in their ‘fundamental status’ as citizens of 
the Union.  While the Charter has not been recognised as representing one of the 
‘fundamental rights’ of Union citizens with which there can be no interference,175 it 
does not seem impossible for the Court to rely upon Union citizenship as a link to EU 
law in certain circumstances, as in Martínez Sala,
176
 or Carpenter,
177
 and then consider 
the application of the Charter as an additional element relevant to Union citizens’ lives 
with their families.  This is the approach in UK courts, and Ruiz Zambrano would have 
been far simpler with fundamental rights considerations.    
Where the Charter has been applicable, it has not applied the highest standards of 
rights protection, so Ruiz Zambrano could have been significantly more generous than 
the CJEU would have been under the Charter.  The difficulty highlighted in the 
Melloni decision in relation to the level of protection to be applied means that, 
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potentially, concerns that the Charter may extend the scope of fundamental rights 
protection and constrain Member States is misplaced.
178
  Instead, it is seemingly the 
higher standards of protection which may be at risk, if a specified and certain EU level 
of rights protection is required to ensure uniformity of the EU law in question.   There 
have not been sufficient examples of reliance upon the Charter to establish whether 
this is likely to occur often: arguably, the right to fair trial arguments in relation to the 
European Arrest Warrant Framework were unique in that Member States could 
become safe havens for wanted criminals should they offer a higher standard of 
protection, as Spain would have done under its constitutional law.  In relation to rights 
to family reunification, such issues are unlikely to be relevant, families are unlikely to 
rush to Member States with slightly better protection of the fundamental right to 
family life: this would not make sense as the right depends on the background of the 
family and their ties to a given state. 
The Charter had something of an acrimonious beginning in the UK, being derided as 
without any effect
179
 or of any great importance.  Following Lisbon, however, the UK 
courts have taken varying approaches: some failed to note the Charter’s binding force 
or that Protocol 30 was not an ‘opt out’ protocol at all,180 while others recognised the 
potential of the Charter
181
 and some actually used it to great effect – to actually 
disapply national law in order to respect Charter rights.
182
  The High Court reference to 
the CJEU leading to the NS
183
 decision meant that the status of Protocol 30 has been 
considered by the Court, and now must be followed by domestic courts.  The impact of 
the Charter in the employment matter in Benkharbouche where domestic legislation 
was disapplied was opposed by the Secretary of State so has been appealed but the 
appeal has not yet been decided. 
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EU accession to the ECHR will further cement the principles which have been 
enshrined as general principles of law and also through the Charter.  As Former AG 
Jacobs said: “Informed opinion regards the Convention system as an unprecedentedly 
effective system for the collective enforcement of human rights in Europe, and indeed 
as a model for the world.”184  Jacobs’ argument is far stronger than Williams’ criticism 
of the lack of principled reform,
185
 and the CJEU has done a great deal to develop the 
idea of Union citizens as rights holding citizens, and to link fundamental rights 
protections with free movement rights.  The extent to which this has been achieved, or 
is achievable, in relation to Union citizens’ family members’ rights to reside still holds 
potential for the future.   
Currently, the Charter has not strengthened Union citizens’ rights to reside within the 
UK, or any other Member State.  Union citizens falling outside of the scope of 
Directive 2004/38 are more likely to be able to rely upon residence rights from the 
Treaty than the Charter.  This is for two reasons: showing that a Member State is 
implementing EU law when the Union citizen has not fallen within the scope of the 
Directive is difficult to show, in addition to the low minimum standard for Article 8 
ECHR protection as developed by the ECtHR.  Thus, while the CFREU is of symbolic 
importance for the EU, it has not been linked to protecting the family life or movement 
of its citizens, which is a missed opportunity. 
                                                     
184
 Francis G. Jacobs, The Sovereignty of Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 34 
185
 Andrew Williams, 'The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU and the UK: Confronting a 
Heresy' (2013) 24 European Journal of International Law 1157 
171 
 
Chapter Seven 
Union Citizenship and Residence Rights as Interpreted by the CJEU and applied 
within the UK 
The influence of the CJEU on the development of Union citizenship is huge: with 
Martìnez Sala,
1
 the Court made the status meaningful, and it later engaged with Union 
citizenship’s potential much more fully so as to make it a truly ‘fundamental status’ of 
Union citizens.
2
  Nowhere has this been more apparent than in Ruiz Zambrano,
3
 where 
there had been no cross-border movement or trigger of EU law, and the ‘genuine 
enjoyment’ of the fundamental rights of two young Union citizens sufficed to bring the 
residency of their parents within the scope of EU law.    
The status of Union citizenship is undeniably constitutionally important: it effected 
changes in the judicial approach to ascertaining the rights of individuals within the EU, 
and has reduced the need for a ‘market’ link, or economic activity within another 
Member State.  Spaventa observed that “free movement and Union citizenship rights 
are a vehicle to assert individual rights which do not necessarily have a clear 
connection with market integration”,4 and this is how Union citizens’ rights of 
residence have grown, in substance and in relevance.  Through the Court’s expansive 
approach to determining their rights, Union citizens have been able to rely upon EU 
rights of residence in their state of origin, and to enable family members to move with 
them.  This holds great potential for UK citizens, who face restrictive national laws for 
TCN family reunification where there is no link to EU law.  This short chapter 
emphasises the importance of two developments in relation to family reunification 
under EU law: the Court’s impact on the purely internal rule, and the introduction of 
EU fundamental rights legislation. 
1. The purely internal rule – time to move on?5 
The CJEU’s decisions have not been ‘neatly linear’,6  and this chapter outlines that the 
activism that was once applied in relation to forging the concept of Union citizenship 
                                                     
1
 Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-02691 
2
 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para 31; Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR 
I-7091, para 82; Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, para 43 
3
 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177 
4
 Eleanor Spaventa, Free movement of persons in the European Union: Barriers to Movement in their 
Constitutional Context (Kluwer Law International 2007) 
5
 Sub-title borrowed from Niamh Nic Shuibhne, 'Free movement of persons and the wholly internal rule: 
Time to move on?' (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 731 
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lives on, albeit in more nuanced ways than previously.  While Förster signified the end 
of the Court’s most expansive decisions, and perhaps its willingness and ability to help 
Union citizens as it pleased,
7
 the decision related to what may be termed an ‘ancillary’ 
right – that of access to maintenance grants - rather than a fundamental freedom under 
the Treaty.  Its continuing expansive approach in relation to ‘primary’ rights is 
evidenced in the return cases, which have growing significance and application within 
the UK.
8
  
Discussing Carpenter,
9
 Guild contended that only Mr Carpenter’s capacity as an 
“economic actor” could give him the result he wanted: the residency of his wife in the 
UK.
10
  At the time Carpenter was decided, she was correct.  Requiring an economic 
link to Treaty freedoms had an enduring hold,
11
 but the Court broke from its shackles 
and moved on from this economic link in O and B,
12
 a very recent decision which 
brought family life to the heart of Union citizenship law.  In this decision, the Court 
emphasised that the reason for which residence rights of TCNs may be derived from 
Article 21(1) TFEU was the fact that a refusal to allow such a right of residence would 
interfere with the Union citizen’s freedom of movement by discouraging him/her from 
exercising rights of entry into and residence within the host Member State.  The Court 
determined that this was capable of extension to family members of Union citizens 
who had resided in another Member State exercising rights under Article 21(1) 
TFEU,
13
 rather than simply to family members of workers or the self-employed.  The 
reason for this was that the obstacle to be removed – the genuine deterrence of a Union 
citizen exercising their rights to free movement - was the same, whichever Treaty 
freedom was exercised.   
                                                                                                                                                       
6
 Michael Dougan, ‘Judicial activism or constitutional interaction? Policymaking by the ECJ in the field 
of Union citizenship’ in Hans W. Micklitz and Bruno De Witte (eds), The European Court of Justice 
and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia, 2012) 112 
7
 Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] ECR I-08507 
8
 Case C-370/90 Surinder Singh [1992] ECR I-04265; Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] ECR I-10719; Case 
C-456/12 O v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en 
Asiel v B, Judgment of the Court, 12 March 2014, nyr; Case C-457/12 S v Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v G, Judgment of the Court, 12 
March 2014, nyr, para 34 
9
 Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-06279 
10
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11
 Niamh Nic Shuibhne, 'The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship' (2010) 47 Common Market Law 
Review 1597 
12
 O and B, n8 above, discussed in Maria Haag, ‘O and B – S and G: Third-Country National Family 
Members and Derived Residency Rights at Home’ on the Durham European Law Institute blog, 2014 at 
http://delilawblog.wordpress.com/2014/03/26/o-and-b-s-and-g-third-country-national-family-members-
and-derived-residency-rights-at-home/ last accessed 29 March 2014  
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This is hugely important in escaping the ‘Maastricht’ approach of market-focus: the 
CJEU respected the residence and movement of a family to another Member State, the 
(lack of) economic activity was irrelevant to the rights of the Union citizen.  This does 
not mean that Union citizens can go on holiday to another Member State then return 
with TCN family members able to reside in their state of origin; the Court emphasised 
that the Union citizen and TCN family member’s residence in the host Member State 
must have been ‘sufficiently genuine’ so as to count as family life, and gave the 
decision certainty by considering the provisions of residence under Directive 
2004/38.
14
  In doing so, it took up AG Sharpston’s call to provide clarification as to the 
circumstances in which rights of residence may be derived from Article 21(1) TFEU,
15
 
and made the decision relatively straightforward for Member States to understand.  
The Court observed that residence under Article 6(1) Directive 2004/38 (residence for 
up to three months) does not demonstrate an attempt to create or strengthen family life 
in the host Member State, so residence of family members following Article 6 
residence in another Member State would not have to be granted in the home Member 
State; Article 16 Directive 2004/38 permanent residence would demonstrate genuine 
residence and genuine family life if this had been with the family member, and 
residence under Article 7 may demonstrate genuine enjoyment of Article 21(1) TFEU 
rights too.   
The focus in O and B was to protect genuine family life which has been ‘created or 
strengthened’ within the host Member State and to prevent the refusal of residence 
rights for a family member restricting a Union citizen’s exercise of free movement 
rights.
16
  While the assessment in relation to genuine family life in the host Member 
State is left to the national court, the CJEU outlined clearly how this should be 
approached, and emphasised that residence within the host state to create or strengthen 
family life must have been as family members, following Directive 2004/38’s 
definition of family member.  This was to the detriment of Mr B, who married his 
                                                     
14
 Council Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004, on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
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Dutch wife after she had resided in the host state with him, so they had not been 
residing together as family members during the relevant time.   
This decision is a far cry from the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano,
17
 which was incredibly 
short and left clarification of most of its meaning to later decisions,
18
 so the Court is 
now, not only demonstrating that Union citizenship is capable of being the basis for 
rights of residence, but making clear when they apply.
19
  While Ruiz Zambrano 
represents, and is likely to continue to represent, the most fundamental reliance on 
Union citizenship possible under EU law, O and B, in addition to Surinder Singh and 
the other return cases,
20
 offers something more tangible to many Union citizens: a 
possibility to benefit from EU law in relation to the residence of their TCN family 
members at home.  This is why the CJEU can still be seen as showing ‘activism’ in 
relation to Treaty rights – it extends them beyond what would have been expected, 
beyond the Treaty text.  Thym suggests that the legal status of TCN family members 
“has become the new battleground,” or frontier, for the CJEU in its development of the 
concept of Union citizenship,
21
 and this can certainly be sensed in the UK. 
Even before O and B had been decided, the UK had restricted its rules in relation to 
return cases, introducing a ‘transfer of the centre of life’ test,22 demonstrating the 
reluctance with which the UK can accept that movement with a consequence of 
improving immigration status can be genuine under EU law.  Its approach in this 
respect is similar to its restrictive views in Chen and Metock,
23
 which received short 
shrift from the CJEU, which confirmed that there was no abuse of law in the 
acquisition of Union citizenship through legal paths, and if reverse discrimination 
resulted from the recognition of rights of TCN family members in Metock, that was no 
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fault of the EU.
24
  The UK is not alone in tightening its laws in order to reduce reliance 
of its nationals on EU rights: Germany, France and the Netherlands all have done so in 
some respects,
25
 as has Ireland: there can be no more Chen cases,
26
 since the ius soli 
principle no longer applies to acquisition of nationality.  Though Ruiz Zambrano has 
an obviously limited scope, there were suggestions that it may have led to a tightening 
of acquisition of nationality laws, too, to prevent circumstances where residence has to 
be granted to families based on the Union citizenship of children who would have been 
otherwise stateless.
27
  Sharpston referred to the development of ‘Fortress Europe’ as a 
“retrograde and reprehensible step– and one, moreover, that would be in clear 
contradiction to stated policy objectives.”28    
All of the Member States’ reactionary and restrictive rules ensure that reverse 
discrimination lives on,
29
 despite the Court’s engagement with the protection of Treaty 
rights meaning that, occasionally, UK nationals will be able to benefit from EU 
provisions within the UK.   
2. The EU and Protection of Human Rights 
The legislative incorporation
30
 of human rights into EU law, alongside the 
development of ‘citizenship’ rights, led Craig to suggest that Union citizenship 
developed, becoming, in addition to a status of Member State nationals, “a label to 
describe the rights accorded by the Charter, which are then regarded as belonging to 
the EU citizen.  The focus is no longer solely on fees, grants and so on, but on rights to 
family life and the like that are protected by the Charter and felt to be constitutive of 
                                                     
24
 Metock, n23 above, paras 75-77 
25
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the EU citizen.”31  The use of Union citizenship as a vehicle to make human rights law 
more relevant to free movement considerations is fitting: ‘traditional’ notions of 
citizenship link citizens with rights, and protection against abuses of these rights by the 
state,
32
 and Union citizenship, though not linked to a single state, has the potential to 
echo this.  
As yet, the fundamental rights changes brought in by the Lisbon Treaty,
33
 have not had 
their ‘citizenship’ moment: the Court has not linked protection of the rights of Union 
citizens categorically with the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
34
 nor 
has the Charter constituted some of the ‘substance of the rights’ of Union citizens, the 
breach of which enables a link to EU law where there was otherwise none.
35
  While, 
obviously, any individual capable of relying upon the Charter may be a Union citizen, 
the potential to link the two concepts together in case law has not been reached.  Using 
this as a criticism of the Court, however, neglects the fact that the CJEU almost 
singlehandedly brought to the EU such a high level of fundamental rights protection 
through its case law that the ‘increase’ of rights which the Charter represents should 
barely be noticeable.  The protection of fundamental rights prior to Lisbon was “almost 
entirely the product of case law”,36 and the lack of decisions relying upon the Charter 
since its introduction mean that its substantive addition to the body of human rights 
law in the EU is limited,
37
 and can even reduce the rights available under national 
law.
38
 
It is mostly for consistency and symbolism, then, that the linkage between the Charter 
and Union citizenship remains important: without such a link, the Court does not seem 
to want to unify two of its most central values: Union citizenship and fundamental 
rights remaining separate does not, from outside of the EU, seem to endow the 
‘citizenship’ of the Union with the rights which would be expected.  Union citizenship 
is entirely different from ‘normal’ national citizenship, and the Court’s development of 
the concept and of case law is not easily predicted.  The extension of ‘citizenship’ 
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rights to TCNs in Chakroun
39
 was not easy to anticipate, and is actually far more 
important than a symbolic linkage between Union citizenship and the Charter. 
In Chakroun, the Court’s reasoning followed that of Metock,40 and emphasised the 
importance of individual assessments of cases, rather than the application of strict 
criteria brought in by Member States.
41
  This type of assessment underscores the lack 
of appreciation for UK citizens’ families which the UK Immigration Rules currently 
enforces.  Where the CJEU applies proportionality in all it does, the UK Immigration 
Rules have already had this assessed by the Secretary of State, so the courts can do no 
more.
42
  Reverse discrimination is easily apparent in the UK Immigration Rules, and 
Mr Justice Blake recognised this, relying upon EU case law to demonstrate how 
wholly disproportionate the rules were,
43
  emphasising that the right of a Union citizen 
to reside in another Member State exercising Treaty rights ‘can rank no higher in terms 
of constitutional significance than the indefeasible right of the British national to reside 
in his or her own country’ and that either right is equally interfered with by preventing 
the admission of a spouse.
44
 
3. Conclusions 
Rights to family reunification within EU Member States are complex: in the UK the 
parallel systems for Union citizens and UK nationals or TCNs cannot be entirely 
separate, as Article 20 TFEU states that UK citizens are Union citizens.  Various links 
to EU law are discernible within the UK’s Immigration Rules: as a spillover effect, EU 
law impacts upon the judicial reasoning and approach to the UK Immigration Rules, 
and, while the UK did not implement the Family Reunification Directive,
45
 even 
Chakroun, a judgment based on its provisions in relation to TCN family reunification, 
has been relied upon in UK courts to demonstrate the disproportionate nature of the 
Immigration Rules. 
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It is not simply in the judicial approach to the Immigration Rules that an EU influence 
is discernible: as highlighted above, the UK has attempted to limit the Surinder Singh 
‘route’ to immigration, so this way by which EU rights are able to apply within a 
Union citizen’s state of origin is not only recognised by the UK, but feared, as 
something that can circumvent the restrictive provisions of the Immigration Rules, and 
also highlight to UK citizens that they are being (reverse) discriminated against within 
their home country.  Weatherill suggested that the “Court's technique of legal 
reasoning is not quite as remarkable as one might think”,46 but in relation to families 
with no other option to achieve family life together than to move to another Member 
State then later return to the UK, the Court’s approach is entirely remarkable, and links 
the genuine enjoyment of family life with that of exercising Treaty freedoms as a 
Union citizen. 
While few Union citizens will be able to rely upon Ruiz Zambrano,
47
 other EU rights 
of residence, such as those found in Surinder Singh,
48
 offer hope to many families 
within the UK:
49
 which is something the UK Immigration Rules cannot.  This shows 
the fundamental status and fundamental importance of Union citizenship, and that the 
Court which moulded it can still help the needy. 
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